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Thesis summary 
 
Aston University. 
Political Leadership: Character & Performance. A Comparative Analysis of British 
Political Leadership, 1997-2010.  
 
Amarjit Lahel. 
Doctor of Philosophy. 
2011.  
 
Classical and contemporary scholarship on leadership has referred to political 
performance and the ability of political actors to deploy the self to political purpose. 
Literature on contemporary British politics (Hennessy, 2001; Marquand, 2008, King, 
2009) has highlighted the qualitative shift in political leadership from the mid-1990s 
towards a focus upon the image, style, celebrity and performance of political leaders, 
and the shift towards the presidentialisation or semi-presidentialisation of the prime 
minister (Foley, 2001). However, the literature has lacked a focus upon political 
performance and a methodology for assessing leadership performance within cultural 
and institutional contexts. This thesis assesses British political leadership 
performance from 1997-2010 through the proposal of a framework of political 
performance to suit comparative purpose. The framework consisting of culture, 
institutions and performance is used to assess the performance of the case studies 
(Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and David Cameron, and Gordon Brown, David Cameron 
and Nick Clegg in the televised Leaders’ Debates of 2010). The application of the 
framework to the case studies will allow us to a) analyse political performance within 
given cultural and institutional contexts; b) establish the character traits and other 
aspects of a politician’s political persona; and c) appraise the role and effects of 
performance and persona upon the political process.  
 
 
Keywords: Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, David Cameron, Nick Clegg, Leaders’ 
Debates.  
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1a Overview of the thesis 
 
The personalisation of politics, including, the role of political celebrity and the 
expansion of the institution of the modern media are two significant developments 
within the British polity which have facilitated an “actor-centred” trend (Shaw, 2007). 
Consequentially, the mediation of political performance, personalisation, symbolic 
leadership politics, discourse, image, character, and the role of the political ‘persona’ 
have become central to understanding contemporary British political leadership. 
Culture and institutions are contexts which frame political action and provide scope 
for the personal as political phenomena. This research undertakes a comparative 
analysis of party leadership performance in the public realm from 1997-2010. The 
case studies used in this research are Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, David Cameron 
and Nick Clegg in the Leaders’ Debates. The research question addressed is:  
 
• Are cultural and institutional configurations significant and consequential for 
contemporary British party leadership performance? 
 
Three related sub-research questions are also addressed. How do political actors 
use the self to political purpose? What is the significance of political actors deploying 
their person and ‘persona’ to affect and structure political outcomes? What is the 
relationship between performance and mediation? 
 
Chapter 2, literature review focuses upon selected classic and contemporary 
leadership theories. The literature contributes towards a framework not of political 
leadership per se but of political performance. This is developed and used to analyse 
the leadership performances of the case studies. The framework is a contribution to 
political science methodologies used in analysing leadership performance.  
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The framework of political performance is presented in chapter 3. Culture, institutions 
and performance are the three constituent parts of the framework and are theorised 
and reviewed in sub-chapters 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3. 1  
 
In sub-chapter 3.1, two characteristics which constitute part of contemporary political 
culture and structure leadership performance are reviewed and theorised: the 
development of personalisation of politics including celebrity, and shifts in Left/Right 
political ideology. Political leadership performance in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s is 
referred to in order to understand the relationship between political culture and 
leadership. The gradual breakdown of the post-war consensus provided a cultural 
context in which the strong and uncompromising leadership style of Margaret 
Thatcher gained political expression. Thatcher demonstrated that personalised as 
opposed to collective leadership did, at least for a time have performative 
significance, and, was considered as a response to the social, political and economic 
problems of the 1970s. This sub-chapter contextualises leadership performance, and 
identifies the significance of contemporary culture for the case studies in this 
research e.g. the impact of celebrity upon political actors, and the lack of Left/Right 
political distinction offering new opportunities for leaders to personalise the self to 
political purpose.  
 
Sub-chapter 3.2 identifies political institutions as contexts of leadership performance. 
The purpose of this sub-chapter is to understand the role of institutions and the 
relationship between institutions and individual effects. Institutionalism as the 
theoretical approach to studying political institutions is referenced. Constructivist 
institutionalism is appraised as this approach stresses the role of language and 
                                                 
1 (Chapters 2 and 3 review the literature relevant to the thesis. In great part, however, many 
of the chapters include references to and analyses of the literature informing this thesis have 
case study relevance).  
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discourse in political life and is relevant to this research on leadership performance 
within institutional contexts. Thereafter, the institution of the political party and the 
cabinet are analysed as institutional contexts which offer performative opportunities 
and/or constraints for contemporary leadership performance.  
 
Sub-chapter 3.3 describes leadership performance as taking place within and upon 
cultural and institutional configurations. Performance exists physically and 
discursively. Physical and discursive performance, both stresses style and image. 
These are not strictly speaking performance in the sense that, for example, gesture 
and discourse are. However, style and image have performative significance in that 
the image of a leader exists physically through comportment and/or discursively 
through utterances. We take image and style analytically to be part of performance. 
This sub-chapter outlines four performative categories which are significant to the 
analysis of the leadership performance of the case studies. The performative 
categories are discursive performances including speeches, responses to events, 
ideological/policy performances, and performance to the media e.g. interviews.  
 
Chapter 4 describes the research methodology. As the main emphasis of the thesis 
is the analysis of leadership performance, the methods used to analyse the four 
performative categories are detailed. Two additional strands of the methodology are 
outlined: elite interviews conducted with senior practitioners who constitute the 
‘Westminster context’ within which the case studies operate; and a comparative case 
study approach which allowed in-depth examination of the leadership case studies 
within the context of British Parliamentary institutions and their cultural conditions.  
 
Chapter 5 analyses elite interviews conducted with senior practitioners who 
constitute part of British politics. Six groups of elites were interviewed: former party 
leaders and chiefs of staff, speechwriters, caricaturists, media practitioners, policy 
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makers, and leaders of quasi and non governmental organisations. The research 
participants illuminated the specific context within which contemporary British political 
leadership performance takes place and the insights derived from the interviewees 
are primary data. The data is used in the case study chapters as leadership contexts. 
Chapter 5 identifies the specific Westminster context which the case studies operate 
within and upon from the perspectives of the practitioners interviewed which 
subsequently affects and structures the character and persona of political leaders in 
the public realm.  
 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 apply the framework of political performance as developed in 
chapter 2 to the three main case studies: Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and David 
Cameron.  
 
Chapter 6 analyses the performance of Tony Blair as opposition leader (1994-1997) 
and as prime minister (1997-2007) and the effects of performance upon cultural and 
institutional contexts. Specific examples of performance are analysed in order to 
illustrate the effects of personalised leadership style and its operation within a 
personalised polity, the role of the media and portrayal of leadership actors, the role 
of symbolic leadership politics vis-à-vis the political party, and political institutions 
offering performative opportunities and constraints. Accounts from Peter Mandelson, 
Alastair Campbell, Philip Gould and Anthony Giddens – key actors who were central 
to the development and mediation of New Labour and the mediation of Tony Blair’s 
public persona are referenced. This chapter uses primary data i.e. accounts from the 
Westminster interviewees, and secondary data in the form of speeches.  
 
Chapter 7 analyses the premiership of Gordon Brown (2007-2010) which was 
characterised by a series of negative attacks upon the person and the ‘persona’ and 
relentless discussions about Brown’s leadership qualities and suitability as prime 
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minister. Chapter 7 examines a central feature of the thesis i.e. the demonstration of 
the relationship between performance and persona.  
 
In Chapter 8, David Cameron’s leadership of the Conservative party from 2005-2007 
is analysed. Context and tradition (the party and Conservatism) are conditions of 
Cameron’s leadership performance. Cameron altered the appearance of the party by 
changing the appearance of ‘New Right Conservatism’. He combined two traditions 
which already existed within the party e.g. ‘One Nation’ and ‘New Right’ 
Conservatism, to constitute modern ‘Compassionate Conservatism’. This narrative 
revised the image of the Conservative party and was used to develop Cameron’s 
political persona.  
 
Chapter 9 has three sub-chapters: 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3 which correspond to each of the 
three televised Leaders’ Debates which took place ahead of the 2010 General 
Election. The framework of political performance is used to analyse the performances 
of Gordon Brown, David Cameron and Nick Clegg in each of the Debates. 
 
Chapter 10 concludes the thesis and stresses the significance of culture and 
institutions for contemporary political leadership performance. The conclusions are 
divided into theoretical and substantive points.   
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2a Overview 
 
Contemporary scholarship on political leadership has referred to the ways in which 
political actors use the self to political purpose but has lacked methodological 
emphasis for analysing political performance per se. This chapter refers first to the 
contributions of three classical theorists and one contemporary theorist of political 
leadership (2.1); our purpose is to retain the essential points from the four theorists 
relating to performance which contribute to the proposal of a framework of political 
performance to suit contemporary comparative purpose. Thereafter, four 
contemporary models of political performance are critically reviewed (2.2); their 
contributions and what we consider to be their shortcomings (in terms of our own 
analysis) are analysed, and consequences drawn for our own proposal of a 
framework of political performance (2.3). The four theorists reviewed are: 
 
• (2.1.1) Aristotle. (2004). The Art of Rhetoric. Translated by H.C.Lawson-
Tancred. St. Ives: Penguin Books. 
• (2.1.2) Machiavelli, N. (2003). The Prince. Translated by George Bull. 
London: Penguin Books. 
• (2.1.3) Weber, M. (1947) The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. 
Translated by A. M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons. London: The Free Press of 
Glencoe. (The sociologist, Max Weber, although perhaps more of a modern 
than classical, is included in the overview of classic literature on leadership as 
his interest in authority, power and institutions and notions of ‘charisma’ 
position him as part of the canon of traditional political leadership studies).   
• (2.1.4) Kane, J. (2001). The Politics of Moral Capital. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
We then review the following four authors which elaborate frameworks for the 
analysis of leadership performance: 
 19 
• (2.2.1) Greenstein, F. I. (2000). The Presidential Difference. Princeton and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
• (2.2.2) Skowronek, S. (1993). The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from 
John Adams to George Bush. Cambridge: Belknap Press.  
• (2.2.3) Bell, D. S., Hargrove, E. C. & Theakston, K. (1999). ‘Skill in Context: a 
Comparison of Politicians’. Presidential Studies Quarterly. Vol, 23. No, 3. pp. 
528-548.   
• (2.2.4) Hennessy, P. (2000). The Prime Minister. London: Penguin Books.  
 
2.1 Classic and contemporary leadership theories 
2.1.1 Aristotle. (2004). The Art of Rhetoric 
Aristotle’s writings on politics are vast. The Art of Rhetoric which outlines three 
rhetorical techniques: ethos (the person), pathos (use of emotion) and logos (use of 
logic) is the text that makes a significant contribution towards our research on 
political performance. The three rhetorical proofs are pertinent to our analysis of 
contemporary political leadership as they stress the nature of communication, the 
role of discourse, and relationship between speaker and audience. 
 
Ethos relates to the persuasive appeal of one’s character. According to Aristotle  
“proofs from character are produced, whenever a speech is given in 
such a way as to render the speaker worthy of credence – we more 
readily and sooner believe reasonable men on all matters in general 
and absolutely on questions where precision is impossible and two 
views can be maintained” (Aristotle, p. 74-5).  
 
For Aristotle, there are two determinants of the character of the speaker; he favours 
middle-aged men and those who have an elite status e.g. positive ancestry, wealth 
and power. The moral credence of a speaker, for Aristotle, is determined by age and 
social status. We retain Aristotle’s characterisation of ethos; however his description 
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will be adjusted to suit contemporary purpose e.g. age is a context of performance, 
as is the background of a speaker, and personal/political trajectory will be significant. 
 
Aristotle’s second rhetorical proof is pathos which refers to “the power of emotion to 
sway the mind when claims are accepted on the basis of how they make us feel 
without us fully analysing the claim itself” (ibid, p. 141). Pathos is the ability of the 
speaker to evoke and create, and control and skew the emotions of the audience to 
persuasive purpose. The use of pathos by political leaders today includes, though is 
not limited to the use of, metaphors, emotionally charged language, biblical 
references; and a whole range of other discursive/communicative techniques e.g. 
alliteration, rhetorical questions, use of opposites (such techniques are elaborated in 
chapter 4, methodology) all of which may or may not contribute towards positive 
political endorsements and followership.  
 
Logos is the third rhetorical proof and appeals to reason and logic; it is thus the 
appeal to one’s intellect through the argument itself. In this form “proof is achieved by 
the speech, when we demonstrate either a real or apparent persuasive aspect of 
each particular matter’” (ibid, p. 75).  
 
Aristotle’s triptych of rhetorical proofs is relevant to our research on contemporary 
political leadership as it stresses:  
• The use of rhetoric in the public realm and its deployment to persuasive 
political effect. 
• The importance of moral credence which we refer to as persuasive character. 
Aristotle stresses age and social status as determinants of the moral 
credence of a speaker. We modernise Aristotle’s concept of ethos by alluding 
to a series of specifically leadership orientated traits e.g. policy vision, 
judgement, articulation of vision, decisiveness and relationships with 
 21 
colleagues. For our purposes, ethos includes the personal and political 
background of a speaker e.g. trajectory. 
• The communicative event and its significance in terms of audience and 
followership.  
 
2.1.2 Machiavelli, N. (2003). The Prince 
Machiavelli’s The Prince is the text that makes a contribution to this research on 
political leadership performance. The Prince was written in 1513 during the latter part 
of the Renaissance, a period in which Italy was characterised by civil war. Machiavelli 
outlines the ways in which leaders should govern principalities and maintain political 
power through the use of a varied repertoire of character traits referred to as virtu. 
Machiavellian virtu should be deployed as and when deemed necessary by 
circumstance; dispositions associated with virtu include: liberal (with money) and 
miserly; generous and rapacious; cruel and compassionate; faithless and faithful; 
affable and haughty; lasvicious and chaste; selfish and caring; hard and easy; grave 
and frivolous; and religious and unbelieving (see Machiavelli, 2003, p. 50). 
Machiavelli also refers to fortuna which relates to events and circumstances that 
leaders face, both good and bad. The relationship between virtu and fortuna which 
exist as character/disposition and circumstance/events is considered as important to 
our research e.g. how do events/circumstances affect leadership performance? Or, 
how does the deployment of a range of character traits affect leadership performance 
in the public realm? And, can fortuna offer opportunities and/or constraints? 
 
The main point that Machiavelli is making is that leadership and power (and 
circumstances) are inextricably linked; in order for a leader to remain in power he 
must “have a flexible disposition, varying as fortune and circumstances dictate” and 
that the “ends [retaining power] justify the means” (Machiavelli, 2003, p. 57). There is 
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another point that Machiavelli makes that is relevant to our thesis. He makes 
reference to the importance of image, perceived character traits, and alludes to the 
relationship between a leader’s publicly perceived political persona and the audience:  
“men in general judge by their eyes rather than their hands; 
because everyone is in a position to watch, few are in a position to 
come in close touch with you. Everyone sees what you appear to 
be, few experience what you really are… the common people are 
always impressed by appearances and results” (ibid, p. 58).  
 
The contributions that The Prince makes to our enquiry of contemporary political 
leadership are his references to a series of political dispositions relating to the 
changing environment (virtu and fortuna). These are insightful regarding the 
relationship between personality, or the persona and institutions and events. 
Machiavelli’s repertoire of contradictory dispositions highlights the role of character 
traits as constituent elements of the political persona in national consciousness as 
well as the cultural endorsement of leadership dispositions. Also, whether virtu 
(dispositions) can affect fortuna (circumstances) and vice-versa.  
 
2.1.3 Weber, M. (1947). The Theory of Social and Economic Organization 
The sociologist Max Weber was primarily interested in forms of authority which 
characterised groups and society. He identified three types of legitimate authority: 
traditional, rational-legal and charismatic authority. Although Weber’s triptych is 
rooted in the sociological tradition of analysing social structures, his reference to 
charismatic authority as existing with an individual has positioned Weber as part of 
the canon of traditional thinkers on political leadership. Weber defines charismatic 
authority as: 
“a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is 
set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with 
supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional 
powers or qualities. These are such as are not accessible to the 
ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine origin or as 
 23 
exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned is 
treated as a leader”  (Weber, 1947, p.358-359). 
 
In order to illuminate the concept of charismatic authority, Weber goes on to state:  
“both rational and traditional authority are specifically forms of 
everyday routine control of action; while the charismatic type is the 
direct antithesis to this” and “charismatic authority is specifically 
irrational in the sense of being foreign to all rules’ and ‘charismatic 
authority repudiates the past, and is in this sense a specifically 
revolutionary force” (1947, p. 361-2).  
 
Max Weber’s concept of ‘charisma’ suffers from two major deficiencies relevant to 
this analysis; first, his vocabulary of ‘ideal types’ is vague and difficult to apply. 
Second, Weber’s mythical and religious references highlight contradictions regarding 
the concept of charisma as semi-sacred or inherently religious or both. 
Methodologically, Weber does indicate that the relationship between leaders and 
followers is important: 
“how the quality in question would be ultimately judged from any 
ethical, aesthetic, or other such point of view is naturally entirely 
indifferent for purposes of definition. What is alone important is how 
the individual is actually regarded by those subject to charismatic 
authority, by his ‘followers’ or disciples’” (ibid, p. 359).  
 
Given that followers are important in terms of endorsing leaders, it is difficult to 
measure the judgements and qualities that followers ascribe to leaders; this raises a 
third methodological problem in terms of conceptualising charisma. For charisma to 
exist and for leaders to be positively judged and endorsed by followers, the role of 
character, persuasive language and communication as well as performative actions 
are significant. Despite some definitional and methodological problems associated 
with ‘charismatic authority’, Weber does stress the relationship between institutions 
and personal authority, leadership performance and positive endorsement, and the 
perception of the audience as significant in terms of constituting the persona of 
leaders.   
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2.1.4 Kane, J. (2001). The Politics of Moral Capital 
John Kane’s concept of ‘moral capital’ has constituted part of the literature on 
contemporary political leadership. Kane makes reference to Robert Putnam’s 
concept of social capital (Putnam, 1993) and postulates that moral capital is 
essentially the same concept, except that moral capital is located primarily in 
individuals as opposed to societies, as Putnam indicated.  
 
Kane considers capital to be “wealth in action” and defines moral capital as “moral 
prestige – whether of an individual, an organisation or a cause – in useful service” 
(Kane, 2001, p. 6, 7). For Kane, political agents or institutions can achieve moral 
grounding by  
“avowing their service to some set of fundamental values, principles 
and goals that find a resonant response in a significant number of 
people. When such people judge the agent or institution to be both 
faithful and effective in serving those values and goals, they are 
likely to bestow some quantum of respect and approval that is of 
great political benefit to the receiver. The quantum is the agent’s 
moral capital” (ibid, p. 10).  
 
The ability of an individual or institution to accrue moral capital depends upon 
positive judgements from the public. If positive endorsements are received, this can 
provide the basis for legitimating forthcoming actions of the individual or institution 
concerned without much scrutiny; he states that the disposition of morality by an 
individual can help in accruing moral capital. Kane also points out that possessing 
moral capital does not necessarily equate with an individual being moral and cites 
totalitarian movements of the twentieth century as an example. For Kane “if moral 
capital is a genuine political resource then it is one based more on an attractive than 
on a compulsive power” (ibid, p. 25). However, that is not to say that a compulsive 
power cannot accrue moral capital.  
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Kane’s concept of ‘moral capital’ illuminates our understanding of political persuasion 
and the relationship between leaders and followers, though he does not fully explore 
the relationship between moral capital, institutions and circumstances. We use the 
following insights from Kane’s work in our research: 
 
• Kane’s work highlights symbolic politics, in particular the symbolism of the 
leader vis-à-vis the audience. 
• The relationship between leaders and followers is an important one which 
legitimates the activities, authority and status of political actors; according to 
Kane, the crux of this relationship is persuasion and the appearance of 
likeness with the audience. Leaders therefore have a responsibility to 
exercise power to positive political effect and not negatively.  
• Kane’s concept of moral capital emphasises the importance of character traits 
and political dispositions. 
•  Moral capital is a personal resource that is attributed to leaders through 
positive judgements by the audience. Moral capital thus incorporates issues 
relating to power, authority, legitimacy as well as the relationship between 
speaker and audience.  
 
The following section reviews selected texts on political performance in order to 
provide a research focus which constitutes in the proposal of a framework of political 
performance.  
 
2.2 Analysing leadership performance 
Much of the literature on political leadership performance emanates from the United 
States. The highly personalised role of the presidency lends itself well to analysis of 
the personal as political phenomena. Edinger (1976) Political Leadership in 
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Industrialized Societies; Barber’s psychologically orientated work The Presidential 
Character (1972) identifies the relationship between presidential character and 
political careers through a framework of active-positive, active-negative, passive-
positive and passive-negative; Paige (1972) Political Leadership and The Scientific 
Study of Political Leadership (1978); and MacGregor Burns (1978) Leadership were 
texts that were significant in investigating leadership and individual effects. 
Thereafter, the literature focused upon leadership techniques and political 
communication, the relationship between character, the office of the presidency, and 
political outcomes. Edelman’s The Symbolic Uses of Politics (1985) identifies the use 
of referential and condensation symbols by political elites to achieve political 
quiescence. The nature of political communication and outcomes is highlighted by 
Edelman. Humbuggery and Manipulation. The Art of Leadership by Bailey (1988) 
uses a wide range of political and non-political case studies to demonstrate the use 
of chicanery in leadership. He goes on to describe the exercise of political power and 
inevitable use of manipulation. Presidential Power by Neustadt (1990) explains how 
persuasion and bargaining are essential to presidential power, and how the personal 
is used to political purpose. Skowronek (1993) The Politics Presidents Make: 
Leadership from John Adams to George Bush emphasises the ways in which 
contextual/situational factors offer presidents opportunities and restrictions. 
Greenstein (2000) The Presidential Difference proposes a six-point criterion which is 
used to measure the success of presidential case studies (political communication, 
organisational capacity, political skill, public policy vision, cognitive style and 
emotional intelligence). Greenstein’s emphasis upon emotional intelligence highlights 
character traits as constituting a leader’s public persona.  
 
Our purpose is not to review each text, two texts from the literature on presidential 
performance are reviewed (Greenstein, 2000 and Skowronek, 1993) in order to 
constitute to the development of the framework of political performance. Thereafter, 
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two recent European texts on political leadership performance are similarly reviewed 
(Bell et al, 1999 and Hennessy, 2000). 
 
2.2.1 Greenstein, F. I. (2000). The Presidential Difference 
Greenstein’s work is exclusively about the American presidency. He assesses 
leaders from Roosevelt (FDR) to Clinton, against six categories which he refers to as 
measures of presidential success. Greenstein’s first category is public 
communication e.g. the communicative strategies deployed by presidents such as 
the deployment of rhetoric and public presentations to produce tangible political 
outcomes. FDR is referred to as the benchmark for his successors “as a 
communicator, Roosevelt is to later presidents what Mozart and Beethoven have 
been to their successors – imitable but endlessly inspiring” (Greenstein, 2000, p. 22). 
Organisational capacity is the second category and relates to the ability to manage 
staff, which may include rivals and adversaries. The dynamics between leader and 
cabinet/inner circle are brought to the fore. Political skill is the third category which 
Greenstein relates to the fourth, public policy vision. Greenstein assumes a 
dialectical relationship between the two, and states that both relate to the operational 
(or mechanistic) side of the presidency and constitute the president’s vision of public 
policy. The fifth measure of presidential success is cognitive style, defined as the way 
in which the president “processes the Niagara of advice and information that comes 
his way” (ibid, p. 6). Greenstein takes the view that intelligence and academic skills 
are determinants of cognitive style. In some ways this is in fact true, that academic 
qualifications/skills do in fact lend themselves well to cognitive style; however this is 
not true in all cases. John Kennedy’s ability to overcome his ‘presidential playboy’ 
image as president was partly through his (being seen) spending weekends reading 
both official memoranda and other literature on politics. Kennedy’s perceived mastery 
of politics whilst in office illustrates that cognitive style can be something that is 
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learned as opposed to something which is ‘inherent’. The sixth and final category is 
emotional intelligence and refers to the president’s “ability to manage his emotions 
and turn them to constructive purposes, rather than being dominated by them and 
allowing them to diminish his leadership” (ibid, p. 6). 
 
Greenstein’s six-point model against which the effectiveness of presidents can be 
measured (public communication, organisational capacity, political skill, public policy 
vision, cognitive style, and emotional intelligence) relies heavily upon the personal 
characteristics of presidents and takes into far less account situational, institutional 
and cultural factors and their impact upon the political process. Greenstein’s 
emphasis upon the personal relates to high levels of personalisation evident in U.S. 
politics. His model is therefore constrained to polities in which emphasis is placed 
upon executive figures, polities such as America, France, and, arguably, Britain.  
 
Two points from Greenstein’s model are particularly relevant for our research. 
Greenstein’s category on public communication highlights the relationship between 
discourse, performance and political outcomes. Secondly, the emphasis upon 
emotional intelligence can illuminate character traits as constituting a leader’s 
political persona. 
 
2.2.2 Skowronek, S. (1993). The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from 
John Adams to George Bush 
Skowronek’s model ‘Recurrent Structures of Presidential Authority’ (1993, p. 36) 
consists of four categories: reconstruction, disjunction, pre-emption and articulation 
which appropriate themselves to cyclical moments of presidential power: 
 
 
 29 
Previously      President’s political identity 
established 
commitments     Opposed   Affiliated 
  
Vulnerable    Politics of                 Politics of 
     reconstruction   disjunction 
     
Resilient    Politics of   Politics of 
     pre-emption   articulation  
 
Skowronek demonstrates that at each stage of the cycle there are different forms of 
presidential leadership and at each stage the leaders have different – but clearly 
identifiable – opportunities and restrictions. Central to Skowronek’s model are two 
contexts associated with political authority: whether a leader is opposed to the pre-
existing coalition or is affiliated with it. A president’s position in this dichotomy (or the 
movement between the two) informs “cycles of political time”, and “points to the 
qualitative differences of presidential leadership” (Skowronek, 1993, p. 35).  
 
Skowronek’s model can be seen as the reverse of Greenstein’s. Skowronek’s 
emphasis upon contextual/situational factors (reconstruction, disjunction, articulation, 
and pre-emption) expressed as cyclical moments of presidential power is a model in 
which contextual scenarios offer leaders opportunities and restrictions. The model 
does not take into account personal and cultural factors which are crucial to the 
understanding of political life in the U.S. as elsewhere. Skowronek illustrates that 
situational factors (albeit understated in the literature on U.S. leadership) are 
important when looking at the performance of U.S. presidential actors, and when 
understanding U.S. political discourse more generally.  
 
The insight that we take from Skowronek’s work is that context and institutions 
matter; political institutions are frames or contexts which condition leadership 
performance. For our enquiry on contemporary British politics, we would propose a 
set of institutions specific to the British prime minister e.g. formal political institutions 
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including the cabinet and political party and the institution of the media; we return to 
this point in section 2.3.  
 
Let us remark on the predominantly American models that we have reviewed. Both 
Greenstein and Skowronek’s models have an insularity owing to the high levels of 
personalisation evident in American politics. The models therefore cannot be easily 
taken out of context, and when they are they prove very uncomfortable with their new 
context. Both David Bell and Kevin Theakston have attempted to redeploy such 
models to different contexts (Kevin Theakston redeployed Greenstein’s model to post 
World War II British leaders; and David Bell redeployed Skowronek’s model to the 
European context, more specifically to Fourth and Fifth Republic France) (see 
Theakston (2006) and Bell (2007)). We can make a few brief remarks on Theakston 
and Bell’s redeployment. Firstly, can studies of the history of the American 
presidency (with its longevity of over 200 years, and the cultural implications of this) 
be transposed to different contexts? When such studies transcend political time and 
space do they lose their original emphasis? Or do they gain new a completely new 
emphasis? The question of what is lost and what is gained by conceptual 
redeployment is one which is important and reinforces the complex nature of 
studying political leadership as involving mutable relations between culture, 
institutions and performance and also possibly some constraints.  
 
2.2.3 Bell, D. S., Hargrove, E. C. & Theakston, K. (1999). ‘Skill in Context: A 
Comparison of Politicians’ 
The model proposed by Bell, Hargrove and Theakston has been adapted from an 
earlier model by Hargrove (1998) which was exclusively about the U.S. presidency. 
The modification of the model means that it is not geographically constrained to 
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American political leadership and now serves comparative purpose. Bell et al’s model 
entitled ‘Skill in Context’ (1999, p. 530) is as follows:  
 
1. Political skill                                                    3. Strategic leadership                                              
     Bargaining and leadership of coalitions                        Purpose                                                             
     Heresthetics (maneuver) a                                             Discernment 
     Rhetoric                                                              Prudence 
     Character as a skill                                             4. Teaching reality (or illusion) 
         Psychological health                                               Teaching                    
         Moral purpose                                                       Preaching                                                 
         Personal integrity                                                  Demagogy 
2. Skill in context                                                          Cultural traps 
         Historical situation                                                Short-run or long-run politics 
and policy 
         Electoral politics                                           
         Dynamics of governments                                      
         Policy problems                                              
     Policy achievements and failures                                 
         Assessment of skill in context                                 
 
a. the term heresthetics denotes clever maneuvers for putting the opponent on the 
defensive and was invented by Riker (1986). 
 
The model proposed by Bell et al “permits the comparison and assessment of 
personal political skill in relation to contextual factors” (1999, p. 529). ‘Skill in Context’ 
therefore analyses the impact of personal leadership traits upon the institutions within 
which such leaders operate. Bell et al apply each of the four categories of the model 
to three case studies: George Bush (senior), John Major and Jacques Chirac. In so 
doing, character traits, the role of language and historic/institutional contexts permit 
analysis of the individual vis-à-vis political institutions. The authors note that each 
leader was a transactional leader; however, the operation of a transaction leader 
within a prime ministerial system clearly differs from a presidential system; however, 
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their analysis of the context within which their case studies operate provides the 
background for the characterisation of the leaders as transactional e.g. John Major’s 
leadership of the Conservative party in 1992 was deeply contextualised by 
Thatcherism. Bell et al note that “transactional leaders [Bush, Major and Chirac] were 
appropriate for the Conservative politics of their time as previous policy themes had 
burned out and an ad hoc style of leadership matched the new situation” (1999, p. 
546).  
 
Bell et al make three contributions to this research. First, ‘Skill in Context’ assesses 
leaders according to political and personal skills and therefore is an appraisal of 
character traits. The character traits that constitute a political persona are important 
as is the performance of the persona within cultural and institutional contexts. The 
authors make reference to character and in the case of Chirac, to political persona. 
However, they place less emphasis upon the interaction of character within the 
institutional configurations of the office of the prime minister or president e.g. how did 
the image of John Major as a weak prime minister affect his premiership, policies and 
political outcomes? Second, the authors make reference to culture, specifically to 
‘cultural traps’ e.g. “the American messianic impulse, the British ambivalence about 
being part of “Europe”, and the search for grandeur in French foreign policy” (1999, 
p. 530); whilst the historic influence of culture is significant for leadership, perhaps 
more emphasis upon the immediate culture within each polity would help in the 
analysis of their case studies. Third, Bell et al make reference to the personal and 
political trajectory of the case studies but do not include trajectory in the model itself. 
For our purposes, the analysis of both personal and political trajectory is formative of 
character; more importantly, trajectory is a condition which conditions leadership 
performance and therefore can affect political outcomes. 
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2.2.4 Hennessy, P. (2000). The Prime Minister 
Hennessy proposes not a model of political leadership per se but “the ingredients of 
assessment for premiership performance” (Hennessy, 2000, p. 542-3). Hennessy’s 
criteria for assessing the British prime minister come from a post-war historical-
political perspective which is advantageous for our research as he includes reference 
to history and institutions and the current context within which leaders operate. 
Hennessy’s criteria for assessing post-war British political leadership are:  
1. Backdrop to the premiership 
• Condition of the economy and society 
• Parliamentary arithmetic 
• Internal condition of premier’s party 
• Disposition of the media to the premier, his/her government, his/her party 
 
2. Management capacity 
• Premier’s skill at managing the status quo (i.e., the prosaic but necessary on-
going functions of central government) 
• Handling crises (including the media aspects of crisis management) 
3. Insight and perception 
• Personal (including self-awareness) 
• Political (sensitivity towards colleagues, official and party) 
• Policy (a capacity to see beyond the shibboleths of established or manifesto 
positions) 
 
4. Changes and innovation 
• Planned 
• Improvised 
• Contingent upon unforeseen events 
 
5. Constitutional and procedural 
• The running of No. 10 and the balance within it between the political and the 
administrative 
• The handling of Cabinet and the apparatus of collegiality 
• Managing Whitehall and the career Civil Service 
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• The personal handling of the House of Commons; the care and attention paid 
to the institutional of Parliament and the management of his/her party in both 
Commons and Lords 
• Probity and decency of the system (Prime Minister as manager of codes, 
ministerial and Civil Service) 
 
Hennessy’s criteria are helpful as the basis for assessing the performance of the 
British prime minister as the balance between the personal attributes of a prime 
minister (political comportment: rule bound behaviour; disposition: handling of crises, 
attitude towards staff; policy decisions and the exercise of political arithmetic and 
judgement; vision and foresight); and institutions (internal condition of the political 
party, state of the economy, maintaining the day-to-day smooth running of parliament 
and Number 10). This provides a helpful methodology for the analysis of leadership 
performance, as it includes the ability of prime ministers to respond effectively the 
media. Hennessy does not use the criteria for assessing leadership; his work, which 
balances the personal and the institutional, is helpful to us methodologically; 
however, political trajectory is not included, and, as stated above, trajectory is 
considered as a context of leadership performance.  
 
2.3 Proposal of a framework of political performance 
Taking into account the contributions (and for our purposes) shortcomings of the 
literature reviewed in this chapter, the following insights contribute towards the 
development of a framework of political performance:  
 
• Aristotle stresses the role of language in the public realm and its deployment 
to political effect; the importance of the act of communication and its 
significance in terms of audience and followership and character.  
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• Machiavellian virtu and fortuna illuminate our understanding of the 
relationship between political performance and circumstances/contexts of 
leadership performance. Also, whether virtu (dispositions) can affect fortuna 
(circumstances) and vice-versa and impact upon leadership image.  
• Weber highlights the relationship between institutions and personal authority; 
and the mythical relationship between leaders and followers. 
• Kane’s concept of ‘moral capital’ brings to the fore character traits and 
political dispositions. He highlights symbolic politics, in particular, the 
symbolism of the leader vis-à-vis the audience. 
• Greenstein stresses the role of the personal and its use to political effect but 
does not acknowledge the institutional context within which the personal 
gains expression. Skowronek’s model is the reverse of Greenstein and over-
emphasises context and situation and not the personal. From Greenstein, we 
take the role of the personal and its use to political effect; from Skowronek, 
we acknowledge the institutional context of leadership performance. 
• Bell et al refer to character traits, the role of language and historic/institutional 
contexts which permit analysis of the individual in relation to political 
institutions. For our purposes, we include the appraisal of character traits and 
emphasise the interaction of political persona, culture and institutions. We 
also place emphasis upon trajectory as a condition of leadership 
performance. 
• Hennessy achieves a balance between the personal attributes of a prime 
minister and institutions, thus providing a helpful methodology for the analysis 
of leadership performance. 
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From this range of contributions we have drawn concepts which help us constitute 
the framework of political performance which relates performance to culture and 
institutions. As below, the framework is diagrammatically expressed. 
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Figure 2.1 A framework of political performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Culture, institutions and performance constitute the framework of political 
performance.2 The diagram represents the three elements in order of their evolution 
i.e. culture within a given polity influences institutional configurations which provide 
political protagonists with stages upon which performance (as forms of political 
action) takes place. This is expressed by the blue arrows which depict the primary 
                                                 
2 The framework of political performance was developed with Professor John Gaffney; I have 
used it in this thesis and adapted it specifically to the analysis of British political leadership 
performance. 
1. Culture 
 
The cultural features of a given 
community such as history and 
traditions, norms and values and the 
way these interact with and 
influence or are influenced by formal 
political institutions and practices. 
 2. Institutions 
 
The institutional configurations within 
the polity as informed by culture and 
history e.g. formal political institutions 
and the media.  
  
 
  
 
3. Performance 
 
The actions, utterances, comportment of 
political figures, informed by personal 
and/or political trajectory, situated within a 
given culture and set of institutions. E.g. 
discursive performances; responses to 
events/performance in crisis moments; 
ideological and/or policy performances; 
and performance to the media.  
 
Key: 
   Evolution of  
   constituent elements 
   
  Application of 
framework 
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direction of influence. The framework is applied to the leadership case studies by 
analysing moments of political performance and then identifying their impact upon 
cultural and/or institutional contexts; as expressed by the red arrows. 
 
The three-dimensional framework has a degree of political mutability; it is not 
confined to polities which place emphasis upon leaders, neither is its use framed only 
for polities which emphasise institutional contexts. It can be applied to political 
leaders and aspirant leaders who operate within different institutional and cultural 
configurations by changing the categories within culture and institutions so that they 
are relevant to the case study and polity in question. The framework provides an 
appreciation of the personal and the symbolic as crucial to the understanding of 
politics as such aspects are included in the framework.  
 
The application of the framework to the case studies allows us to understand politics 
as performance, and character and persona as political phenomena, which are 
situated within broader cultural and institutional configurations. It is through analysing 
moments of political performance (as forms of political action) that take place within a 
set of institutions within a broader set of cultural norms that the perceived character, 
persona and image of a leader gains expression in the public realm. By looking at 
politics as performance, we are illustrating the role of the personal as formative of the 
development of political practice. The framework takes into account path-dependent 
cultural and institutional frameworks and the role of symbolic politics.  
 
As this research focuses on contemporary British politics, the framework as applied 
to British political leadership performance is as follows:  
 
 
 
 39 
Figure 2.2 A framework of British political performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
The following chapter (3) and sub-chapters (3.1, 3.2 and 3.3) elaborate each 
constituent part of the framework of political performance. Chapter 4 on methodology 
details the way in which each of the four performative categories (discursive, 
1. Culture 
 
• Personalisation of 
politics including 
celebrity. 
• Shifts in Left/Right 
political ideology. 
 
 
2. Institutions 
 
• Formal political institutional 
configurations: prime minister and 
cabinet; political party. 
• The media as a semi-political 
institution. 
 
  
 
 
3. Performance 
 
The actions, utterances, comportment of political figures, 
informed by personal and/or political trajectory, situated 
within a given culture and set of institutions:  
• Discursive performances: leadership acceptance 
speech, party conference keynote speech, 
announcements, utterances, manifesto launches, 
Prime Minister’s Questions, leaders’ debates. 
• Responses to events/performance in crisis 
moments. 
• Ideological and/or policy performances/Queen’s 
speech.  
• Performance to the media.  
Key: 
    Evolution of  
    constituent elements 
   
   Application of 
framework 
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responses to events/crisis moments, ideological/policy, and performances to the 
media) are analysed in this research.  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the literature relevant to leadership performance; the 
contributions of the literature form the basis of a framework of political performance 
which we use in this research.  
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3 A FRAMEWORK OF POLITICAL PERFORMANCE: CULTURE, INSTITUTIONS 
AND PERFORMANCE 
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3a Overview 
Three sub-chapters (3.1 culture, 3.2 institutions and 3.3 performance) theorise each 
constituent part of the framework of political performance and outlines how 
contemporary culture, institutions and performance affects leadership performance. 
 
Sub-chapter 3.1 focuses on two elements which constitute part of contemporary 
political culture: 1). the personalisation of politics, including the development of 
political celebrity; 2). shifts in Left/Right political ideology, in particular, the ideological 
repositioning of the Labour party both in opposition and government (1994-1997 and 
1997-2010). Leadership in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s demonstrates the cultural 
significance for leadership performance.  
 
Sub-chapter 3.2 examines institutions as conditions of leadership performance. This 
sub-chapter describes the institutional complexities that political leaders operate 
within, and identifies the relationship between political actors, institutions and political 
outcomes. Institutionalism as the theoretical literature on political institutions is 
referenced. The political party and the cabinet are examined as significant political 
institutions which condition leadership performance. The media as a semi-political 
institution offering a range of opportunities and/or constraints is also a condition of 
leadership performance.  
 
Sub-chapter 3.3 examines political performance in the context of contemporary 
British political discourse. We outline the ways in which culture and institutions 
provide scope for political performance e.g. a personalised political culture provides 
leaders with opportunities to use the self to political purpose; and the institutional 
shifts in the media, specifically the advancement of 24/7 news, has offered constant 
opportunities for – as well as altering the institutional conditions of – performance.  
 43 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Culture   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 44 
3.1a Overview 
The personalisation of politics, including the development of political celebrity and 
shifts in Left/Right political ideology are two characteristics which constitute part of 
contemporary political culture. This sub-chapter analyses the ways in which 
personalisation of politics and changes in traditional Left/Right political ideology affect 
the leadership performance of the case studies. We begin by making reference to 
leadership in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s in order to demonstrate the relationship 
between culture and political actors and ways in which culture subsequently affects 
the leadership style of predecessors.    
 
3.1b Leadership in the 1970s 
Four prime ministers governed in the 1970s: Edward Heath (1970-74); Harold Wilson 
(1974-76); James Callaghan (1976-79); and at the end of the 1970s, Margaret 
Thatcher (1979-1990). The changes in political orientation (Conservative-Labour-
Labour-Conservative) highlighted the broader contradictions of this period while 
emphasising the two-party dichotomy between Labour and Conservative. The 
transitions in government reinforced the gradual breakdown of the post-war 
consensus and the social and political problems of the 1970s.  
 
Marquand characterises Britain in 1979 as a “perplexed and discontented place”. He 
states that the “Conservative victory [in 1979] was as much about punishing Labour 
than to reward the Conservatives” (2008, p. 277). Thatcher’s victory in 1979 
legitimated her pursuit of neoliberalism as a form of governance, which she alluded 
to in a lecture delivered to the Conservative Political Centre in October 1968 as 
shadow power minister at the party conference. Riddell notes that Thatcher’s 
pamphlet entitled What’s wrong with politics? (1968) explicitly referred to her distrust 
of government as well as her belief in neoliberalism as a form of governance: 
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“What we need now is a far greater degree of personal responsibility 
and decision, far more independence from the government, and a 
comparative reduction in the role of government” (Thatcher, 1986 
cited in Riddell, 1991, p. 2).                                                                                                                                                               
 
Jessop states that the “initial rise of neoliberalism as a wide-ranging economic and 
political strategy was associated with the neoliberal regime shift in Britain and the US 
in the late 1970s” (2002, p. 458), as indicated in the following table: 
 
Table 3.1.1 Forms of neoliberalism  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Changes in political leadership in the 1970s illustrated the gradual breakdown of the 
post-war consensus and the context in which the strong leadership of Margaret 
Thatcher gained expression. The latter part of the 1970s signified that strong 
uncompromising leadership in which Thatcher shifted political discourse in favour of 
neoliberalism was politically acceptable, and a proposed solution to the social, 
economic and political contradictions of this decade. 
 
3.1c Leadership in the 1980s 
Margaret Thatcher’s administration governed throughout the 1980s. Jessop cites 
Thatcherism in the 1980s as the zenith of neoliberalism (see Jessop, 2002) in which 
deregulation, privatisation, less state dependency were promoted as, in some sense, 
moral from a Rightist perspective,  
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The perception of Margaret Thatcher, in particular as regards the 1984 Miners Strike 
was that of uncompromising leadership. Thatcher likened the Miners, and their union, 
the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) led by Arthur Scargill, to the “enemy 
within” and the Argentine junta (Marquand, 2008). The defeat of the Miners and 
changes in occupational structure with the decline of manufacturing reinforced the 
dominance of neoliberalism and a market orientated discourse within the polity. The 
economic doctrine of the free market was pursued highly publicly, as was the 
celebration of individualism, consumption and less state dependency. Markets were 
argued as being moral by those who promoted them. Deregulation was promoted. 
Thatcher shifted the discourse of political leadership in favour of dominant and 
personalised as opposed to collective leadership.  
 
Conservative policies throughout the 1980s had a significant effect upon the political 
culture within the polity. More specifically, the relationship of the individual to the 
state was reconfigured, re-imagined as it were. Morgan notes Thatcherism 
“penetrated the very substructure of national consciousness, with the message of 
traditional capitalism proclaimed in an unusually explicit and aggressive form” (2001, 
p. 438). The pursuit of neoliberalism under Thatcher and her style and approach 
were so dominant, they informed her successors, even to the point where they 
crossed party lines, dominating the administrations of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown; 
we identify the policy shift of a traditionally Left party to the centre-Right in section 
3.1.2.  
 
3.1d Leadership in the 1990s 
The boom of the late 1980s did not last. “1990 and 1991 were years of deepest 
recession, in which GDP declined and official unemployment figures went up over 3 
million” (Marwick, 2003, p. 340). Protests against the unpopular ‘Poll Tax’ contributed 
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to Thatcher’s resignation on 22 November 1990. In the wake of the first Gulf War, on 
27 November 1990, Thatcher’s then Chancellor, John Major, became “prime minister 
after barely twelve months experience of high office” (Morgan, 2001, p. 506). The 
thinness of Major’s majority “of only twenty-one compared to the one hundred-plus 
majorities that had bolstered Thatcher in 1983 and 1983” (Bell et al, 1999, p. 538) 
coupled with internal divisions over Europe within the party contributed to an image 
of him as a weak prime minister, that is a weak prime minister who followed one of 
the strongest the country had known. 
 
Within the first six months of Major’s premiership, on 7 February 1991, the IRA 
launched a mortar attack on 10 Downing Street during a cabinet meeting. The attack 
– a direct attack upon the executive – was symbolically successful for the IRA as 
they had attacked the prime minister’s residence. Major “gave an impression of calm 
imperturbability” (Morgan, 2001, p. 507); despite the illustration of strong leadership 
by Major, his image as a weak prime minister was not significantly revised.   
 
At the beginning of Major’s premiership, national finances were under huge strain, 
the Poll Tax was abolished and replaced with the Council Tax. Interest rates were in 
double figures and house prices fell, leaving many householders in negative equity.  
The Conservative party was deeply divided over Europe. The events of Black 
Wednesday (16 September 1992) in which the then chancellor, Norman Lamont, 
announced that Sterling was to be withdrawn from the European Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) meant that despite some economic recovery, Conservative party 
popularity was declining, and its image of financial soundness eroding fast. The 
ramifications of ‘Black Wednesday’ for Major’s leadership were as follows:  
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• Despite Major’s policy position and centre stage role as leading proponent of 
the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) as chancellor, the impression of 
economic mis-management portrayed Major as an incompetent politician. 
• Foley refers to Black Wednesday as “a political and personal disaster from 
which the Major administration never recovered” (2000, p. 147). 
• Major’s image as a weak prime minister contributed to his lack of political 
authority within the party (see Bell et al, 1999). 
 
During the 1990s, economic recovery under Major was evident and standards of 
living were higher that those in many European countries. The recovery did not, 
however, have positive political consequences for Major; Europe was the issue that 
divided the party. Major’s political image was still that of a weak prime minister who 
lacked political authority and was unable to unite the party. He was harassed by his 
own strident anti-Europeans (in fact because his majority was now so thin) and 
unable to stop the public squabbling. As regards leadership image, Major’s position 
as prime minister was undermined even by his own core executive. Economic 
recovery continued throughout the 1990s and at the time of the 1997 General 
Election, the economy, which at the time was managed by chancellor Kenneth 
Clarke, was strong and not really a political issue, as had been the case in the 1980s. 
Mandelson notes that “especially since Black Wednesday, the government was seen 
as unfocused and incompetent. John Major looked weak and out of his depth. Labour 
was on the brink of a potentially redefining leadership election. The outpouring of 
goodwill towards John Smith had led to a surge in support for the [Labour] party” 
(2011, p. 173).  
 
References to leadership in the 1990s have demonstrated that cultural shifts and 
political developments from Margaret Thatcher to John Major meant inordinate 
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emphasis upon political leadership and performance. Moreover, we have 
demonstrated that the legacy of predecessors can have negative political 
consequences for leadership image; and events can dramatically affect the image of 
political actors.  
 
The significance of leadership in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s for the performance of 
our case studies is that post-Thatcher, celebrity culture and the personalisation of 
politics accelerated and were demonstrably expressed throughout the Blair 
premiership (see chapter 6), with a whole series of political effects. Marr notes that 
“Tony Blair arrived in power in 1997 in a country spangled and sugar-coated by a 
revived fashion for celebrity. It offered a few politicians new opportunities but at a 
high cost” (2007, p. 514). We have also demonstrated that the legacy of 
predecessors can have adverse political effects e.g. party disunity in the case of 
John Major. The expansion of the media and 24 hour news which focused on 
leadership provided a cultural and institutional context in which political actors were 
given greater visibility in the public realm that was hitherto the case.   
 
We now analyse the significance of personalisation of politics including the 
development of political celebrity and shifts in Left/Right political ideology for 
contemporary British political leadership performance. 
 
3.1.2 Contemporary political culture 
3.1.2.1 Personalisation of politics  
A body of literature refers to the personalisation of British politics, in particular, the 
personalisation of the prime minister and party leaders (see Shaw, 2007; Foley, 
2000; Allen, 2003; Poguntke & Webb, 2005; Hennessy, 2000; Marquand, 2007; King, 
2009). Foley, 2000; Poguntke & Webb, 2005; and Allen, 2003 use the Blair 
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premiership as a case study to demonstrate the presidentialisation of the British 
prime minister. Foley recognises the similarities between British and U.S styles of 
leadership and suggests that the British premiership and American presidency “have 
come to move along parallel paths. The comparability that has come to exist does so 
at a level that transcends the constitutional differences within the two systems” 
(2000, p. 331) Foley’s suggestion of the shift towards a presidential system has 
implications for leadership. If cultural and institutional configurations are shifting in 
favour of a presidential system, this makes it easier for prime ministers to comport 
themselves in a presidential manner and further the cultural institutional change.  
 
Poguntke & Webb, 2005 examine presidentialisation across western democracies 
and refer to Britain as becoming increasingly presidential in practice, without 
changing the formal structures. They emphasise the changes in the presentation of 
British politics but not the procedure. Allen (2003) focuses specifically on institutional 
points of convergence between U.S. and British politics and considers the Blair 
premiership as constituting the modern U.K. presidency. Whilst there are key 
institutional differences between presidential and prime ministerial offices, the British 
prime ministerial system has, in recent times, offered leadership actors new 
opportunities and scope to personalise the self to political purpose than was hitherto 
the case. 
 
Personalisation is part of British political culture and incorporates the development of 
‘celebrity’. The modern mass media provide the basis for the mediation of 
personalised styles of leadership. 
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3.1.2.1a Personalisation and celebrity 
King states that “the connections between power and celebrity are tenuous to the 
point of non-existence” (2009, p. 320). He states that some previous British prime 
ministers have been celebrities, others not. King views celebrities as set apart from 
the masses; therefore, by virtue of the office of the prime minister, this in itself is an 
aspect of celebrity, as is the ability of politicians to attract large crowds. In this 
respect, King refers to previous prime ministers, Gladstone, Disraeli, Churchill, Eden 
or Heath as celebrities. Crucially, for King “celebrity and fame seem as likely to follow 
the acquisition of power as to lead to its acquisition” (2009, p. 320) and a politician’s 
adoption of “celebrity may create an image of power, it does little, if anything, to 
confer power” (2009, p. 320). For King, the office of the prime minister offers 
politicians opportunities to become celebrities e.g. Anthony Eden, Winston Churchill; 
however, some leaders choose not to be perceived as celebrities e.g. Clement 
Attlee. The perception of a politician as a celebrity therefore depends in part upon the 
leader in question and whether or not they choose to express aspects of celebrity 
and personalisation. Crucially, for King, power and celebrity are mutually exclusive. 
They do not exist together but celebrity can momentarily create the image of a 
powerful prime minister which might enhance political status and authority. The use 
of celebrity by politicians may create the perception of a powerful political actor, but 
King doubts the long term effects of celebrity. Our point is not to contradict King but 
to add that celebrity has become part of the condition of political performance, and 
however short-term its effects, it remains the condition of subsequent performance, 
and therefore becomes permanently, although not exclusively, formative.  
 
We must stress that the institution of the media is the basis for the personalisation of 
politics and the inclusion of aspects of celebrity within political comportment. Various 
media provide leaders with stages upon which celebrity/personalised styles of 
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leadership gain expression in national consciousness. Gould notes that post-1997, 
the ‘total news media’ i.e. 24-hour news “tends to push coverage of politics towards 
the sensational and the extreme; it leads to a focus on personalities not policies” 
(Gould, 1998, preface). He refers to New Labour as the new incumbency operating 
within a new context of media whereby “the demands of modern government fuse 
together the act of delivery with the communication of delivery”. Corner and Pels 
theorise Gould’s point by referring to a shift in political communication; they state that 
“the mass visibility that is afforded by modern mediated politics has 
foreground issues of ‘style, appearance and personality’, breaking 
down some of the forces that separate politics from entertainment 
and political leadership from media celebrity” (2003, p. 2).  
 
The institution of the media can offer leaders opportunities to personalise the self to 
political effect as well as constraints. The British media’s ability to import aspects of 
highly personalised U.S. and European politics e.g. Leader’s Debates is significant in 
terms of increasing the personalisation of the prime minister and party leaders ahead 
of the 2010 General Election with a series of tangible effects. The Leaders’ Debates 
are analysed in sub-chapters 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3; our point here in relation to the 
Debates is to stress the media’s cultural endorsement of U.S. and European politics 
and the opportunities that this offered for British political leaders to use the self to 
new political purpose.   
 
The head-to-head U.S. style Leaders’ Debates between the three political 
protagonists (Gordon Brown, David Cameron and Nick Clegg) provided an un-edited 
stage upon which political action (e.g. discourse, comportment, utterances, gestures 
and body language) could be undertaken and mediated, independently of editorial 
value judgements. The televised Debates were significant in that the desire to 
outshine rivals would be intense and perhaps ferocious; The stage provided British 
political party leaders with three key opportunities rather than constraints. Firstly, the 
emphasis upon the ways in which individuals perform discursively and otherwise 
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(tone, utterance, gesture, pitch) offered party leaders scope to fashion their publicly 
perceived character and image and establish the self as a site of political authority (or 
not). Secondly, the ability to acknowledge and resonate with the concerns of the 
audience can create a certain dependency upon the speaker and consequentially 
generate high levels of followership. Thirdly, the live Debates provided a sense of 
intimacy between speaker and audience. The ability to talk directly to the audience 
can create a series of imagined relationships between speaker and audience. 
Imagined relationships can be a factor upon which personal capital is accrued and 
authority and legitimacy conferred. These three opportunities illustrate that the 
personal can be deployed as a political resource which can have tangible political 
outcomes.  
 
The Debates were the first of their kind within a British prime ministerial polity. Their 
acceptance within mainstream political culture illustrated: a) the embeddedness of 
the personalised role of the executive and party leaders; b) the acceptance of 
performance and personalisation as part of mainstream political discourse; and, c) 
the influences of personalised politics and presidential styles of leadership.  
 
Our analysis of personalisation as a part of contemporary political culture illustrates 
the following two points: 
 
• The cultural acceptance and endorsement of celebrity and its extension to 
politics offers prime ministers and political elites more generally scope to 
deploy the self to political effect and therefore fashion one’s publicly 
perceived character, persona and image. 
• The influences of highly personalised politics as seen in U.S. and European 
polities e.g. presidential style Leaders’ Debates and their acceptance within 
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the British polity places greater emphasis upon leadership performance, 
presentation and style.  
 
3.1.2.2 Changes in Left/Right political ideology 
There are several factors within and outside the polity which have contributed to the 
lack of distinction between traditional Left/Right political ideology in contemporary 
Britain, for example, changes in occupational structure, the rise of post-industrial 
generations, globalisation, and expansion of the media and communications. We 
focus on the rebranding of the Labour Party, in particular, the abolition of Clause 
Four of the party’s constitution (and the pursuit of neoliberalism and its adoption by 
New Labour, both in opposition and in government (1994-1997 and 1997-2010). We 
identify the effects of these upon ideology, leadership and contemporary political 
culture.  
 
Domestically, the first major contemporary expression of the decline in the 
differences between Left/Right political ideology within the polity (we say 
contemporary, as we could go back to the 1950s for other versions of the decline of 
difference) was evident from 1983 onwards. Neil Kinnock’s leadership of the Labour 
party. His attempts at party modernisation were a response to the dominant 
leadership and successes of Thatcher; he began the modernisation of the party 
which included aspects of individualism and personalisation of the self to political 
purpose. After Kinnock’s election defeat in 1992, his successors John Smith (1992-
1994) and Tony Blair as opposition leader (1994-1997) continued party 
modernisation with a whole series of demonstratable cultural and institutional effects. 
Under the leadership of Tony Blair, the then opposition party, Labour, had rebranded 
itself as New Labour and abolished Clause Four of the party’s constitution (see 
chapter 6 for a discussion of the abolition of Clause Four as a form of political 
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performance). Clause Four had “committed the party to the common ownership of 
the means of production, distribution and exchange” (Seldon, 2007, p. 35). Such a 
policy shift post-1994, and the public embracing of such a shift, marked a move to 
the Right and Right policies of a supposedly Left party. Symbolically, New Labour 
was broadening its appeal by rejecting the party’s policy assertion of – or rather lip 
service to, but ‘lip service’ has a major symbolic function –common ownership and 
state socialism.  
 
New Labour’s embracing of the market and a version of capitalism under the 
leadership of Tony Blair was theorised by ‘Third Way’ analyses, Professor Anthony 
Giddens being the main proponent of this approach. Giddens notes that  
“the overall aim of third way politics should be to help citizens pilot 
their way through the major revolutions of our time: globalization, 
transformations in personal life and our relationship to nature” 
(1998, p. 64).  
 
Giddens cites the following as values of the Third Way: “equality, protection of the 
vulnerable, freedom as autonomy, no rights without responsibilities, no authority 
without democracy, cosmopolitan pluralism, philosophical conservatism” (1998, p. 
66). Such values sought to provide a middle ground between state socialism and 
neoliberal conservatism and re-position a traditionally Left party in or towards the 
middle of the ideological terrain.    
 
The move towards centre-Right politics reconfigured and reflected the already 
changing Left/Right ideological terrain in Britain, and meant that the policies of the 
two main political parties, Labour and Conservative, were more similar to than 
distinct from one another. In this respect, Tony Blair’s persona was mediated as the 
‘human face of Thatcherism’ in that his adoption of Third Way politics sought to 
humanise capitalism and make it more responsible, but only within the boundaries of 
the broad thrust of neoliberalism.  
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The radical and public way in which Tony Blair reconfigured traditional political 
ideology through personalisation enabled him to fashion his perceived character and 
persona as the embodiment of change. In terms of symbolic politics, Blair 
represented change, renewal and modernisation. The opposite is even more 
important, that changes to neoliberalism were made through the self. Jessop (2002), 
cited in our overview of the 1980s defines the pursuit of neoliberalism under Thatcher 
as ‘regime shift’ i.e. “paradigm shift in accumulation and regulation, introducing new 
economic and political principles” (2002, p. 458). He characterises New Labour’s 
version of neoliberalism not as regime shift but as a form of policy adjustment within 
the polity: “modulation of policies to improve performance of an accumulation regime 
and mode of regulation” (ibid). Internationally, the collapse of communism in 1989 
gave way to the dominance of neoliberalism as an ideology.  
 
New Labour’s adoption of a version of neoliberalism both in opposition and in 
government was a major expression within the British polity of the decline in the 
difference between Left and Right ideology since the 1980s. The convergence of 
ideology can be seen to affect contemporary culture in the following ways:  
 
• The policies of traditionally Left and Right parties were more similar to than 
distinct from one another; thus loosening traditional forms of party affiliation 
which were based upon social class and occupational structure. The nature of 
party affiliation had been reconfigured and gave rise to issue voting. 
• Changes in ideology created ‘space’ for the personalisation and for leaders to 
deploy the self to political effect; and more importantly, it saw personalised 
leadership become the vehicle for ideological shifts. 
 
In this sub-chapter, we have discussed two aspects which constitute part of 
contemporary British political culture. The following working definition of culture is 
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used in this research: the features of a given community such as history and 
traditions, norms and values and the way these interact with, influence (and are 
influenced by) formal political institutions and practices. Political culture is an 
expression of public sentiment towards politics and a matrix of dispositions, attitudes, 
beliefs and understandings which evolve and develop over time, for example, 
whether or not there is a high degree of personalisation of executive figures or the 
concentration or dispersal of political power. Over time, these have an influence upon 
the institutional configurations within the polity. Culture, institutions and political 
action are inherently linked.  
 
3.1.3 Conclusion 
Two conclusions are made on culture as offering opportunities and/or constraints for 
the leadership performance of the case studies. First, the conjuncture of 
personalisation, celebrity and the expansion of the media have offered greater scope 
for political performance and the expression of one’s perceived character and 
persona within and outside the polity. The rise of celebrity culture in the late 1980s 
and its extension to mainstream political discourse thereafter meant that the culture 
itself has become increasingly personalised to the point that the personal and 
political exist as more similar to than distinct from one another. For Marquand, the 
personalisation of political discourse in Britain and its mediation has had a negative 
impact upon culture; he states “the British media’s obsession with fame and charisma 
tells us more about the degradation of our public culture than about the outside 
world” (2009).  
 
Second, changes in political ideology and party affiliation have given rise to 
individualism and have reconfigured the perceived relationship between the 
individual and the state. The lack of ideological distinction between the two main 
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political parties has created greater emphasis upon political leadership and the 
symbolism of leadership. 
 
The following sub-chapter (3.2) sets out the second part of the framework of political 
performance, institutions. 
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3.2 Institutions 
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3.2a Overview 
“The study of political institutions is central to the identity of the discipline of political 
science” (Rhodes et al, 2008, preface). The relationship between political institutions, 
political actors and political outcomes is central to understanding contemporary 
British political leadership and performance. Political institutions are viewed as 
contexts of leadership performance, as indicated in the framework of political 
performance. In order to understand institutions as contexts to leadership 
performance, we refer to the academic literature on political institutions. ‘New 
institutionalism’ is the approach to studying political institutions which gained 
currency in Anglo-Saxon debates from the 1980s onwards. The ‘new institutionalism’ 
literature (3.2.1) is a range of different theories of the role of the state in politics; 
constructivist institutionalism is the theory that is significant for our research as it 
stresses the role of discourse and ideas in political life. Thereafter, McAnulla’s (2006) 
research on British political institutions is referenced in order to describe the 
institutional complexities that the case studies operate within and upon. The political 
party and cabinet government are analysed as two significant institutions that affect 
and structure performance. The media operates as an institution and is a major 
context of leadership performance; the relationship between the media and political 
performance is described. 
 
The purpose of this sub-chapter is to understand the role of institutions and the 
relationship between institutions and individual effects. Central to our analysis are 
two points. First, institutions exist not as separate entities, but within and alongside 
social, political and economic contexts which they are in some sense a part of; 
context and political culture both have a formative role in the configuration or 
reconfiguration of political institutions and institutional actors. Second, related to ‘new 
institutionalism’ is the structure/agency debate which refers to the relationship 
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between structures, in our case political institutions, and agency which refers to 
actors and how they shape or are shaped by political institutions which they are a 
part of, or in a relationship to. The structure/agency debate and its origins are 
appraised in section 3.2.1.1, constructivist institutionalism. 
 
3.2.1 New Institutionalism 
March and Olsen’s ‘The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life’ 
(1984) and Rediscovering Institutions (1989) has drawn the most attention to 
institutions over the last 25 years. Central to their approach to institutions is the idea 
that norms and values are institutionally significant and influence behaviour and 
political outcomes, hence their approach being characterised as ‘normative 
institutionalism’. They define ‘New Institutionalism’ as  
“a narrow collection of challenges to contemporary theoretical 
thinking in political science… the ideas deemphasize the 
dependence of the polity on society in favour of an interdependence 
between relatively autonomous social and political institutions” 
(March and Olsen, 1984, p. 738). 
 
Rational choice, historical, sociological and constructivist institutionalism are forms of 
new institutionalism which proceeded (and departed) from March and Olsen’s 
neoinstitutionalist approach to theorising political institutions. New institutionalism is 
characterised by its attempts to illuminate how political institutions affect political 
outcomes and behaviour. Rational choice institutionalism is informed by rational 
choice theory. Actors are viewed as rational and as having fixed preferences; 
preferences are maximised by strategic calculation and action. Institutions are thus 
explained in terms of effects and functions (see Homans (1961); Peters (1999); 
Scott, 2000, p. 127). Historical institutionalism emphasises history and path 
dependency. Institutions are viewed as structuring individual behaviour and political 
outcomes. This approach explains political institutions via the importance of the state 
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and how it structures political action (see Evans et al (1985), Skocpol (1992), 
Steinmo (1992), Thelen (1999), Hall (1986); Hall and Taylor (1996); and Schmidt 
(2006)). Sociological institutionalism is linked to organisational theory (Powell and 
DiMaggio, 1991), and identifies forms of organisational life stemming from culturally 
specific practices (Schmidt, 2005) as well as norms, values, culture and ideas 
(Dobbin, 1994), thus showing similarities with March and Olsen’s normative 
institutionalism. Institutions are explained through culture, cognitions and norms 
which frame action and outcomes. Constructivist institutionalism assumes the 
centrality of ideas in political life and the way in which they are communicated 
through discourse (see Hay, 2001, 2006). The role of language and discursive 
performance is central to this approach as is the structure/agency debate. The focus 
on incorporating the behaviour of actors within institutions has led to the 
neoinstitutionalist project being branded as part of the behavioural revolution in 
political science, which “tended to reverse completely the emphasis on formal 
institutions of government, instead it concentrated on the inputs from society into the 
‘political system”’ (Easton, 1953, p. 112). The focus on behaviour has allowed for the 
structure/agency debate to be explored within new institutionalism. According to 
Peters “new institutionalism is not a single animal but rather is a genus with a number 
of specific species within it” (1999, p. 2). For Judge, the variants of new 
institutionalism share “a common concern to locate institutions at the centre of 
political analysis. What differentiates them is why they believe institutions play this 
central role” (2005, p. 6).  
 
Our purpose is not to review each type of institutional theory but to appraise 
constructivist institutionalism as this approach is relevant to our research question on 
the performance of political actors in the public realm. Constructivist institutionalism 
is related to political performance and to the way in which political leaders use 
discourse within institutional configurations.  
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3.2.1.1 Constructivist institutionalism 
Constructivist institutionalism, also termed as ideational and discursive, focuses on 
ideas and how they are communicated in the political sphere. This approach 
emphasises the role of ideas in political institutions and the relationship to structure 
and agency/material. One of the leading exponents of constructivist institutionalism is 
Colin Hay. He states that “constructivist institutionalists were motivated by the desire 
to capture, describe, and interrogate institutional disequilibrium” (Hay, 2008, p. 57-
60). Hay is referring to the inability of rational choice and normative/sociological 
“institutionalist scholarship to deal with post-formative institutional change particularly 
that associated with disequilibrium dynamics” (ibid, p. 57). He views rational choice 
and normative/sociological institutionalism as relying on the assumption of 
equilibrium. He argues against this; constructivist institutionalism seeks to define 
institutional disequilibrium through reference to ideas in the political process. This 
approach stresses language and discourse. Hay combines normative and 
sociological forms of institutionalism, he identifies both premised upon behaviour that 
is based upon norms. He does however, acknowledges some common ground with 
historical institutionalism as well as difference:  
“if historical institutionalism has typically served as an initial source 
of inspiration for constructivist institutionalists, it has increasingly 
become a source of frustration and a point of departure” (Hay, 2008, 
p. 60).  
 
Hay’s departure from historical institutionalism was mainly because of its over-
emphasis upon formal political structures and de-emphasis upon the political actors 
within such institutions and their ability to structure political outcomes. The common 
ground that both constructivist and historical institutionalism share is based on the 
importance of ideas; for historical institutionalists this has been associated with the 
work of Peter Hall. Hall’s work signifies the importance of ideas within policy that is 
made within a setting of policy paradigms. “Policy makers internalise such paradigms 
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and work within a framework of ideas” (Hall, 1993, p. 279) which can lead to policy 
changes, thus to institutional changes. Constructivist institutionalism shares another 
common feature with its historical predecessor e.g. path dependency, which 
highlights the importance of history informing the present. The important point in the 
similarity between constructivist and historical institutionalism is limited to sequential 
developments and their ability to impact and cause change;  
“constructivist institutionalism emphasize not only institutional path 
dependency, but also ideational path dependency. It is not just 
institutions, but the very ideas on which they are predicated and 
which inform their design and development, that exert constraints on 
political autonomy. Institutions are built on ideational foundations 
which exert an independent path dependent effect on their 
subsequent development” (Hay, 2008, p. 65).  
 
Constructivist institutionalism focuses on ideational path dependency and highlights 
ideas through time and how such ideas shape and inform current institutions. The 
role of ideas in constructivist institutionalism and structure/agency is discussed in the 
following two sub-sections. 
 
3.2.1.1a The role of ideas 
Ideas are the basis of constructivist institutionalism:  
“ideas should be accorded a crucial role in political explanation, 
since actors behave the way they do because they hold certain 
views about the social and political environment they inhabit. 
Moreover, those ideas cannot simply be derived from the context 
itself” (Hay, 2002, p. 213).  
 
According to Hay, political actors lack complete information about their environment 
and contextual setting, they make assumptions and direct these assumptions 
towards forms of strategic action. Ideas thus become crucial to political outcomes. 
“Ideas provide the point of mediation between actors and their environment” (Hay, 
2002, p. 209/210). If ideas are accepted as integral to political outcomes and if such 
outcomes (based on ideas) 
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“include material effects (as invariably they do) then it must follow 
that the material and the ideational are related dialectically, since 
the ideas actors hold have demonstratable material effects. In sum, 
a dialectic understanding of the relationship between the ideational 
and the material is logically entailed by a dialectic understanding of 
the relationship between structure and agency” (ibid, p. 210).  
 
Hay highlights the role of language and discursive performance and its specificity to 
the institutional context within which actors operate. As follows, the structure-agency/ 
material-ideational debate. 
 
3.2.1.1b Structure-agency  
According to Hay  
“structure means context and refers to the setting within which 
social, political and economic events occur and acquire meaning. 
Agency refers to action, in this case political conduct. It can be 
defined simply, as the ability or capacity of an actor to act 
consciously and, in doing so, to attempt to realize his or her 
intentions” (Hay, 2002, p. 94).  
 
He relates the structure-agency debate to the material-ideational, in that structure 
equates to the material and agency to the ideational. The structure/agency debate is 
crucial to understanding new institutionalism, particularly the constructivist variant, as 
ideas are accorded a central role in understanding political outcomes. It is the 
structure/agency question which forms the basis of constructivist institutionalism; this 
enables understanding of how structures impact on individuals and vice versa and 
how political outcomes are shaped as a result of this interaction (albeit to differing 
degrees). Hay states that though “analytically separable, structure and agency are 
ontologically intertwined” (Hay, 2000, p.2). According to McAnulla (2005, p. 33), Hay 
reiterates the view of Anthony Giddens who argues that “structure and agency are 
ontologically fused, that they are in fact two sides of the same coin that may only be 
separated analytically” (see McAnulla, 2005, p. 33). Giddens refers to structure within 
social analysis as  
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“the structuring properties allowing the ‘binding’ of time-space in 
social systems, the properties which make it possible for discernibly 
similar social practices to exist across varying spans of time and 
space and which lend them ‘systemic’ form” (Giddens, 1984, p. 17).  
 
Structure thus refers to rules and resources; rules have two meanings for Giddens: 
“constitution of meaning and secondly rules refer to the sanctioning of modes of 
social conduct” (ibid, p. 18). In order to fully understand the structure-agency debate, 
Giddens refers to the duality of structure as system and structuration:  
“structure, as recursively organised sets of rules and resources, is 
out of time and space, save in its instantiations and co-ordination as 
memory traces, and is marked by an ‘absence of the subject’. The 
social systems in which structure is recursively implicated, on the 
contrary, comprise the situated activities of human agents, 
reproduced across time and space. Analysing the structuration of 
social systems means studying the modes in which such systems, 
grounded in the knowledgeable activities of situated actors who 
draw upon rules and resources in the diversity of action contexts, 
are produced and reproduced in interaction” (ibid, p. 25).  
 
The duality of structure as relating to social systems and structuration means that, for 
Giddens, structure is not external to individuals. In terms of the relationship between 
structure and agency “structure is not to be equated with constraint but is always 
both constraining and enabling” (ibid, p. 25). Institutions therefore can offer actors 
opportunities as well as constraints or constraints and no opportunities.  
 
Agency is a form of action. The degree to which structure is affected by agency or 
vice-versa has been explored by Archer (1995). She asserts that structure and 
agency are ontologically distinct and argues against the position taken by Hay and 
Giddens that structure and agency are ontologically intertwined. Archer states that 
structure and agency are distinct by virtue of the different properties and powers 
each possesses and puts forth a threefold morphogenetic model of structural 
conditioning, social interaction and structural elaboration:  
“structural conditioning refers to systematic properties or aggregate 
consequences of past actions which shape social situations and 
endow people with interests. Action will always be predated by 
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forms of social conditioning” (Archer, 1995 cited in McAnulla, 2005, 
p. 33). 
 
Archer defines social interaction in  
“which agents while socially conditioned also express their own 
irreducible emergent powers relating to intentionality, rationality, 
personal psychology, consciousness or unconsciousness. These 
powers mean that, whilst agents are socially conditioned, their 
actions are never fully determined”. Thirdly, structural elaboration 
“modifies structural properties, in part, in line with the intention of 
actors but in large part in the form of unintended consequences 
emerging from conflict and concession between different groups. 
Agency then does not create structure, but only transforms (or 
reproduces) it in any ‘generation’” (Archer, 1995 cited in McAnulla, 
2005, p. 34). 
 
Archer’s separation of structure and agency illuminates the influence of one over the 
other. Hay objects to Archer’s separation, arguing that both structure and agency are 
ontologically intertwined and should not exist as separate entities. According to 
McAnulla, Hay’s oversight “overlooks the fact that structure is a condition of agency 
and vice versa” (McAnulla, 2005, p. 34). 
 
The structure/agency debate is fundamental to understanding constructivist 
institutionalism and the centrality of ideas in the organisation of political life. For Hay, 
structure and agency are analytically separable but ontologically intertwined; 
although both are linked through actors and ideas, it is possible to separate the two 
as demonstrated by Archer. Viewing structure and agency as distinct from one 
another has the advantage of uncovering the cause and effect relationship between 
the two. According to Hay  
“institutions emphasise the extent to which political conduct is 
shaped by the institutional landscape in which it occurs, the 
importance of the historical legacies bequeathed from the past to 
the present and the range of diversity of actors’ strategic orientation 
to the institutional contexts in which they find themselves” (Hay, 
2000, p. 14-15).  
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In terms of political performance, for Hay, political actors are able to stress the role of 
ideas (the ideational) to affect political outcomes; however, the link between the 
material (structure) and the ideational (agency) suggests that political action occurs 
within pre-existing frameworks and structures. Hay’s assessment of structure and 
agency is relevant to our research as he stresses the role of political institutions and 
political actors and the interaction between the two. Political action therefore cannot 
be seen in isolation to institutions. Constructivist institutionalism stresses the role of 
ideas within institutions; the ideational thus stresses the role of discourse and 
language and its deployment to political purpose within institutional configurations.  
 
Having theorised political institutions as relating to our research, the institutions that 
the leadership case studies operate within and upon are discussed in the following 
section.  
 
3.2.2 British political institutions 
In order to present a broader view of British political institutions as contexts of 
leadership performance, McAnulla (2006, p. 12) outlines the following table which he 
refers to as ‘Traditional models of British politics’. McAnulla’s view indicates that 
British political institutions are informed by a range of theories and perspectives. The 
institutional context within which Blair, Brown and Cameron perform is highly 
complex and related to historic notions of power and authority and current 
perspectives:  
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(McAnulla, 2006, p. 12). 
 
McAnulla’s research represents the broad institutional context which frames political 
performance and offers a range of performative opportunities and/or constraints. As 
follows, Rhodes & Dunleavy (1995) detail cabinet government vis-à-vis the executive 
in their model of ‘the core executive’ which suggests that “a range of institutions are 
important in the operation of central government and that the distribution of power 
may be horizontal rather than vertical” (see Smith, 1999, p. 15-17 for an appraisal of 
the merits of ‘the core executive’ thesis). The party as a condition of leadership 
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performance is detailed thereafter. We must stress that the research consulted refers 
to the institutional context post-1997 which is specific to the period of analysis used 
in this thesis.  
 
3.2.2.1 The core executive 
The ideas that constitute cabinet government are related to British political history 
and culture, particularly in the Labour party. We shall pay particular attention to the 
idea of primus inter pares and collective responsibility. Rhodes & Dunleavy’s The 
Prime Minister, Cabinet and Core Executive (1995) researches the core executive 
thesis by outlining six scenarios through which prime ministerial power is exercised 
e.g. prime ministerial government, prime ministerial cliques, cabinet government, 
ministerial government, segmented decision making and bureaucratic coordination. 
Cabinet government is viewed as an institution and as a condition of leadership 
performance, this also applies to the shadow cabinet. Two key features of cabinet 
government: collective responsibility and the notion of first among equals (primus 
inter pares) are significant in terms of the modern conception of the cabinet and 
relationship to political leadership performance. The origins and history of cabinet 
government within the framework of analysis are not detailed; however, there is one 
point that we make on the shift from monarchy to parliament in the 19th century which 
developed the notion of collective responsibility and the prime minister as first among 
equals. The 19th century shift from monarchy to parliament and government created 
greater emphasis upon the cabinet as a decision making body which was central to 
the day-to-day functioning of government. Sampson states  
“as the franchise was extended in the nineteenth century and the 
civil service expanded its scope, the cabinet became more 
institutionalised, the crucial link between a more democratic 
parliament and a more powerful executive” (2004, p. 880).  
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Bagehot’s description of the cabinet as in The English Constitution (1867) is cited by 
Sampson as: 
“the efficient secret of the English constitution may be described as 
the close union, the nearly complete fusion, of the executive and the 
legislative powers…A cabinet is a combining committee – a hyphen 
which joins, a buckle which fastens, the legislative part of the state 
to the executive part of the state. In its origins it belongs to the one, 
in its functions it belongs to the other” (Bagehot, 1867 in Sampson, 
2004, p. 88).  
 
Bearing in mind Bagehot’s description of cabinet government; British political history 
has stressed two key features of cabinet government: the principle of the prime 
minister as ‘first among equals’ alongside the cabinet, and collective responsibility.  
 
The notion that the prime minister as Head of the cabinet assumes a position of first 
among equals is central to the historic tradition of cabinet government (see 
Mackintosh, 1977; Hennessy, 2001; King, 2009). However, the term itself is of course 
a contradiction; to be first is not the same as being equal to another member of the 
same institution. The contradiction underlies the supremacy and depiction of political 
leadership vis-à-vis the core executive, and therefore legitimates the performance of 
a dominant prime minister to command, control and overrule the cabinet. 
 
 “The cabinet is always expected to present a common front, under the principle of 
collective responsibility” (Sampson, 2004, p. 89). Heywood describes collective 
responsibility as all members “sing[ing] the same song” (Heywood, 2000, p. 193) thus 
maintaining the public integrity of government as a collective institutional 
arrangement.  
 
March and Olsen attribute the centrality of norms and values to the behaviour of 
political actors; the notion of collective responsibility assumes the behaviour of 
members of the cabinet as defined by rules and mutually reinforcing behaviour. 
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Normative institutionalism outlined by March and Olsen is relevant to the evolution of 
cabinet government, as culture within the cabinet and the wider party can affect the 
collective nature of the cabinet. This point is qualified by Lijphart who states that  
“because strong cabinet leadership depends on majority support in 
the House of Commons and on the cohesiveness of the majority 
party, cabinets lose some of their predominant position when either 
or both of these conditions are absent” (1999, p. 12). 
 
Three points are made on cabinet government post-1997 as a condition of 
contemporary leadership performance. First, according to Lijphart “the most powerful 
organ of British government is the cabinet” (1999, p. 10). The centrality of the cabinet 
to the legislative and executive branches of government and to the wider political 
system reinforces Lijphart’s view. However, in practice, the centrality of the cabinet 
depends upon the exercise of executive power and dominance and management of 
colleagues, rivals and adversaries. Political actors therefore operate within a system 
of cabinet government which conditions political performance. Second, Heywood 
cites the declining influence of the modern cabinet “whether or not cabinets are 
invested with formal policy-making responsibility, they have struggled to maintain 
their political role and status” (2000, p. 194). He attributes the weakening of cabinet 
to the growing prominence of the chief executive i.e. the prime minister which he 
sees as resulting from a) the media, particularly the tendency of television to focus 
upon personality and image; b) the need for clear policy leadership in a globalised 
world; and c) the increased size and importance of government departments and 
agencies which contribute to policy development (see Heywood, 2000, p. 193-4). 
Third, we must preface our remarks pointing out that King was writing after the Blair 
premiership; his points nevertheless illustrate our point about modern cabinet 
government as a condition of leadership performance. King’s (2009) conception of 
modern cabinet government is  
“collective decision making by some combination of the full cabinet 
and a range of formally constituted cabinet committees, with non 
ministers brought in as and when” (2009, p. 328).  
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While asserting the advantages and disadvantages of cabinet government (luck, 
orderly decision making, frank thorough discussion versus less good luck, delay, 
fudge, obfuscation) (King, 2009, p. 328), King states that the future of cabinet 
government in the constitution remains unclear, and four broad options are available 
to future prime ministers and governments:  
1. “To reinstate something approaching post-war cabinet 
government, that is, a system of government at the top based on the 
ultimate authority of the cabinet sustained by a network of cabinet 
committees” (2009, p. 328). 
2. The old fashioned virtues of the cabinet would take into account 
the expansive size of modern cabinets; thus the size of the cabinet 
would be reduced to half a dozen instead of 20 and more. 
3. A recognition of collegial government e.g. an orderly form of 
committee government. The full cabinet would exist in the 
background; constituted committees alongside the prime minister, 
officials, advisers would take decisions. 
4. “The ‘smart casual’ option stresses informality and almost infinite 
flexibility. The characteristic modes of communication include phone 
calls, e-mails, text messages, snatched conversations in corridors” 
(ibid, p. 330).  
 
The modern form of cabinet government relevant to the case studies and period of 
analysis has evolved from its pure type, from collective responsibility, ministerial 
accountability and cabinet intimacy in policy making, to prime ministers exercising 
considerable degrees of political power vis-à-vis the cabinet, and in fact bypassing 
cabinet government, failing to record information, or failing to engage in detailed 
policy discussions. Cabinet government as an institution provides leaders with 
opportunities for political performance and use of the self to affect political outcomes.  
 
The political party as a condition of leadership performance is discussed in the 
following section. 
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3.2.2.2 The political party 
This section makes reference to the origins and evolution of the British political party 
system of governance and the characteristics of the Labour and Conservative party 
organisation. The political party is viewed as an institution which frames political 
performance within a series of normative party values, ideologies and traditions. 
 
Ingle notes the “Whig interpretation’ of history as marking the beginning of political 
parties at the time of the constitutional settlement of 1688-9”. He refers to the two-
party myth as rooted in the Whig/Tory political factionalism of the 17th century (Ingle, 
2008, p. 6). Judge notes that  
“the incremental admission of urban and industrial classes into 
parliament post-1832 had repercussions for the party system 
therein… party became the major force in parliamentary politics and 
brought attendant institutional change. The essence of ‘party 
government’, with parties identified with both government and 
opposition and each party seeking to secure an electoral majority, 
was apparent by the mid-1830s” (2006, p. 30).  
 
Forman & Baldwin note that after the 1867 Reform Act  
“the growing power of nationally organised political parties began to 
limit the independence of individual MPs. One of the consequences 
was to accord increased political stature to the main party leaders, 
such as William Gladstone and Benjamin Disraeli, who alternated as 
Prime Minister for nearly twenty years” (1999, p. 291).  
 
The development of the political party therefore gave additional power and authority 
to party leaders and prime ministers throughout the 20th century. In the 21st century, 
in particular as expressed in the leadership of Tony Blair, his reconfiguration of the 
organisation of the party e.g. the declining influence of trade unions within the Labour 
party consequentially created scope for leadership performance within the party. The 
expansion of the media at this time also provided the basis for mass coverage and 
greater scope than in the 20th century for leaders to use the personal to political 
effect. Party organisation and the effect upon leadership performance are detailed. 
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Forman & Baldwin (1999) depict the organisation of both Labour and Conservative 
party: 
 
Table 3.2.1. Labour party organisation 
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Table 3.2.2. Conservative party organisation 
 
 
Both diagrams depict the complex internal organisation of the Labour and 
Conservative parties and depict the leader as part of a series of complex networks 
which take place at the national level; the arrows pointing to and from the leader 
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illustrate this. For example, both Tony Blair and David Cameron (and their 
predecessors) did not become party leaders from the bottom-up e.g. individual 
membership at the local level to state/regional/county level to national level. Instead, 
both leaders were situated within the complex set of networks that exist at the 
national level before being endorsed as party leader. David Cameron’s rise to 
political prominence illustrates this. Within the sphere of national politics, David 
Cameron worked at the Conservative Central Office before being selected as a party 
candidate for the safe seat of Witney in Oxfordshire and became MP for Witney in 
May 2001 (Beech, 2009, p. 19). Thereafter, in the 2005 party leadership election, he 
stood as a candidate and became leader of the party. Cameron’s political trajectory 
existed within the sphere of national politics only. His performance as party leader 
from 2005-2010 existed at the national level; upon becoming prime minister in 2010 it 
is only then that the state/regional and local levels become conditions of political 
performance. Therefore, the national political party determines candidates for the 
leadership election; the local level has some part in their selection as party leader. As 
party leader, it is mainly the national level of the party that is significant. As prime 
minister, all levels of party organisation (national, state/regional and local) become 
relevant, and the audience for political performance becomes wider; the 
comportment of political leaders vis-à-vis the political party is fashioned by 
complexity.    
 
Our second point on the political party as a condition of leadership performance is 
that the positioning of the annual conference assumes a centrality in the organisation 
of both political parties. The annual conference has proximity to the regional and 
local level as well as to the national level. This suggests that the annual party 
conference is considered as crucial to the organisation of the party. Leadership 
performance at the conference is therefore a national event, and important in terms 
of maintaining internal political support and political outcomes.   
 78 
The political party exists as a series of complex and related spheres of influence 
which are conditions of leadership performance. As we have demonstrated, the 
practice of party leadership exists at the national level of party organisation. The 
national, regional and local tiers of the party all become related conditions which 
frame political performance at the prime ministerial level. The annual conference is 
central to the party and incorporates the national, regional and local levels of party 
organisation; the scope for leaders to use the personal as a political resource and 
establish the self as a site of political authority at party conferences has highlighted 
the role of discursive performance and performative actions. 
 
3.2.2.3 The media 
For the purposes of analysis here, the media is viewed not as a political institution 
per se but an institution which affects and structures British politics and the practice 
of leadership. In chapter 5 there is extensive discussion of the interviews conducted 
with media practitioners including commentators and editors which describe the 
effects of the media upon British political leadership. Without stating here all the 
analytical points derived from the interview data, we make two points on the media 
as a condition of contemporary political leadership performance.  
 
In the late 1980s, Britain’s first celebrity glossy magazine Hello! was launched; the 
positive audience reception to the notion of celebrity resulted in similar, highly 
popular, magazines being launched throughout the 1990s. The conjuncture of 
celebrity culture and the expansion of 24 hour news and the Internet in the 1990s 
offered political leaders mass exposure and the ability to communicate with 
audiences in new ways. Corner and Pels as referenced in sub-chapter 3.1 sum up 
this point and state that  
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“the mass visibility that is afforded by modern mediated politics has 
foreground issues of ‘style, appearance and personality’, breaking 
down some of the forces that separate politics from entertainment 
and political leadership from media celebrity” (2003, p. 2).  
 
The media provides the basis for celebrity culture. The emphasis that the media 
places on celebrity culture and its impact upon politics has been cited by Hennessy 
(2001) who cites Richard Eyre’s comments on the coverage of the 1997 election 
campaign, and that since the days of Churchill and Attlee: 
“all politics has declined to the condition of show business, and all 
politicians have been obliged to become performers. They choose 
their costumes carefully, their décor fastidiously; their fellow actors 
and their agents; they study their scripts, they rehearse, they put on 
make up and they give performances; they adapt their acting styles 
from the would-be intimacy of the small screen to the not-to-be 
avoided histrionics of the public platform; and sometimes, often 
disastrously, they improvise” (Eyre, 1997 in Hennessy, 2001, p. 86).  
 
The mass media and its reflection of celebrity culture has impacted upon British 
political leadership performance, personalisation, and the public versus private 
image, character and persona of political actors (as demonstrated in chapters 6-8). 
 
Our second point on the media is that post-1997, Philip Gould notes that politics 
takes place through an “entirely new environment: a context of ceaseless change 
and exploding technological opportunity in which the news media focuses on 
personalities not policies” (Gould, 1998, preface). He notes that “the demands of 
modern government fuse together the act of delivery with the communication of 
delivery” (ibid). This offers leaders performative opportunites and constraints in that 
the self can be used as a political resource to mediate policies and campaigns; 
however, the increasing emphasis upon political actors can lead to negative scrutiny. 
Our main point is that post-1997, the operation of New Labour and leadership actors 
in the public realm relates to changes in the mediation of politics, namely, the 
expansion of political reporting and 24 hour News, which consequentially affects the 
practice of political leadership.  
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3.2.3 Conclusion 
In conclusion to this sub-chapter, institutions exist not as separate entities, but within 
and alongside social, political and economic contexts which they are a part of. 
Institutions frame political action and can affect political outcomes, and are therefore 
inherently linked to leadership performance.  
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3.3 Performance 
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3.3a Overview 
Elements of political performance have been identified in the classic and 
contemporary literature on leadership (chapter 2). However, the literature lacks 
emphasis on the analysis of political performance per se and upon the role and 
details of individual performances, the role of political discourse in the construction 
and deployment of leadership persona, and the effects of these.  
 
This sub-chapter outlines political performance within the context of British cultural 
and institutional configurations. The term performance as used in this research is 
defined, and types of performance relevant to the leadership case studies are 
outlined. The main thrust of this chapter is to elaborate performance as the third 
constituent part of the framework. To reiterate, the following framework of British 
political leadership performance is used in this research: 
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A framework of British political performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
3.3.1 Political performance  
For the purposes of analysis, performance refers to the public presentation of political 
actors. Whilst there is a clear differentiation between a leader’s public and private 
1. Culture 
 
• Personalisation of 
politics including 
celebrity. 
• Shifts in Left/Right 
political ideology. 
 
 
2. Institutions 
 
• Formal political institutional 
configurations: prime minister and 
cabinet; political party. 
• The media as a semi-political 
institution. 
 
  
 
 
3. Performance 
 
The actions, utterances, comportment of political figures, 
informed by personal and/or political trajectory, situated 
within a given culture and set of institutions:  
• Discursive performances: leadership acceptance 
speech, party conference keynote speech, 
announcements, utterances, manifesto launches, 
Prime Minister’s Questions, leaders’ debates. 
• Responses to events/performance in crisis 
moments. 
• Ideological and/or policy performances/Queen’s 
speech.  
• Performance to the media.  
Key: 
    Evolution of  
    constituent elements 
   
   Application of 
framework 
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performance, our focus of analysis relates to the public performance e.g. a discursive 
event such as a public speech, the announcement of policy or the presentation of the 
self including publicly perceived comportment. Performance as used in this thesis is 
twofold. First, performance is a physical act; including the comportment, gestures, 
image and style of political figures. Second, political performance is verbal and 
discursive; this includes the physical, but stresses the role of language and rhetoric 
and its deployment to political effect. Physical performance can exist without 
discursive performance but discursive performance invariably includes aspects of the 
physical e.g. what is said and how it is said. Bearing this in mind, everything that 
political actors publicly say and do can be considered as performance and as forms 
of political action which have intended and unintended political consequences.  
 
Style and image are not strictly performance – performative acts – in the sense that, 
for example, rhetoric is; however, we take style and image as part of our analysis, as 
style and image exist as part of physical and discursive performance and have 
performative significance. Style and image contribute to and emerge from political 
performance and comportment; essentially, the repetition of particular leadership 
traits or actions constitutes leadership style. Image is thus an acquired public 
perception of a political actor. Performing a particular image through a range of 
physical and discursive actions can affect the media refraction of performance and 
thus the ‘reception’ of character in the public realm. Tony Blair’s image as prime 
minister as a ‘regular guy’ was partly constructed through physical and discursive 
performances undertaken to political purpose, but also through the mediated 
performance as communicated by the media in the wider public realm. The 
endorsement of Tony Blair’s ‘regular guy’ image by the media helped him constitute 
his publicly perceived political persona. The inclusion of style and image as part of 
performance emphasises that contemporary British politics and the deployment of 
leadership are constituted in personalities and their mediation. The caveat is – and it 
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is a major caveat – that political actors are not fully in control of their image as it is 
informed by, and refracted through, the media. In some circumstances – often 
cumulatively – ‘image’ is, indeed, out of control. The premiership of Gordon Brown 
analysed in chapter 7 illustrates the negative impact of the media portraying and 
refracting leadership personalities in the public realm. The Brown premiership raises 
an interesting point which we come back to in our concluding chapter, that the style 
and image of predecessors can frame the mediation of political leadership and 
impact upon subsequent leadership styles. 
 
The description of political performance used in this research includes four 
performative categories that are relevant to prime ministers and aspirant leaders and 
are specific to British cultural and institutional configurations:  
 
• Discursive performances: leadership acceptance speech, party conference 
keynote speech, announcements, utterances, manifesto launches, PMQs, 
Leaders’ Debates. 
• Responses to events/performance in crisis moments. 
• Ideological/policy performances/Queen’s speech. 
• Performance to the media.  
 
All and each of these performative categories will be informed by, framed by, will 
shape and be shaped by the evolving image and style of political leaders. The 
analysis of each type of performance makes reference to the preceding persona as 
impacting upon political performance. Chapter 4, on methodology details specific 
methods used in analysing each of the four performative categories.  
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3.3.1.1 Types of political performance 
This section outline the ways in which each of the four performative categories 
(discursive, events/crisis, ideological/policy and media) enables leadership character 
and persona to gain expression in public consciousness.  
 
The first performative category is discursive; the analysis of the range of 
performances included in this category allows us to appraise a leader’s discursive 
persona and its effects. Discursive performance stresses a communicative event in 
which language and its use can link speaker and audience and thus affect political 
outcomes. We should stress that discursive performance and the communicative 
event between speaker and audience is culturally and institutionally informed. Prime 
Minister’s Questions (PMQs) is one of a series of discursive performances which has 
a cultural and institutional tradition in which, often ferocious, political exchanges take 
place mainly between the prime minister, MPs and opposition parties. The tradition of 
PMQs as situated within the House of Commons and broader institution of parliament 
can offer political leaders performative opportunities and constraints e.g. a leader can 
enhance his/her position vis-à-vis the party (or diminish political authority as was the 
case with Iain Duncan Smith, Conservative party leader from 2001-2003 (see Bale, 
2010 who elaborates Smith’s inability to perform at PMQs and the negative effect 
upon the party and his political authority).  
 
Expected and unexpected events and crisis moments can – invariably do – present 
themselves during a leader’s premiership. We consider a crisis as an event but an 
event may not necessarily be the same as a crisis, though it still presents difficulties, 
challenges and opportunities. The impact of an event as refracted through the media 
and a leader’s reaction to events and circumstances can affect political image. 
Political persona can therefore be projected through responses and reactions to 
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events and circumstances. Performance in crisis moments can offer opportunities to 
fashion or re-fashion one’s publicly perceived character and persona. This may have 
positive ramifications in terms of status and authority, particularly if the use of 
performative actions e.g. comportment, discourse and action are fitting to 
circumstance as well as to the political culture. Responses to crisis moments are 
forms of political action.  
 
Policy initiation and its presentation can, if successfully received by the audience 
within the polity or more restricted constituency, enhance the status of the leader as 
well as confer authority and legitimacy. Policy making and its ‘assumption’ by the 
leader are considered as performance e.g. a policy speech or announcement 
highlights discursive performance and use of political rhetoric, and projects the idea 
that the leader ‘owns’ and is even the author of policy. Responses to policy, 
nationally and internationally, are acts of political performance.  
 
From the period of analysis used in this thesis (1997-2010), the expansion of the 
media (e.g. 24-hour News and the Internet) takes on crucial significance for the 
mediation of political leadership in Britain to the point that press secretaries and 
advisors take on a very important role in terms of managing leadership style and 
image to affect political outcomes. The media is an institution and condition of 
leadership performance. Performance in the media e.g. interviews with 
commentators and journalists, can generate tangible political outcomes through 
positive political coverage, more so since the expansion of the media and ability to 
reach wide audiences. Interviews with the media or articles in newspapers or 
magazines exist as discursive performances, and highlight the role of language and 
its political effect. 
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3.3.2 Conclusion 
This sub-chapter has presented the third constituent part of the framework of political 
performance. The definition of political performance as used in this research is the 
public actions, utterances, and comportment, image and style of political actors, 
situated within a given culture and set of institutions.  
 
In the next chapter, the methodology used for assessing the four categories relating 
to political performance is detailed.  
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4a Overview  
Three strands constitute the methodology for this research on contemporary British 
political leadership. First, the application of the framework of political performance as 
the main method for analysing leadership performance is outlined in section 4.1. The 
methods used to analyse each of the four categories of performance (discursive, 
events/crisis, policy and media) are detailed. Second, elite interviews were carried 
out with senior practitioners who constitute an integral part of contemporary British 
politics especially as regards the deployment of leadership. The research 
participants, including former political leaders and chiefs of staff, speechwriters, 
policy makers/advisors, media commentators, including public service broadcasting 
editors and caricaturists, and civil service support leaders, illuminate the practice of 
contemporary British politics and leadership and provide insights into the 
Westminster context within which leadership performance takes place. Although the 
elite interviews were not the main part of the methodology for this study on political 
performance, the analysis of the interviews was important and has methodological 
and case study relevance in terms of describing the Westminster context within 
which the case studies operate. Elite interviews, which provided direct insights into 
the cultural and institutional Westminster context that the leaders perform within, are 
analysed in section 4.2. Thereafter, the research approach e.g. qualitative 
methodology and use of the constructivist paradigm (4.2.1), selection of research 
participants (4.2.2), access and gatekeepers (4.2.3), semi-structured interview 
structure (4.2.4), role of the researcher (4.2.5), ethical considerations including 
anonymity (4.2.6), and data management (4.2.7) are outlined. The use of a 
comparative case study approach is the third part of the methodology which allowed 
in-depth examination of the case studies within their context of British parliamentary 
institutions and political culture (4.3). 
 91 
4.1 Political performance methodology 
In sub-chapter 3.3, political performance in the context of British cultural and 
institutional configurations was outlined. This section details the specific methods 
used in analysing the following four types of performance which are relevant in 
assessing the leadership performance of the case studies:  
 
• (4.1.1) Discursive performances e.g. leadership acceptance speech, party 
conference keynote speech, announcements, utterances, manifesto 
launches, Prime Ministers Questions (PMQs), and Leaders’ Debates. 
• (4.1.2) Responses to events/performance in crisis moments. 
• (4.1.3) Ideological/policy performances. 
• (4.1.4) Performance to the media e.g. interviews, articles.  
 
4.1.1 Discursive performances 
Discursive performance highlights the role of language and rhetoric and its 
deployment to political effect. A body of literature describes discourse analysis per se 
e.g. the practical aspects of language including syntax (sentence structure), 
semantics (meaning), phonology (sounds/tones) (see Stubbs (1983), Coulthard 
(1985), Schiffrin (1994), Nelson (2002)). Critical discourse analysis (CDA) 
emphasises the relationship between language and society and emphasises the 
context in which language is grounded. Authors such as Fairclough (1995, 2001), 
Wodak and Meyer (2001), Chilton (2004), Lueewen (2008) have used CDA to 
analyse political discourse. For our purposes, some aspects of discourse analysis 
and CDA are referred to; the method used for analysing discursive performances 
draws upon contributions from the following authors, from Aristotle (2004), and in the 
contemporary context, Bolinger (1980), van Dijk and Kintsch (1983) Atkinson (1984), 
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Gaffney (1991, 2001, 2007), Chilton (2004), Gladwell (2005) and van Dijk (2008) as 
elaborating discourse, political communication and performative techniques.    
 
The analysis of a discursive performance is considered as a physical performance. 
We analyse a discursive performance by focusing upon three strands. First, the 
significance of the opening statement is referred to in relation to Gladwell’s (2005) 
assertion that audiences cast snap judgements upon actors very quickly. Gladwell’s 
research as in Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking is primarily about 
behavioural psychology. His assertion that audiences judge actors immediately can 
be used in our study of political leadership performance as this thesis identifies the 
immediacy of reactions to persona. Taking into account Gladwell’s assertion, the first 
utterances that a leader makes and the language/issues that exist discursively can 
affect the relationship between a leader and the audience. We should also stress that 
physical comportment throughout the delivery of the opening statement of a speech 
(body language and gestures) can also affect the relationship between leader and 
follower. The second strand in analysing a discursive performance includes selecting 
discursive moments from the speech which demonstrate the relationship between 
performance and persona. The following list cites discursive techniques that can be 
deployed by a speaker to political effect. The techniques listed are performative in 
that their use can enhance the status and authority of a leader and can affect political 
outcomes and may contribute towards a leader’s discursive persona. The following 
list draws upon the work of Max Atkinson (1984) as well as a range of other authors 
cited. Atkinson’s study of observable human politics is essentially about the 
interaction between political speakers and the audience and the use of particular 
verbal and non-verbal techniques used to gain a favourable audience response. His 
notion of ‘claptrap’: particular devices used to catch audience applause focuses upon 
political speakers at large-scale party rallies. Although Atkinson focuses on political 
oratory within the context of rallies, his insights into language, discourse and political 
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behaviour are helpful methodologically and can be used in analysing discursive 
performance relevant to British political leadership, most notably, leadership 
acceptance speech, party conference keynote speech, announcements, utterances, 
manifesto launches, PMQs and Leaders’ Debates. Our analysis of discursive 
performances includes reference to the following communicative techniques:  
 
• The speakers depiction of the world, depiction of the self and others (see 
Gaffney 2001, 2007). 
• The use of Aristotelian pathos which refers to the ability of the speaker to use 
emotion to political effect e.g. metaphorical language. 
• The speakers relationship to discourse and audience, Chilton (2004) refers to 
three strategies by which utterers manage their interests e.g. coercion, 
legitimisation and delegitimisation, and representation and misrepresentation. 
• Use of personal pronouns. 
• Use of alliteration to create emphasis upon a particular aspect of the speech 
e.g. use of a particular sound in the first syllables similar to rhyme may be 
used to create emphasis (see Atkinson, 1984, p. 81); (alliteration and 
repetition may be used together but can exist separately). 
• List of threes e.g. repetition of the same word three times or three contrasting 
words. “One of the main attractions of three-part lists is that they have an air 
of unity or completeness about them. Lists comprising only two items tend to 
appear inadequate or incomplete” (ibid, p. 57). 
• Use of rhetorical questions to pose a puzzle and engage the audience (ibid, 
p. 75). 
• The use of opposites/contrastive pairs may be used to resolve the rhetorical 
questions. Moreover,  
“praiseworthy evaluations of ‘our side’ involve speakers in 
comparing ‘us’ favourably with ‘them’. If ‘we’ are virtuous, resolute 
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and full of good intentions, then presumably ‘they’ must be wicked, 
weak and full of bad intentions. However, insults aimed at ‘them’ do 
not have to be left implicit, but can and often do comprise the main 
burden of a politician’s message. When made openly, criticisms and 
attacks directed at opponents also have a similar capacity for 
attracting a favourable response, and as such constitute another 
important type of applaudable message” (Atkinson, 1984, p. 39). 
 
• Use of intonational shifts (changes in pitch and tone). “In packaging 
applaudable messages, orators are thus able to use intonational shifts to 
communicate to the audience whether they are proposing to carry on or come 
to a close” (ibid, p. 63). Physical gestures can also aid intonational shifts (see 
Atkinson, 1984, p. 64). 
• van Dijk and Kintsch (1983) refer to the situational model which is “an 
integrated structure of episodic information, collecting previous episodic 
information about some situation as well as instantiated general information 
from semantic memory” (p. 344). Thus, what the political speaker sees or 
thinks about is a construction e.g. the situational model; “it is the 
representation of that fragment of the world that the text is speaking about” (p. 
338). The authors go on to state that a communicative context model 
“representing speech acts and their underlying intentions, as well as other 
information about speaker, hearer, and the context” (p. 338) forms the link 
between the situational model and the text representation. For our purposes, 
reference to the situation contextualises political discourse, and reference to 
situation/context can be deployed to affect political status, authority and 
outcomes. 
• van Dijk in Discourse and Context (2008) states that contextualisation is not a 
pure mental phenomenon and that a “crucial component of a theory of 
situation-discourse relations should be a cognitive theory about how members 
represent communicative situations as context models” (van Dijk, 2008, p. 
120). To illustrate the interaction between social situation and discourse, van 
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Dijk cites the example of Tony Blair’s Iraq speeches in the House of 
Commons and states that Blair’s utterances were informed by the context 
model which he more or less consciously represented and ongoingly 
monitored e.g. setting: time, date, place: House of Commons; position in the 
House: Despatch box; his personal identity as Tony Blair; his personal 
attributes as being democratic and tolerant; his communicative identity as the 
main speaker and as recipient; his political identity as prime minister, head of 
government, leader of the Labour party; his national identity as British; the 
current political action(s) e.g. defending policies, seeking legitimacy for 
sending troops to Iraq; the relevant social and political opinions (see van Dijk, 
2008, p. 122 for a full description of Tony Blair’s context model). In terms of 
analysing a discursive performance, van Dijk’s elaboration of the context 
model is helpful to us methodologically as he refers to the interaction between 
the speaker, the situation and the discourse and the deployment of context 
and the self to affect political outcomes. Our analysis therefore makes 
reference to van Dijk’s situational model as relating to political persona. 
Similarly, Chilton (2004) refers to the cognitive approach to political discourse 
in that discourse is defined by a ‘frame’ within which the speaker’s cognitive 
experiences are expressed.  
 
The points made above illustrate a range of physical and discursive, rhetorical and 
communicative techniques that suit analytical purpose; discursive performances may 
or may not include the above, depending upon the interaction between the discourse 
and situation, performance and reception. The analyses of discursive performance 
therefore make reference to communicative techniques as part of discursive 
performance in order to demonstrate the relationship between performance and 
persona.  
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The third strand in analysing a discursive performance is analysis of the relationship 
between political actors and the audience – audiences vary according to situation 
and context and exist as, for example, an immediate studio audience, viewing public, 
opponents, media, and colleagues. The analysis of the relationship between speaker 
and audience identifies:  
 
• References to the audience, e.g. ‘we’, ‘us’ or ‘our’. “Directing praise to ‘us’ 
and “assertions which convey positive or boastful evaluations of our hopes, 
our activities or our achievements stand a very good chance of being 
endorsed by audiences with a burst of applause” (Atkinson, 1984, p. 37). 
• Invented dialogue e.g. use of rhetorical questions. 
• Proximity to the audience – whether in a studio hall or televised invented 
proximity created through gestures and body language (see Gaffney, 1991). 
• Proximity to and size of the audience are conditions which affect imagined 
relationships between leaders and audiences (see Gaffney, 1991, 2001).  
• Scanning the audience encourages imagined dialogue between speaker and 
audience “it also has the considerable advantage of revealing signs of 
boredom, puzzlement or disbelief, to which speakers can instantly respond 
with a suitable joke, explanation or elaboration” (Atkinson, 1984, p. 12). 
 
As the analysis of discursive performance focuses on performance and language, 
each of the three strands makes reference to Bolinger (1980) who notes the 
relationship between performance and language/the physical and the discursive: 
“eye contact, head movements, gestures with arms and hands, posture, facial 
expression, distance from another speaker, noises such as clearing the throat, 
loudness and softness, high pitch and low pitch, the real or pretended quaver that 
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accompanies emotion – all communicate singly, together, and in concert with 
language” (1980, p. 11).  
 
The method for analysing performance in events/crisis moments is set out in the 
following section.  
 
4.1.2 Responses to events/performance in crisis moments 
The relationship between circumstance and performance is important in terms of the 
effect upon political persona and image. Throughout a leader’s premiership, events 
and crisis moments may present themselves as eruptions into the polity. Given that 
events and crisis moments differ in terms of scale and complexity, an event is 
analysed discursively and makes reference to the points in section 4.1.1; analysis of 
a crisis makes reference to a) the immediacy of leadership response; b) type of 
response e.g. pragmatic and/or discursive (as listed in section 4.1.1); and c) 
relationship to culture and institutions in order to demonstrate the relationship 
between performance and circumstance and impact upon political persona. As image 
and style are included as performance, the impact of an event or crisis upon 
leadership image is also treated as performance.  
 
4.1.3 Ideological/policy performance 
The analysis of ideological/policy performance makes reference to the political 
trajectory of a leader e.g. personal and/or political relationship to the specific policy in 
question and performance of the policy (or its effect upon leadership image). 
Thereafter, the ideological/policy performance is analysed discursively e.g. the policy 
utterances, situational dependency (as indicated by van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983 and 
van Dijk, 2008), depiction of the speaker, and relationship to the audience.   
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4.1.4 Performance specifically to the media  
As most of leadership takes place through the mass media, the mediation of 
leadership performance is crucial to political authority, survival in office and 
relationship to audiences. Arguably, each utterance and action is a mediated 
performance which impacts upon the publicly perceived political persona. According 
to Gaffney “in the modern period, the mediation of the politician is an essential 
feature of his or her political reality” (2007, p. 200). For our purposes, leadership 
performance to the media relates specifically to interviews to the media (television, 
radio, print) and articles written for the print media (newspapers, magazines). The 
method used for analysing interviews and articles is similar to the method set out for 
analysing a discursive performance such as a speech. Specifically, we refer to the 
following points:  
 
• Depiction of the self and others, the depiction of the world (see Gaffney, 
1991). 
• Themes within the interview/article (see Gaffney, 1991). 
• Use of the situational/context model (van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983, van Dijk, 
2008). 
• Emphasis upon particular points/themes and relationship to the self. 
 
The use of elite interviews as providing the context within which British political 
leadership performance takes place, and the use of a case study approach as the 
second and third parts of the methodology are detailed in the following sections. 
 
4.2 Elite Interviews 
Six groups of elites were interviewed including 2 former party leaders and 1 chief of 
staff; 4 speechwriters, 2 policy makers/advisors, 15 media commentators including 
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public service broadcasting (PSB) editors, political commentators and magazine 
editors, 4 caricaturists and 2 leaders of Quasi Non-governmental Organisations. The 
research participants illuminated the practice of contemporary British politics and 
leadership, and provided the context within which the case studies perform. The 
rationale of using interviews was a qualitative approach based upon constructivism 
as a mode of enquiry. Section 4.2.1 refers to the research framework and 
constructivism.   
 
4.2.1 Research Framework 
A qualitative approach was adopted as the data produced is ‘deeper’ than a 
quantitative approach and deals with the actor’s feelings [research participants] 
through the process of verstehen (see Schwandt, 2001). “Qualitative approaches can 
effectively give voice to the normally silenced and can poignantly illuminate what is 
typically masked” (Greene, 1994, p. 541). In addition, qualitative data has a focus on 
‘thick’ description; categories which include “richness and detail in the data” 
(Denscombe, 1998, p. 220), “stressing the interpretation of cultural meaning” 
(Atkinson & Hammersley, 1994, p. 258), and “includes the intentions of the social 
actors” (Blaickie, 2000, p. 240). These four categories exemplify the way in which the 
use of ‘thick’ description (introduced by Geertz, 1999) provides data that is 
contextually informed, interpretative, and focused upon the intentions of the actors. In 
our case, as the elites were internal to the political process, the data produced was 
contextually informed. 
 
Underlying the qualitative approach, the constructivist paradigm was adopted; in 
doing so, the knowledge claims that were made from the interview data would 
typically seek the meaning of human action. The use of elite practitioners allowed 
understanding of the role of research participants and their contribution towards 
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political phenomena in contemporary Britain. Furthermore, as constructivism is 
contextually grounded, all research participants were part of the political process, 
therefore, contextually embedded within British politics.  
“Constructivist inquirers seek to understand contextualised 
meaning, to understand the meaningfulness of human actions and 
interactions as experienced and construed by the actors in a given 
context. The aim is based on the assumption that the social world, 
as distinct from the physical world, does not exist independently” 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2000, p. 986). 
 
The constructivist paradigm is inductive and works broadly from data to theory as 
opposed to the positivist paradigm of hypothesis testing, that is to say, the other way 
round. (The use of induction is referred to in section 4.2.7).  
 
4.2.2 Research Participants 
Research participants were drawn from six broad areas which provided a working 
framework with which to understand British political phenomena. Research 
participants were selected according to two criteria: a) their knowledge of, and 
involvement in, the political process; b) their representativeness for the categories 
used e.g. speechwriter, policy maker. The following groups were interviewed: 
1). Former party leaders and chiefs of staff. 
2). Speechwriters. 
3). Caricaturists. 
4). Media commentators/correspondents/public service broadcasting editors. 
5). Policy makers/advisors. 
6). Leaders of Quasi-non governmental organisations (quangos). 
This pattern of interviewees provided analysis of the Westminster context within 
which the case studies operated e.g. role of speechwriters, impact of the media and 
caricaturists, policy makers, leaders of quangos upon a leader’s publicly perceived 
character traits and political persona; and the impact of such contexts upon British 
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political leadership. The interviews with former party leaders highlighted the 
relationship of leaders to the Westminster context.  
 
4.2.3 Gatekeepers and access 
Given the contemporary nature of the research topic, interviewees were difficult to 
access as they worked in “closed or private settings where access is controlled by 
gatekeepers” (Silverman, 2000, p. 198). In our case, research participants were 
internal to the political process and most had a direct link to the case studies and 
operated within the ‘Westminster village’. Having approached participants as a 
University PhD student who was conducting research, all declined to be interviewed, 
citing various reasons e.g. time, did not want to elaborate case studies, and 
anonymity.  
 
Partly in order to overcome this barrier, I undertook a full-time research internship at 
Demos, a centre-left London-based think-tank. Demos is a recognisable brand within 
the Westminster village context; working at Demos was particularly helpful for the 
research in terms of access to participants and neutrality. Accessing research 
participants through gatekeepers became much easier as Demos already had an 
established network of contacts with elites across the three main political parties. For 
the duration of fieldwork, I became part of the ‘Westminster village’ context and 
adopted the pattern of networking and language used by the elite community. At 
Demos I was also able to observe the role of think-tanks and relationship to political 
actors and politics, particularly leadership politics. As a full-time research intern I had 
access to all the identified research participants who, having previously declined to 
be interviewed, now agreed. The internship at Demos was successful in terms of 
gaining access to research participants as well as a base for 6 months while I carried 
out the fieldwork (September 2008-February 2009). As an independent PhD student, 
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access to research participants was refused; ironically, as an involved intern at 
Demos, access to interviewees was infinitely easier. 
 
4.2.4 Semi-structured interview structure 
Semi-structured interviews were used to gain the viewpoints of research participants; 
this allowed respondents greater voice than in a structured interview; and offered the 
researcher a degree of latitude in terms of posing further questions to points raised 
by the interviewee. As a qualitative approach to the research was adopted, semi-
structured interviews were the best method of gaining the views of elites and their 
role in the political process. This approach provided understanding of political 
phenomena in British politics as elaborated by research participants, and provided 
understanding of political leadership in context.  The aims were not to provide a 
“mirror reflection of the reality that exists in the social [and political] world” 
(Silverman, 2000, p. 125) as in the positivist tradition, partly because  
“we cannot study lived experience directly in social science due to 
language, speech and systems of discourse mediate the very 
experience and define the very experience we attempt to describe. 
We study the representation of experience, not experience itself” 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2000. p. 636).  
 
Elite interviewees provided representations of their experiences within the political 
process, enabled understanding of the nature of contemporary British political 
leadership as constructed by the Westminster village, and generated 
analytical/theoretical propositions from the interview data. In order to generate 
meaningful data, the interview questions posed were open-ended but all related to 
the theoretical preoccupation with British political leadership performance and were 
informed by a series of pre-identified themes that emerged from the literature review 
and framework of political performance. The identified themes for each group were: 
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• Former party leaders: character traits, political culture, institutions, 
events/circumstances, practice of leadership. Chiefs of staff: role, influence, 
projection of the leader, relationship to the media. 
• Speechwriters: process of speechwriting, characteristics, projection of 
character, audience. 
• Caricaturists: characteristics of the product, representation of political actors, 
impact, audience and longevity. 
• Media (including Public Service Broadcasting editors, commentators and 
magazine editors): influence/impact, practice of political reporting, 
representation of political actors, relationship between politics and the media. 
• Policy makers: characteristics, impact, representation of political actors. 
• Leaders of quangos: role of the quango, relationship to political actors.  
 
The questions/discussion prompts used for each group were derived from the 
identified themes referred to. The questions used were consistent for each group 
interviewed, apart from political leaders as previous party leaders made direct 
reference to their experiences of political leadership and performance. The interview 
sheet used prompts rather than definitive questions. The prompts/questions used for 
former political leaders were:  
• Does the idea of the character traits of a leader have any mileage in terms of 
politics? 
• Are character traits politically significant? 
• How do leaders communicate with audiences? 
• How do events and circumstances affect leadership? 
• What is the role of the media as regards leadership and performance? 
• Does the style and substance, policy and personality debate inform 
contemporary political leadership? 
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• Does the conflation of the public/private realm affect political leadership 
persona? 
• Will the character and image of political leaders play a part in the General 
Election of 2010? If so, how? 
The questions/discussion prompts used for speechwriters, media practitioners, 
caricaturists, policy makers, leaders of Quangos were as follows:  
• What is the role of [speechwriter, media, caricaturist, policy making, leader of 
the quango], in terms of politics? 
• Does the idea of the character traits of a leader have any mileage in terms of 
politics? If so, how? 
• How does the character of a leader come across in [speechwriting, political 
coverage, visual journalism, policy making]? 
• What is the impact of [speechwriting, political coverage, visual journalism, 
policy making] on political leadership? 
• Can sympathetic coverage enhance the status of a leader? Can you promote 
the leader rather than policy? 
• Specific questions on the case studies i.e. how did coverage of Tony Blair 
inform his ‘regular guy’ image?  
• Will image and character play a part in the General election of 2010? If so, 
how? 
For all six groups, the themes determined the questions. However, new themes 
emerged from the interviews which are outlined in the analysis chapter (see chapter 
5). The emergence of new themes provided a richer account of the context in which 
the case studies operate.  
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4.2.5 Role of the researcher in conducting the research 
The role of the researcher was internal to the research process. My own ‘self’ was 
acknowledged and used as an additional resource e.g. as a young, smart, formally 
dressed British-Asian female, I gained a positive response from interviewees. 
Although the characteristics of the researcher can lead to bias and error, a focus on 
objectivity and a strict ethical code of conduct overcame this. At all times, I was 
professional, adhered to ethical guidelines and considerations and protected the 
anonymity of research participants. The context of the interviews varied and was 
determined by the interviewee, some interviews were conducted at the institution 
where interviewees worked e.g. Portcullis House, Millbank, or informal settings such 
as various coffee shops and pubs around Westminster. Some interviewees re-
arranged interviews, 2 interviews were conducted by telephone, and 1 interviewer 
requested sending questions by email, and responded discursively in writing. 3/30 
interviews were not conducted in person. According to Bryman “telephone 
interviewing suffers from certain limitations when compared to the personal interview” 
(2004, p. 115). Given the ratio of telephone to personal interviewing, 2:30, 
meaningful data was obtained although I was unable to produce full transcripts of the 
telephone interviews. At the beginning of the interviews, I introduced myself and the 
research, and reason for conducting interviews; this provided a context for research 
participants as their role in the research was acknowledged. Some interviewees were 
very interested in the thesis and a discussion followed; others were aware of time 
limitations and diary commitments and therefore wanted to begin the interview 
immediately. I then gave participants the consent form to which they either agreed to 
be recorded or not (see appendix A). Where interviewees did not want to be recorded 
I took notes. The length of interviews varied from 15 minutes to one hour, depending 
upon the time available to interviewees. I received very positive feedback from 
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interviewees regarding my subject knowledge, and professional conduct during the 
interviews. As follows, ethical considerations are referred to. 
 
4.2.6 Ethical Considerations 
“Qualitative researchers are guests in the private spaces of the world. Their manners 
should be good and their code of ethics strict” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000. p, 447). 
Throughout the research process there was an emphasis on ethics as the research 
topic was of a sensitive nature and research participants were part of the political 
process. Interviewees therefore had overt access to the research project and 
interview questions.  
 
4.2.7 Data management 
The 30 interviews were treated as a data-set. All recorded interviews were fully 
transcribed; the main points of the telephone and non-recorded interviews were 
noted.  
 
The data-set was then separated into six groups of interviewees. As part of the 
research methodology, I adopted a qualitative approach and the constructivist 
paradigm which is inductive in that it works from data to theory. The interview data 
was coded according to pre-identified themes identified in the literature review and 
framework of political performance. The interview data generated analytical points 
which constituted the Westminster context within which the case studies perform 
within and upon. The points raised in the interviews are set out in chapter 5 and are 
referred to in chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9. 
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4.3 Case Study Approach 
The framework of political performance was applied to the case studies. “As a 
research strategy, the case study is used in many situations to contribute to our 
knowledge of individual, group, organizational, social, political, and related 
phenomenon” (Yin, 2003, p. 1) This approach tied in well with the aims of our 
research which were to understand political phenomena, specifically, political 
leadership performance in Britain. The use of a case study approach allowed us to 
“appreciate the uniqueness and complexity of the case, its embeddedness and 
interaction within its contexts” (Stake, 1995, p. 16). The case study approach enabled 
us to understand political phenomena and the notion of political persona in relation to 
institutional structures and cultural conditions within the polity. 
 
Yin identifies three different types of case study: 1) exploratory, 2) explanatory which 
focuses on causal investigations; and 3) descriptive which outlines and describes a 
phenomenon within its natural context (see Yin, 2003, p. 1-5). In addition to this, 
Stake (1995, p. 4-5) outlines a further three types of case study: 1) intrinsic: when the 
research is interested in the case; 2) instrumental: when the case is used to 
understand more than what is obvious to the researcher; and 3) collective: when a 
group of cases are studied. For the purposes of our research, the type of case study 
that we used was explanatory (which will seek to explain political phenomenon and 
look at causation) and descriptive. Our case study approach is also explanatory and 
collective and as we are analysing the leadership performance of more than one 
political leader, our case study approach is also comparative.  
 
The case studies were analysed according to the application of the framework of 
political performance; the interview data provided the specific Westminster context 
for leadership performance and was used in the analysis of the case studies. The 
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material used for analysing the performance of the case studies was derived from 
several sources: biographies, academic literature, speeches and party manifestos 
were obtained from official party websites. Some broadsheet newspapers and online 
news websites also provided useful information.  
 
A comparative case study approach allowed us to determine leadership performance 
and its operation within cultural and institutional contexts and comparison of 
leadership performance and political persona.   
 
4.4 Conclusion 
The framework of political performance, elite interviews, and the use of a case study 
approach enabled contextually informed analysis of political leadership performance 
in Britain. The following chapter (5) outlines the interviews conducted with elite 
practitioners and provides the context for chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9 on the leadership 
performance of the case studies.  
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5a Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, to describe the interviews conducted 
with a range of senior practitioners (former party leaders and chiefs of staff, 
speechwriters, caricaturists, media practitioners, policy makers and leaders of 
quangos) which constitute the Westminster context within which the case studies 
operate. Each of the six groups were interviewed with a view to understanding the 
activity of the practitioner, the representation of political actors, and the perceived 
practice (by the practitioners) of contemporary British politics and leadership.3 
Second, drawing on the interview data, the specific Westminster context relevant to 
contemporary British political leadership performance is presented.  
 
5.1 Former party leaders  
Two former leaders of a national political party were interviewed with a view to 
understanding contemporary British leadership performance, the relationship 
between leaders and culture and institutions, personalisation and its effects, and, the 
mediation of leadership.  
 
5.1.1 Leadership and the emergence of character 
Both party leaders agreed that the character traits of political leaders were important 
to British political practice; political leader B made reference to ‘character’ as 
‘perceived character’ and stated that the perception of character can contribute to 
political effectiveness (we can also add that the perception of character can 
contribute to the perception of political effectiveness). A positively perceived 
character as represented by the media can have tangible political effects; for 
                                                 
3 30 interviews were conducted in total. 27 out of 30 interviews were fully transcribed and 
notes were taken during the other 3. The interviews constitute approximately 30 hours of 
digital recording and 120 hours of transcription. They are not included as appendices but are 
available on request.  
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example, enhance one’s status and credibility amongst audiences, peers, 
adversaries and the commentariat, confer authority and legitimacy, increase one’s 
popularity and fend off political rivals, and generate sympathetic media coverage. 
Conversely, a negative perception of political actors through one’s political actions (or 
lack thereof) or by way of association, can be very damaging and, often, very difficult 
to distance oneself from; such circumstances can offer adversaries and rivals political 
opportunities.  
 
5.1.2 Leadership and culture 
Political leader B made specific reference to the political culture in the polity and its 
“leadership-centred” emphasis e.g. personalisation of political leaders in which the 
conflation of the personal and political can offer political advantage and opportunity. 
The boundaries between the political and the personal, the public and the private 
have become increasingly fuzzy and distorted. Analysis of politics and political 
processes must take into account the personal. For political actors, the integration of 
the personal into political activity (and its reception) can generate forms of personal 
capital; the use of the ‘self’ as a political resource (and often the correlation with 
personal capital) has placed greater emphasis upon Aristotelian ethos (the person). 
The ‘person’ thus exists as a publicly perceived political persona. 
 
5.1.3 Leadership and institutions 
Both interviewees made significant reference to the ways in which the media portray 
politicians, noting that the media is influential in shaping audience opinion. The 
mediation of leadership (including editing and selecting coverage) is crucial to 
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political effectiveness and survival in office. The appraisal of the character of political 
actors in the public realm is a mediated appraisal which may at times be incomplete, 
edited or politically biased. The ability to read the media is crucial to understanding 
political elites and political processes more generally. Political leaders are vulnerable 
to media biases and prejudices; and understanding the role of media management 
(press secretaries, spin doctors) is important to understanding contemporary politics. 
Political leader A referred to the relationship between the comportment of political 
actors and media perceptions: 
“if the media perception of someone is as being younger then the 
politician’s reaction will be to try and look more mature. If the 
perception is of somebody older then the reaction is to try and say 
and do things which make you appear to be younger”.  
 
5.1.4 Leadership and circumstance 
As regards events and circumstances, political leader A stated “what’s happening at 
the time can be completely defining”. Both leaders agreed that the public display of 
character is fashioned by circumstance and events or eruptions to the polity as well 
the evolution of political culture: “leadership qualities are a question of fashion 
depending on the circumstances of the time” or “two years ago you would have put 
forward a different set of requirements than today”. Leadership responses to 
unexpected circumstances or events as forms of political action can offer 
opportunities to fashion publicly perceived character and persona; conversely 
mishandling or inaction may lead to negative constraints which can damage 
reputations and status. However, the mediation of leadership and relationship to 
circumstances is important in terms of the public perception of leadership character 
and persona. 
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One interview was conducted with a political chief of staff. The following three 
quotations as regards leadership performance and character are relevant for our 
research:  
• “In a democracy political personality as manifested in the perception of the 
public is crucially important and shapes political landscapes and polls and 
what is felt to be possible”. 
• [On the relationship between character and performance] “It is acutely 
intertwined. It matters if you make a mistake and the way that the public 
perceive you shapes their response. Tony Blair and the Bernie Ecclestone 
affair – his character bought him the right to say sorry. It matters when things 
go wrong”. 
• [On political leadership image] “Substance is everything and image follows. 
We live in a world in which there is a total intermediation of political 
communication”. 
 
5.2 Speechwriters  
The interviews focused on the practice of speechwriting and relationship to aspects 
of leadership performance; more specifically, to the invention of the discursive 
persona.  
 
5.2.1 The practice of speechwriting 
As regards the activity of speechwriters and the process under which political 
speeches are produced, all four speechwriters interviewed agreed that speeches are 
not exclusively the result of an iterative relationship between a political leader and 
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speechwriter; actors such as special advisors are also key contributors and proof 
readers. The involvement of multiple actors is consequential for the construction of 
the publicly perceived discursive persona and its relationship to the audience. In the 
elaboration of the speechwriting process, speechwriter D raised the point that part of 
the process involves an understanding of psychology and audience: attention span, 
suitable junctures to bury something in the text. And that the consideration of the 
audience is important e.g. a delegate list can help tailor the speech; however, 
audience can be unpredictable and cannot always be controlled to political purpose.  
 
5.2.2 Representation of character 
On the question of how the character of political leaders is represented in speeches, 
all four speechwriters agreed that familiarity with the personal narrative, 
comportment, gestures and tone of a speaker enables political character discursive 
expression. Two out of four speechwriters were of the view that “you have to work 
with ones strengths” and to emphasise these in speeches. The other two 
speechwriters were of the opinion that one’s strengths, by virtue of being them, can 
be likened to a solid base, and that new character traits can be introduced and built 
into speeches. Speechwriter C stated “the first year he [David Cameron] was seen as 
lightweight, we made him more gritty after the first year in terms of policy. Now he is 
more hard headed and not fluffy language”. For speechwriter A 
“the trick then is to write against that main tendency and not to 
confirm it because you’ve got that anyway. So with Blair you get that 
lightness, that frothiness anyway… what you want to do is give him 
the stuff that he doesn’t have by virtue of simply being himself. So in 
a sense you’re writing against character traits”.  
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5.2.3 Impact/success 
All four speechwriters agreed that the success of a speech can be measured through 
the following days’ press coverage. A leader’s discursive persona can therefore be 
appraised through the following day’s press coverage. However, this is not always 
possible; for example, David Cameron’s 2008 party conference speech received front 
page coverage from only three newspapers, as events within and outside of the polity 
i.e. the global financial crisis, dominated headlines. His speech and its impact were 
overshadowed by circumstance. Speechwriter A stated that the reduction of a 
speech into a sentence or soundbite and its appearance in televised News can also 
demonstrate the impact and success of a speech. The soundbite contained in a 
speech serves a function beyond media coverage, that is, the longevity of a speech 
in public memory; for example, Gordon Brown’s 2008 conference speech which was 
primarily about ‘serious times’, was tagged as the ‘no time for a novice’ speech. The 
soundbite also contributed towards Brown’s perceived character at this time.  
 
5.2.4 Relationship to the audience 
All four speechwriters agreed that the ability to gauge audience was crucial to the 
success of a speech. Misreading the audience can sometimes establish perceptions 
of leaders as politically incompetent and out-of-touch, which can be damaging for 
political careers. Speechwriter B stated that the impact of a speech can be 
determined by the audience’s reaction in the conference hall. However, audiences at 
party conferences (aside from the media commentariat) are party members; the 
reaction of the party faithful in most circumstances is positive (and sometimes 
euphoric) rather than negative. Speechwriter A stated the way in which speeches 
filter out beyond the conference hall can affect political actors:  
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“the audience for a political speech isn’t big enough but it does get 
through into the system in a different way which is you are 
influencing a smaller group but that smaller group in turn influences 
a larger group so you’re talking to your colleagues, to the informed 
journalist, to the informed public through the broadcast media 
usually and the speech will usually change the terms of trade; it will 
change the terms on which you are viewed”.  
 
5.3 Caricaturists 
This section describes the interviews with caricaturists and refers to the practice of 
political caricature and how this relates to aspects of leadership performance e.g. to 
the relationship between political caricature and image and persona, and to the ways 
in which persona is shaped by visual representation.  
 
5.3.1 Caricature and image  
The characteristics (and practice) of political caricature i.e. the representation of 
political actors, is, by nature, negative and reductive. Caricaturists, also referred to as 
‘visual journalists’, often exaggerate what is considered to be trivial e.g. facial 
expressions or gestures; such exaggerations/trivialisations can balloon and establish 
themselves within mainstream politics, in doing so, establish a particular image 
and/or persona of political actors which can live on in public memory. The 
embeddedness of political caricature as a part of the political process can have 
damaging and irreversible political consequences; for example, Steve Bell’s depiction 
of John Major wearing his underpants outside his trousers made reference to Major’s 
perceived character as dull, silly and twitty, and a comical imitator of Superman; traits 
which proved difficult to negotiate and revise in the public realm. 
 
5.3.2 The activity of visual journalism  
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The activity of visual journalism can damage the reputations and status of political 
leaders. Illustrations of Sir Menzies Campbell (leader of the Liberal Democrats in mid 
2007) walking with a zimmer frame or wearing colourful woolly socks symbolised his 
age and, consequentially, a ferocious media attack on Campbell’s leadership began 
through the mediums of print and visual journalism. This dented his authority and 
legitimacy within his party and beyond, and led to his resignation. The image of 
youthful party leaders became, at least for a time, part of the culture of contemporary 
British politics. Aside from the activity of the caricaturist as a “licenced court jester” 
(Caricaturist A), caricature has a dark side that can diminish political credibility and 
end political ambitions and careers. Another case in point being the representation of 
David Steel in ‘Spitting Image’ in that it contributed to the failure of the Steel-Owen 
alliance. Conversely, some illustrations have the opposite effect and can (temporarily 
and dependent upon the lifespan of the cartoon) enhance the status of political 
actors. Depictions of Gordon Brown as ‘Superman’ in late 2008/9, drawing humour 
from his Freudian slip at Prime Minister’s Questions when he said that he had saved 
the world instead of the economy, in part, revived his image as a pragmatic, 
experienced and capable executive who was able to solve complex problems such 
as the financial crisis. The caricature of Brown as ‘Superman’ coincided with an 
increase in his poll ratings; caricature can, temporarily, enhance the status of political 
figures (see BBC Poll Tracker). 
 
5.3.3 The representation of political leaders 
One of the characteristics of political caricature includes “exaggerating the cock-ups 
the politicians make” or “going for the weak spot” (Caricaturist A). Visual journalism is 
therefore based upon some truth and likeness to the political actor being 
represented; and such likeness or (albeit exaggerated) faithfulness is constructed 
around the actions, utterances, comportment, style and image of the subject. Political 
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caricature exaggerates aspects of leadership character as identified by caricaturists. 
Caricaturist B stated that  
“some political figures can be reduced down to symbols and props 
i.e. Thatcher and her handbag, Churchill and his cigar, Hitler and his 
moustache; with other political figures this may not be so easy and 
when this is the case, cartoonists tend to concentrate on 
physicality”.  
 
In the quotation above, the image and style of political actors is crucial to 
understanding politics. Caricaturist C stated that:  
“I used to think that I was drawing a cartoon to bring a government 
down but I realised that’s not the point at all. They are in fact almost 
as ritualised as a kind of no theatre that politicians must expect to 
be treated in extremely unpleasant and disrespectful ways because 
it is part of the political process”. Interviewee C elaborated the way 
in which the character of Gordon Brown was represented in 
caricature: “I think Gordon is an interesting case because um, um… 
I always used to draw him before he became Prime Minister as this 
kind of brooding Hamlet figure indecisive Hamlet figure, you know 
sort of him, pictures of Blair about to peg out in the forum as Julius 
Caesar and Brown saying to the conspirators ‘not yet he is still 
looking a sight too feisty’ and then, um, when he became Prime 
Minister, he was actually doing quite a good job for about 2 or 3 
months”.  
 
5.4 Media 
In this section, the interviews conducted with media practitioners are described. The 
interview sample was divided into three categories: 5.4.1) Public Service 
Broadcasting (PSB) political editors, 5.4.2) political correspondents and 5.4.3) 
political magazine editors. The three categories included practitioners from television 
and print media. We decided to focus primarily on these two mediums as the 
mediation of political discourse and leadership takes place actively through these two 
established mediums in contemporary British politics. From the 20 media interviews 
conducted, we sought to understand the mediation of politics and leadership; 
coverage of politics: process, content, selection; political literacy; personalisation of 
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political discourse; representation of the character of political leaders; and elements 
of political performance. 
 
5.4.1Public Service Broadcasting (PSB) Editors 
5.4.1a PSB and political literacy 
All three political editors interviewed agreed that the role of PSB is to provide the 
public with political information that is based upon truth and actual events/scenarios 
and that political coverage remains faithful to the values of objectivity and impartiality. 
The public dimension was endorsed strongly by PSB Editor B: 
“I think public service broadcasting feel a weight of conscience to 
help people to understand politics and guide them towards the 
election and their decisions which you wouldn’t, I don’t think the 
conscience would weigh so heavily, if the public section really 
wasn’t there”.  
 
The nature of PSB as non-partisan means that it is one medium through which 
audiences gain political literacy that would have itself, at least impartial and value-
free. In spite of this, however, PSB Editor A stated that the mantra of PSB is to 
“inform, educate and entertain” and went on to state that “being entertaining and 
engaging is absolutely crucial”. Similarly, PSB Editor B made reference to “the 
appetite for sexy stories in inverted commas, umm… appetite for personality stories 
and we dabble in those and maybe we overdo it”. The nature of political coverage 
within the medium of PSB (in part responsive to competing mediums) has changed 
and can be referred to as ‘politainment’; politainment referring to the representation 
and coverage of politics in an entertaining fashion. Therefore, political literacy that 
audiences gain through the medium of PSB may not be completely objective and 
may contain elements of entertainment which may offer political actors positive 
opportunities in terms of status, credibility, authority; or, negative constraints. PSB is 
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linked to culture e.g. the emphasis upon celebrity – which informs performance via 
the institution of the media. 
 
5.4.1b Editorial practices and political coverage 
The question of editorial practices is politically significant and consequential in terms 
of political coverage and representation. All three PSB editors described editorial 
practices e.g. “in the end all you can do is ask yourself ‘does this matter?’ and is this 
of interest to the public” or  
“we choose and if I think er that it’s important that people see that 
moment, er, and I think that it tells you something about the person 
or if it’s something that they're entitled to see because it tells me 
something I mean learn about the person because they suddenly 
got angry, or lost their way or something like that then you know 
Charles Kennedy Um losing his way at the press conference 
because of his alcohol problem… at the election 2005, er, you you 
put it in”;  
 
or “most of the politics that we cover is not so much the machinations but so much 
what the politicians are doing and the impact of their decisions or not on our viewers”. 
PSB editor B outlined editorial influence and responsibility and value judgements:  
“and to say that we don’t shape things and were just I think is er 
slightly er understating our role. I think we should know our role and 
our influence because we’ve got to be responsible and we’ve got to 
be beating ourselves up and self… all the time, making sure we 
don’t abuse it, to pretend that we don’t have it er opens the door to 
all sorts of abuse I think”.  
“My job is meant to be about judgement. It’s meant to be um, every 
journalist, most journalists job is meant to be about judgement. It’s 
about working out what’s important that day, who these characters 
are, what makes them tick, what their what their judgement is like 
but um… that’s what we do” (ibid). 
 
5.4.1c Representation of political actors 
In the discussion of the representation of political actors, all three PSB editors made 
reference to editorial practices and the emphasis upon impartial coverage as it 
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happens, and coverage that is based upon the actions of politicians, PSB editor A, B 
and C respectively stated:  
“We would never select a look and feel for our packages and our 
studio with the objective of helping to positively or negatively 
present a party leader. I mean that would never enter our mind. We 
would never get involved in trying to enhance or diminish the 
reputation of any politician. We would never do sympathetic or 
hostile coverage. We report the news as we see it”. 
“He [the politician] decides erm the original framing and we can only 
use the picture he gives us. I don’t I don’t think we… the question 
might have suggested that we in some way were trying to work out 
how that we project him as a leader and I don’t think we really I 
don’t think that’s a mental process we go through”. 
“We try and cover things as they happen and try and do them as 
faithfully as we think we are covering them correctly. I don’t think we 
go out and think ‘this man is wonderful, this man is whatever, we will 
paint him that way. I think image is rather like a cartoon, cartoonists 
seize on an aspect of someone’s personality or look and use that as 
a short-hand. Political journalists do the same as well”. 
 
All three editors emphasised their role in the process of representing politicians and 
that they aimed to faithfully present news and politics as it happens, as opposed to 
consciously projecting and endorsing political figures in particulars ways that would 
be beneficial (or not) to them. In the discussion of how the character of politicians is 
represented, PSB Editor A made reference to the ways in which they select 
politicians for TV interviews:  
“on the basis of how they perform. If a politician mumbles their way 
through an interview then you may think people will immediately be 
turning to the off button so we have to consider those factors as 
well. This is where the whole image side of things comes in”.  
 
Character and performance are acutely intertwined and can have positive effects for 
politicians. PSB editor A referred to David Cameron’s performance of his 2005 
conference speech against his political rival, David Davis: 
[Cameron’s] “performance was notable because it was seen in stark 
contrast to his political opponent in that particular conference which 
was David Davis… Cameron’s speech looked better but if you stood 
back and made an assessment, actually what those two speeches 
said was more than what they just said. You’re saying being a 
leader of the party, being the leader of any institution is a 
performance and you have to instil confidence”.  
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In this case, it was the performance itself that conferred character traits upon the 
audience and in turn generated personal capital and established Cameron’s political 
persona within his party and as a credible opposition leader.  
 
PSB editor B referred to the relationship between performance, character and faithful 
political coverage:  
“when Gordon was running for office, um maybe this is shaming 
him, no, but he would he would frequently miss the step on his way 
er onto the platform and then just… not fall over but just miss the 
step slightly… we use that shot because it was him and it was it was 
authentic, it was authentic, it told you something about the man. 
You’ve got to engage and draw people in and, but it is about the 
man and and likewise, if I saw David Cameron, the equivalent would 
be sort of turning round and just sort of touching his hair a bit in the 
in the shop window, god I’d use that shot as well it just, there’s 
something authentic about it”.  
 
The mediation of the character of politicians through PSB is informed by the value-
judgements of editors as indicated by PSB Editor B:  
“I’m supposed to be, you know, getting to know them, working out 
who they are and helping people with that judgement its er, you 
know enormous… er er it’s a responsibility and a privilege and all 
sorts of other things”.  
 
As PSB is unlike other media outlets which are commercially driven, it was noted in 
the interviews, nevertheless, that the style of political coverage has changed in 
response to intense competition from other mediums such as the Internet and the 
press, as well as a change in audience expectations towards entertainment. The 
emphasis upon entertainment and personalisation of politics has altered the ways in 
which politicians communicate, for example, PSB editor A stated that the style of 
politicians communicating in the media was 
“one of which you concede where you have limitations, you’re more 
honest in the way you communicate and I think a lot of broadcasters 
actually warm to those kinds of politicians because it’s more 
engaging for the public and you don’t hit a brick wall”.  
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High levels of personalisation, as in British politics e.g. the public display of the 
character of political leaders and its mediation, can generate forms of personal 
capital and create a series of imagined relationships between leader and led (or 
leader and audience) which in turn can offer politicians followership, authority and 
legitimacy.  
5.4.2 Political Correspondents 
Political correspondents were interviewed with a view to understanding media 
influence; the practice of political commentating; the representation of political 
leaders; the mediation of political leadership; and the relationship between 
correspondents and politicians. Political reporters, journalists, commentators and 
sketch-writers were included in the category of political correspondents.  
 
5.4.2a Political influence of the media 
All interviewees were aligned to different sections of either mainstream press or T.V. 
and PSB channels, they noted that political influence did not really lie with their 
institution, and cited objectivity, competition between different mediums (in particular 
associated with New Media and the Internet) as weakening the influence of any one 
medium, and that the fragmentation of audiences means that specific new mediums 
such as blogs are able to represent specific audiences and interests.  
 
Political commentators who worked for newspapers noted that the media “can shape 
the impressions of people” (Correspondent A) but influence is limited to readership 
profiles and political affiliation. However, the political influence of newspapers was 
cited as being linked to readership profiles. Furthermore, the declining sales of 
newspapers were also referred to; they have become niche products which appeal to 
different readership profiles and are representative of particular interests (ibid). It was 
 124 
also noted that the medium of television is politically influential than newspapers in 
shaping the preferences of audiences. 
 
5.4.2b Practice of political reporting 
In terms of the practice of political reporting and representation of the performance of 
political leaders, 3 interviewees made reference to the principles of objective 
reporting: “we try and tell it straight and as it is” or “we are mirror images of 
politicians. If a politician is hopeless the media will report him as hopeless.  If a 
politician is brilliant, and has what we call box office appeal, we can get that out 
there” or “we work hard to be fair”, suggesting that politics is faithfully reported and 
that political actors (through their actions, comportment, performances) are able to 
control, to some extent, their mediation in the public realm. Correspondent B noted 
that editorial practices are important in terms of how politics is reported “even with a 
paper, an editor has influence over how the leaders appear on page 2 of The Times. 
So that kind of features obviously in the promotion of people”. The activity of political 
commentating strives to be fair and impartial; however, editorial practices can be 
influential and feature in the ways in which politics and political actors are 
represented.  
 
Correspondent C made reference to the practice of political reporting, and that the 
media can exacerbate political infighting between opponents, and shape the image of 
political actors; the example cited was that of Vince Cable’s intervention at Prime 
Minister’s Questions in November 2008 citing Gordon Brown as ‘Mr Bean’ (see also 
chapter 7):  
“it will often be a newspaper or a TV programme which spots 
something you know. The ... writers, the commentators, they are 
quite influential at projecting the image. I mean it was famous you 
know – Stalin to Mr Bean quote… but I mean he was… but I mean 
he was following on, that was something in a way that had been set 
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by the media. And you will find that the attacks that politicians make 
on each other, both parties, are usually based on what was 
happening in the media”.  
 
The media are thus semi-political actors who are embedded in the political process; 
contemporary British politics cannot be seen in isolation to the media. 
 
5.4.2c Representation of politicians 
Interviewees were questioned about how they represent the image and character of 
politicians. 6 out of 8 correspondents noted that represention depends upon different 
forms of political action undertaken by politicians e.g. responses to 
events/circumstances, performance handling (or mis-handling) during crisis 
moments, performances in front of the media which cultivate a particular character 
and image e.g. “David Cameron’s opening his home through Webcameron, 
portraying him as a family man” (Correspondent C). It was agreed that the reporting 
of the perceived character of political leaders was a result of political actions 
undertaken by politicians themselves (and his/her team of spin doctors) and that 
political reporters “just write what they see”. And,  
“any mess that occurs is usually created by the politicians 
themselves. Yes we highlight it, yes we magnify it. But only on the 
basis that you know its blatantly obvious for all to see... but they 
don’t actually make the initial incision. The initial incision is usually 
the creation of the politicians” (Correspondent D); 
 
or “I suppose perceptions of their character change and they are often determined by 
things that they do” (Correspondent A); if this is the case then political actors are 
able to some extent, control their publicly perceived character and image within 
media circles and beyond.  
 
5.4.2d The relationship between correspondents and politicians 
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The relationship between correspondents and politicians can be formative of the 
representation of political actors and consequential in terms of the amount of political 
coverage, duration and type of coverage e.g. positive or negative. Such a 
relationship (in part brokered by spin-doctors) can be decisive in offering politicians 
positive opportunities to shape and manage their publicly perceived character and 
persona or negative constraints. The relationship is particularly important in 
contemporary British politics given the context of commercialisation and intense 
competition between media institutions in gaining access to news stories. 
Correspondent A stated “what we are striving for is to be close enough to politicians 
so that they will tell us what is going on and tell us in their opinion and tell us the truth 
and give us great stories they give to us first before they give to anyone else”. 
Access to political actors and political representation is an important one; 
correspondent C noted that politicians can, to an extent, control the media by offering 
them privileged access which results in positive coverage and if coverage is negative 
any future access will not be granted. If this is the case, political actors can shape 
their mediated character and image. Conversely, correspondent B noted that it is the 
media that have influence over politicians:  
“we are constantly interacting with leaders; they are watching what 
we say. They’re constantly watching what we say and adapting their 
projection of themselves to media expectations. So it’s a 
complicated interaction”.  
 
We now turn to the analysis of political magazine editors and look at the 
representation of political actors in the context of commercially driven mediated 
political output. The aims were to understand politics in practice from the point of 
view of political editorship in the context of a political magazine.4  
 
5.4.3 Political magazine editors 
                                                 
4 In total, 3 political magazine editors were interviewed from two leading magazines, Editors A 
and C worked for the same magazine.  
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5.4.3a Role of political magazines 
In the discussions of the role of political magazines, Editors A and C who worked for 
the same magazine stated that their publication was a political lifestyle magazine 
which “represents the positive side of politics”. The magazine is sent to every elected 
politician in the U.K. and sold nationally. Editor A stated that political coverage is 
comprehensive and that they were trying to overcome the approachability issue in 
that the publication is not only read by politicians but has a wider appeal. Editor B 
stated that their publication attempts to uncover a “side of new political leaders which 
might be underplayed elsewhere” and that the emphasis was upon the intellectual life 
and intellectual heritage of politicians. The two magazines differed in terms of 
purpose and priorities, the question of audience was important in terms of purpose; 
both magazines are monthly publications and are sold nationally. The typical 
readership profile is likely to be political practitioners within the Westminster Village, 
MPs, academics, policy makers and some sections of the electorate. 
 
5.4.3b Representation of the character of leaders  
All three editors stated that they aim to faithfully to portray the character of political 
leaders while adhering to the house style of the publication, whether that is “delving 
into one’s intellectual heritage” or “talking to them more about their life as a politician, 
and what drives the day to day acts of being a politician”. Interviews with leaders 
contained headings appropriate to the character of the politician; Editor A interviewed 
Gordon Brown at the beginning of his premiership in 2007, the seriousness projected 
throughout the interview represented Brown’s perceived character and the 
publication highlighted one of the quotes from the interview that referred to Brown 
differentiating himself from his predecessor, a quote which read “I have character, 
not personality”. The projection of the seriousness of Brown as prime minister, devoid 
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of spin was captured in the publication. Editor A stated that a lot of time is dedicated 
to  
“investigating relationship between parties and government 
departments… and obviously that increasingly involves people’s 
personalities, their decisions, their judgements and all that comes 
down to character at the end of it”.  
 
Political coverage is thus coverage of the publicly perceived character of politicians 
who perform within (and to) Westminster (and beyond). One out of the three editors 
interviewed referred to performance. Editor C stated “if you’re not naturally good at 
performing in modern politics its unlikely you’ll succeed”, and went on to state that 
presentation is linked to character: “well the character again can sound a 
presentation” and “character is the vehicle through which you communicate who you 
are, what you are about, and why you are good for the country”. Thus performance 
and presentation are linked to character; the positive reception of a leader’s 
performance, presentation and character by political magazine editors and the media 
more generally can have tangible political effects e.g. positive coverage of character 
and representation of persona.  
 
In terms of the influence of magazines in creating political characters, editor C stated 
“I don’t think the media do create characters. I think characters create themselves” 
and “the media doesn’t create the persona, it’s your actions that allow them to create 
the persona”.  
 
5.5 Policy makers 
Two civil service policy makers were interviewed with a view to understanding the 
nature of policy making and its impact, and the relationship between policy and 
leadership performance. 
 
 129 
5.5.1 The activity of policy making 
The activity of policy making in British politics differs departmentally and is informed 
by the style of the policy leader. Policy maker B provided a threefold framework with 
which we can understand the policy making process within the context of British 
political culture and institutions:  
1. “Policy can be made by an unelected government and if they are 
voted in it is generally the case that the policies outlined in the 
manifesto become legislation”. 
2. “Within a parliamentary cycle you have to react to events. When this 
government was re-elected in 2005, the global economic downturn 
was not on the horizon. So policies are being reinvented in the light 
of events: economic; military; social; the big explosion in knife 
crime”. 
3. “The third aspect of policy is ministers and their department briefs 
are constantly thinking of ideas, receiving ideas from their civil 
servants, special advisors, general public, lobby groups’. It is also 
the case that under the direction of the Prime Minister of the day, 
The Strategy Unit provides policy and strategy advice and 
undertakes commissioned pieces of work”.  
 
The way in which policy is presented and received by audiences can affect the 
publicly perceived persona of political leaders. Policy is one area through which the 
character of a leader gains expression within the public realm. 
 
5.5.2 The projection of character through policy 
As policy is one way in which a leader’s character is projected; unexpected events 
and circumstances can offer opportunities to deploy innovative policy, in so doing, 
fashion publicly perceived character and persona. The 2008 financial crisis offered 
scope for  
“fundamental changes in direction e.g. recapitalising the Banks was 
innovative policy of a very big nature, and bold and brave. That was 
clear policy innovation. It’s risky, big and it’s got to impact; it was 
driven out of urgent events. So in a crisis that means someone is a 
risk taker, have the judgement and guts to try things that are 
different and I think that comes to the character of people” (Policy 
maker A).  
 
 130 
The policy of recapitalising the banks initially was very successful in terms of the 
positive character traits of Brown that were conferred upon the audience, first 
internationally and then nationally. The replication of Brown’s ‘Bailout’ policy package 
internationally was decisive in enhancing his status and moral authority 
internationally; positive endorsements from (mainly) international political peers fed 
into the national perception and image of Brown as wise, innovative, and proactive, 
and temporarily enhanced his status and credibility as prime minister. Interviewee B 
stated that the Bailout policy was “a good example of an innovation that boosted the 
reputation of the person who took it”. Small scale policy innovations too can have 
positive (or negative) effects. 
 
5.5.3 Policy versus personality 
Over the last 10-15 years the policy versus personality or style versus substance 
debate has gained currency in British politics and has coincided with the 
personalisation of political actors. We sought to understand the views of policy 
makers in relation to this. They stated:  
“in the long run substance will always prevail over form. People who 
are salesmen and no substance do get found out. You have got to 
be able to do both in the modern political age. If you can’t 
communicate your policies and make people believe that what you 
are doing is right, the morals and character behind it then you will 
fail. I think it’s necessary to have both. The British public will always 
vote for something that they think is right rather than something that 
is presented smoothly” (Policy maker A) 
 
Policy maker B stated “I think things change a lot. I think at times style matters, I 
think at other times substance matters”. The projection of either personality over 
policy or vice versa depends upon several factors; what is important is that a leader’s 
comportment (whether emphasising style or substance) fits events/circumstances 
and audience expectations. 
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5.6 Quasi non-governmental organisations 
Two leaders of Quasi non-governmental organisations were interviewed. As both 
leaders have direct experiences with past and present prime ministers and party 
leaders, the interviews sought to understand contemporary political culture, 
institutions and leadership performance from the point of view of the interviewees. 
 
 
5.6.1 Contemporary political discourse 
Both interviewees were reflective of the Blair administration and the leadership of 
Gordon Brown. Interviewee A referred to British politics and the emphasis upon a 
presidential style of government:   
“I think it’s – I think it’s something which is changing. I think people 
now talk when they talk about the prime minister they talk about and 
ask questions about whether we’ve got now a presidential form of 
government. In other words are people more interested in the 
person, that person and their characteristics, their character, their 
competencies rather may be than they are in individual policies”. 
Question: And has that changed over time? “I think it probably has. I 
think it’s too simple to say it’s kind of following the American model. 
But even in my lifetime I’ve seen quite significant shift towards kind 
of presidential character based system”. 
 
Interviewee A also referred to the role of spin in relation to the Blair administration 
and the ways in which confidence was lost in Blair:  
“I think the other thing you can’t kind of ignore where he’s [Tony 
Blair] concerned is the effect of what became his spin. You know 
people’s confidence in him and their ability to believe him.  So what 
started out as informal regular guy who will engage and speak to 
people, kind of people then became to start questioning that I think, 
you know.  Can we believe what we see?  Can we believe what we 
hear? Is it actually to some extent, artificial? Is it a charade because 
you know the spin appears to be capturing the person? So even 
before Iraq I think people had begun to kind of out, but it was the 
Iraq policy that did it for him”. 
 
On the personalisation of politics, interviewee A stated  
“I think we are just becoming a more obsessed with – well image 
and character are different things. I mean I think one would hope 
that character always has played a part in elections. I think the fact 
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that people are under such scrutiny during the election period, 
means that their character is under huge kind of investigation”. 
 
On the mediation of leadership, interviewee B stated that 
“the publics relationship with political leaders I think is mediated 
through the print and televisual media to be honest so er, I I I don’t I 
don’t think people feel a greater sense of connection with the 
politicians now. In fact in some ways I think they feel slightly more 
alienated”  
 
and went on to note that the electorate’s alienation from politics is manifested 
through declining levels of political trust. Perhaps even more important than this, 
interviewee B elaborated on the image management and staging of political actors:  
“I think this sort of image management of politicians identity, of their 
personality, character whatever er I think it’s a real problem because 
it prevents people, prevents people getting some sense of who this 
person really is er, but er, but also makes it very difficult for people 
to identify with them”. 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
In conclusion to this chapter which has described the interviews conducted with a 
range of practitioners integral to contemporary British politics, aspects summarising 
the Westminster cultural and institutional context within which the case studies 
operate are outlined. This is then related to contemporary leadership performance, 
character and persona. The following aspects constitute the Westminster context:                                                                                                
 
• A cultural shift within the polity in which a “leadership-centred kind of political 
culture” has emerged (Political leader B). The emphasis upon political 
leadership has highlighted the role of character, the ‘person’ and the 
‘persona’. For example, “where David Cameron goes, where he is seen, what 
he is seen wearing, what he is seen talking about, what his interests are, all 
serve to define the character” (Speechwriter C) and “if you’re not naturally 
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good at performing in modern politics its unlikely you’ll succeed” (Political 
magazine editor C). 
• An institutional shift is evident in the ways in which politicians are portrayed in 
the media. The age of 24 hour news has intensified coverage of political 
leaders; in some cases the ferocity of media coverage can offer positive 
opportunities for performance as well as negative constraints. The media are 
thus semi-political actors who are embedded in the political process; 
contemporary British politics cannot be seen in isolation to the media. 
 
• A highly influential media operates within Westminster, which, at times, 
operates as a “pack mentality” (Political correspondent A) and can 
significantly affect political status, authority and outcomes. Political leaders 
are thus not in control of their publicly perceived character and persona.  
• The value judgements of PSB editors are significant to the political process 
and the representation of political actors in the public realm; PSB editors are 
semi-political practitioners who can help or hinder political careers. The often 
close relationship between politicians and PSB editors/journalist can blur 
objectivity and can determine value-free judgements which consequentially 
can cause damage to the credibility of PSB. 
• Political correspondents were committed to the principle of objective political 
reporting; however, in practice, the value judgements of political 
correspondents and editors can feature in political reporting. 
• The rise of New Media e.g. the Internet, has lessened the influence of 
newspapers or news broadcasts and has increased the competitiveness 
between correspondents in terms of gaining access to politicians and news 
stories. The role of spin doctors is a feature of contemporary British politics. 
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• The way in which political actors are received by caricaturists is important in 
the representation of politicians. The nature of political caricature depends 
upon several factors, including the actions, utterances, image, style, 
character, performances of politicians, events and circumstances, and the 
actions of political peers and opponents. 
• Speeches are part of the political process, and one of the ways in which the 
perceived character of politicians is imagined by audiences. “Speeches are 
an important act of leadership. It’s a very effective form of leading because 
you’re gathering you’re tribe because they’re all watching, not necessarily 
there in the hall paying keen attention, all 300 MPs you got and they then 
start to pick that up it’s a lot more efficient than writing to them all or having 
them all in for a meeting and you’re doing it all the time. So it’s a very 
important act of leadership… its honing the argument and pushing it forward”. 
(Speechwriter A). Moreover, the emphasis upon party conference speeches 
by the media illustrates not only the role of language in politics but political 
performance.  
• British politics has undergone a shift towards a highly personalised/semi-
presidential system in terms of contemporary styles of leadership and the 
emphasis placed upon political actors:  
“I think people now talk when they talk about the prime minister they 
talk about and ask questions about whether we’ve got now a 
presidential form of government, in other words are people more 
interested in the person, that person and their characteristics, their 
character, their competencies rather may be than they are in 
individual policies”. “I think it probably has. I think it’s too simple to 
say it’s kind of following the American model. But even in my lifetime 
I’ve seen quite significant shift towards kind of presidential character 
basis system” (Leader of quango B). 
 
• Policy innovations that are responsive to circumstances/events can have 
some effect upon a leader’s status and authority. Through policy, the publicly 
perceived political persona can emerge both nationally and internationally. 
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Circumstance and a leader’s handling of unexpected events through policy 
can have positive (and negative) effects. The media reception of policy can 
be decisive in terms of the perceived character of a leader. Political 
commentator F stated that “positive coverage is very potent”.  
 
Taking into account aspects of the Westminter cultural and institutional context, 
contemporary British political leadership performance is affected in several ways:  
 
Firstly, political leaders negotiate (whether explicitly or implicitly) their character and 
image with media institutions. The mediation of leadership is the product of (or 
struggle with) inherited media institutions which may be politically biased. The media 
are semi-political actors who are embedded in the political process. 
 
Secondly, the increasing emphasis upon the visual mediation of leadership has 
emphasised the role of symbolic politics and offered political leaders scope to fashion 
their political image and style. Furthermore, political action (timing, what is said, 
done, when, how, by whom) is crucial to the publicly perceived image and character 
of leaders. Political persona can also be shaped by circumstance and can offer 
scope for political performance. 
 
Thirdly, political leadership can be reactive, specifically relating to one’s political 
rivals and adversaries, for example  
“in 1991 when John Major’s government ran into the sands, and 
there was huge disillusionment – Tony Blair was new, and different, 
what was looked for, in him as a leader was a reaction to what 
people had become disillusioned with… it is less the product of what 
people are or what the public think they are; it is more about the 
product of how we offer an alternative to what is discredited” 
(Political leader A).  
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Political performance cannot be viewed in isolation from political opponents. The 
ability to outshine or rival political rivals can generate forms of personal capital and 
enhance a leader’s status and credibility within mainstream political discourse.  
Fourthly, the value-judgement of PSB editors is one way in which the mediation of 
the perceived character of politicians can translate into political success: followership, 
personal capital, election winning and so on or political failure. The ways in which the 
character of politicians is reported by the media is based upon some element of truth. 
An already established character and image can have negative political ramifications 
as regards the mediation of political persona e.g. Brown’s dithering over a possible 
election offered the media scope in which  
“quickly they were able to portray a character who was not just 
dithering but kind of they implied or lots of different... implied lots of 
different other things for him… awkward or weird or – so I think that 
does – a misfit” (Political correspondent H). The speed in which the 
political representations of Brown as the above began was based 
upon his political actions (albeit exaggerated) and “it does have a 
slight impact – it feeds through his media, the press he gets, as a 
slow drip feed effect on the public” (ibid). 
 
Fifthly, the projection of a publicly perceived character and image by a politician that 
fits ill with circumstances can be damaging, and, very quickly, politicians are no 
longer in full control of their character and image and are susceptible to negative 
representations. Even more fatally, once a negative perception gains currency in the 
media and it can feed into public perception, political status and authority can be 
damaged. The attempt to recuperate the loss of personal/moral capital can be even 
more damaging and disingenuous. If it is the case that media representations are 
exaggerated, then we might say that the role of political reporters is similar to the 
practice of caricature, as correspondent F pointed out “all we are is a verbal 
equivalent of a cartoonist”. In addition to the ways that political reporting offers 
insights into the character of politicians, correspondent F noted the importance of 
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photographs “photos are the most potent way of getting the image across”. Visual 
imagery can inform leadership character, image and persona. 
Sixthly, political leaders are not in control of their publicly perceived image and 
persona and are vulnerable (and susceptible) to negative, often very damaging and 
undermining representations by caricaturists. The frequency of some representations 
can keep alive a particular image of a political actor and in doing so, can erode and 
diminish political reputations. Illustrations of politicians are, in part, shaped through 
the lens of the caricaturist, and the wider prism of caricature as a practice can have 
negative consequences. Illustrations of politicians in some cases, transcend political 
time and space e.g. the boundaries of the national polity and exist on an international 
stage When visual representations transcend the polity, the image and character of 
political actors is exposed to a wider audience, and the audience reception to such 
representations can (if positive) permeate its way through cultural boundaries and 
offer political actors mass exposure. This enhanced international image can then 
(though not always) permeate back into the national polity with significant effects. 
Conversely, the rejection of such representations offers constraints and limited or no 
opportunities. Therefore, culture outside the polity becomes significant when 
illustrations of political leaders (or political leaders themselves) transcend national 
political boundaries. 
 
Seventhly, the effectiveness of a political speech can often be determined by 
performance and delivery as annual political party conferences have become rally-
style events which attract considerable national media attention. A leader’s 
conference speech is important in terms of establishing or reasserting moral and 
political authority, enhancing political status and credibility, improving political image, 
and increasing one’s stock of personal capital. The memory of David Cameron’s 
2005 party leadership speech (see chapter 8) was his performance and delivery 
which established Cameron as a site of political authority within the Conservative 
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party and as opposition leader. If immediate audiences for political speeches (i.e. in 
the conference hall) are considered as powerful actors able to initiate a snowball 
effect of opinion, then the relationship between leader and led becomes crucial to the 
understanding of politics. Devotion and dependency upon a speaker can translate 
into positive support and emotional availability. It was, however, the general view 
among speechwriters that the media reception of a speech (coverage and comment) 
can impact upon the ways in which political actors are mediated.   
 
This chapter has demonstrated the Westminster context within which the leadership 
case studies operate. The interviews conducted with elite practitioners who were 
integral to the political process indicated that leadership character, persona and 
performance are affected, in most part, by the media. The media refraction of political 
persona projected in the public realm can dramatically affect political status, authority 
and tenure in office.  
 
The following three chapters, 6, 7 and 8 apply the framework of political performance 
to the leadership case studies and use the insights from this chapter as partially 
constitutive of the context within which performance takes place. Chapter 9 has three 
sub-chapters, 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3 which correspond to each of the three Leaders’ 
Debates and similarly uses the insights from this chapter as contexts of political 
performance.  
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6 CASE STUDY, TONY BLAIR 
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6a Overview 
Tony Blair’s performance as opposition leader (1994-1997) and as prime minister 
(1997-2007) is analysed. Nine moments of performance are analysed in order to 
demonstrate the effects of individual performances upon cultural and institutional 
contexts, personalised leadership and its operation within a personalised polity, the 
role of the media and portrayal of leadership actors, the role of symbolic leadership 
politics vis-à-vis the political party, and political institutions offering performative 
opportunities and constraints. Accounts from Peter Mandelson, Alastair Campbell, 
Philip Gould and Anthony Giddens – key actors who were central to the development 
and mediation of New Labour and the mediation of Tony Blair’s public persona are 
referenced throughout this chapter. The following performances are analysed: 
 
• (6.1.1) Party modernisation: 
Under the leadership of Blair, from 1994-1997 the identity of a traditionally 
Left party was discursively repositioned as a centre-Left political party; the 
Labour party was rebranded as New Labour. Within the context of party 
rebranding, the appeal of the party was broadened and theoretically justified 
by its adherence to ‘Third Way’ politics and the construction of a developing 
trend of ‘modernising’ within the party. Blair’s modernisation of the Labour 
party is analysed in terms of rebranding and his discursive response to the 
rewriting of Clause Four.  
• (6.1.2) The Blair/Murdoch agreement: 
In 1994, Blair courted media tycoon, Rupert Murdoch and secured positive 
print media endorsement leading up to the 1997 General Election. We identify 
the significance of the agreement and Blair’s relationship to the media 
thenceforth; the creation of the role of a press secretary i.e. the appointment 
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of Alastair Campbell (and centrality) to New Labour; and Blair’s move away 
from his ‘Bambi’ nickname. 
 
Seven moments of performance during the Blair premiership are analysed:  
 
• (6.2.1) ‘Cool Britannia’: 
We analyse the refracted impact of the performance upon Blair’s image as 
incoming prime minister. 
• (6.2.2) Diana moment:  
The death of Diana is treated as an unexpected event in which Blair exploited 
a defining and emotionally intense moment in British culture. Blair’s statement 
on her death is analysed as a discursive performance. 
• (6.2.3) Bernie Ecclestone scandal: 
Blair’s response to the scandal as a performance i.e. his public apology and 
the effects upon his persona are analysed. 
•  (6.2.4) Institutional revisions:  
Including, the dispersal of political power i.e. independence of the Bank of 
England from Government; centralisation of government and revision of 
collective cabinet government, reform of the House of Commons and Lords; 
and devolution of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland; and the cumulative 
effects of these upon his persona and image. 
• (6.2.5) Good Friday Agreement: 
We analyse, as a performance, the projection of Blair’s persona through the 
events leading up to the peace process and Blair’s announcement of the 
peace deal  
• (6.2.6) Foreign policy, 1999 Kosovo:  
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Blair’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999 as refracted through the media is 
analysed.  
• (6.2.7) Foreign policy, 2003 Iraq War: 
Analysis includes reference to Blair’s deployment of the special relationship 
between America and Britain and Blair’s discursive performances on the Iraq 
war. 
 
6.1 Leader of the Opposition (1994-1997) 
On 12 May 1994, Labour leader John Smith’s death prompted an internal contest. 
Between the three main contenders, John Prescott, Margaret Beckett and Tony Blair, 
Blair (aged 43) was, through the party’s Electoral College voting system, declared 
leader of the party on 21 July 1994 with 57% of the vote. Prior to the election, Blair 
was considered as the “modernisers candidate” (Mandelson, 2011, p. 176) which, in 
some respects, legitimated his pursuit of modernising the party as leader with a 
whole series of social, political and economic effects. Blair inherited a strong political 
party in which there was a general confidence (in part informed by the negativity that 
dominated John Major’s administration and party popularity owing to John Smith) that 
Labour would win the 1997 election. This was performatively significant in that the 
institution of the party is a condition of leadership performance and can be used to 
political purpose. Party modernisation and the Murdoch agreement as forms of 
political action are analysed in the following sub-sections. 
 
6.1.1 Party modernisation 
Under the leadership of Blair, the Labour party was modernised and rebranded as 
New Labour. A symbolic part of the identity of New Labour was Blair’s rewriting of 
Clause Four of the party’s constitution which had “committed the party to the 
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common ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange” (Curtice, 
2007, p. 35) as informed by his predecessors, John Smith and Neil Kinnock.  
 
New Labour and the revision of Clause Four were simultaneously presented by Blair 
at his first conference speech in October 1994. The conference was viewed “as an 
opportunity to dramatise Tony’s boldness and Labour’s change of direction” 
(Mandelson, 2011, p. 183). Campbell notes that Blair “would never get as big an 
opportunity to use a single conference to reshape the party and to signal his 
commitment to change” (Campbell, 2010, p. 55). He also notes that aside from 
setting out a new approach as regards policy, the conference was crucially about 
political leadership and presenting Blair as a “new leader who wanted to change the 
party” (ibid, p. 55). (Chapter 5 makes reference to speeches as an “important act of 
leadership” (p. 142). For Blair, his first conference speech provided an opportunity to 
personalise the self to political purpose; moreover, the party as an institution 
provided a platform to use the self to mediate political ideology). The characteristics 
of New Labour were presented as a “modern social democracy” (Mandelson, 2011, 
preface). Campbell notes that the conference slogan ‘New Labour, New Britain’ was 
bold, however, “the problem was that New had an opposite, and you couldn’t 
guarantee there wouldn’t be a lot of hostility” (Campbell, 2010, p. 56). Thus Blair’s 
relationship to the party and members becomes important as regards policy change. 
 
As a form of policy, Campbell notes that for Blair, “in terms of political substance, it 
[Clause Four] didn’t actually mean that much. But as a symbol, as a vehicle to 
communicate change, and his determination to modernise the party, it was brilliant” 
(Campbell, 2011, p. 50). The act of rewriting Clause Four was mainly symbolic in 
terms of defining Blair “as a leader of conviction, and Labour as a party ready to 
recast itself for the modern age” (Mandelson, 2011, p. 178). Blair was part of the 
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modernisers within the party as opposed to the traditional, and soft (and hard-) Left. 
The rewritten Clause Four reads: 5 
1. The Labour party is a democratic socialist party. It believes that 
by the strength of our common endeavour we achieve more than we 
achieve alone, so as to create for each of us the means to realise 
our true potential and for all of us a community in which power, 
wealth and opportunity are in the hands of the many not the few, 
where the rights we enjoy reflect the duties we owe, and where we 
live together, freely, in a spirit of solidarity, tolerance and respect. 
2. To these ends we work for: 
o a dynamic economy, serving the public interest, in which the 
enterprise of the market and the rigour of competition are 
joined with the forces of partnership and co-operation to 
produce the wealth the nation needs and the opportunity for 
all to work and prosper, with a thriving private sector and 
high quality public services, where those undertakings 
essential to the common good are either owned by the public 
or accountable to them: 
o a just society, which judges its strength by the condition of 
the weak as much as the strong, provides security against 
fear, and justice at work; which nurtures families, promotes 
equality of opportunity and delivers people from the tyranny 
of poverty, prejudice and the abuse of power; 
o an open democracy, in which government is held to account 
by the people; decisions are taken as far as is practicable by 
the communities they affect; and where fundamental human 
rights are guaranteed; 
o a healthy environment, which we protect, enhance, and hold 
in trust for future generations. 
3. Labour is committed to the defence and security of the British 
people, and co-operating in European institutions, the United 
Nations, the Commonwealth and other international bodies to 
secure peace, freedom, democracy, economic security and 
environmental protection for all. 
4. Labour will work in pursuit of these aims with trade unions, co-
operative societies and other affiliated organisations and also with 
voluntary organisations, consumer groups and other representative 
bodies. 
5. On the basis of these principles, Labour seeks the trust of the 
people to govern.  
(Coates, 2000, p. 4-5) (see also Riddell, 1997, p. 47). 
 
The theoretical justification for the abolition of Clause Four and move to the centre-
ground was ‘Third Way’ politics. Professor Anthony Giddens provided the 
                                                 
5 The original Clause Four as adopted by the Labour party in 1918 was as follows: “To secure 
for the workers by hand or by brain the full fruits of their industry and the most equitable 
distribution thereof that may be possible, upon the basis of the common ownership of the 
means of production, distribution, and exchange, and the best obtainable system of popular 
administration and control of each industry and service” (Coates, 2000, p. 4).  
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theoretical/academic justification for a traditionally Left party embracing the centre-
ground of British politics. “At its core the Third Way movement was based on the 
belief that efficient management of a capitalist, globalizing economy could be coupled 
with modest innovations to make a real difference in the lives of ordinary people” 
(Wilson, 2007, p. 7). Blair’s justification for the rewriting of Clause Four as a 
discursive performance was that: 
“the Third Way stands for a modernised social democracy, 
passionate in its commitment to social justice and the goals of the 
centre-left, but flexible, innovative and forward-looking in the means 
to achieve them. It is founded on the values which have guided 
progressive politics for more than a century – democracy, liberty, 
justice, mutual obligation and internationalism. But it is a Third Way 
because it moves decisively beyond an old left preoccupied by state 
control, high taxation and producer interests, and a new right 
treating public investment, and often the very notions of “society” 
and collective endeavour, as evils to be undone” (Blair, 1998a).  
 
Blair’s emphasis upon modernisation was evident; the party and its political trajectory 
were not entirely relevant in delivering a ‘modernised social democracy’. However, 
Blair did make reference to the values that were inherently those of a traditional Left 
party: democracy, liberty and justice, which he conjoined with the values that 
underpin the Third Way (and traditional let it be said) notion of internationalism which 
was a response to neoliberalism and globalisation. Blair’s use of opposites e.g. 
traditional Left and Right values/dispositions was an appeal to the middle ground; 
crucially, he retained aspects of the discourse of the Left and appealed to the Right. 
Such a bold constitutional revision as if imposed by Blair had positive ramifications 
for his image. He became symbolic of vision; the party was now modern and a 
credible alternative to an outdated Conservative administration. His image became 
that of an innovative and bold political moderniser who provided a hitherto 
unelectable Left party with fresh modern appeal. 
 
The rewriting of Clause Four meant that “the party rejected the ‘socialist’ position that 
the state should own and run the country’s major industries and instead embraced 
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the market” (Curtice, 2007, p. 35). This marked to the Right policies of a supposedly 
Left opposition party and then government in 1997. The policy legacy of Thatcher 
was evident; “issues such as law and order, welfare reform, small businesses, the 
burden of taxation – would place New Labour on the on the side of Britain’s 
aspirational majority” (Mandelson, 2011, p. 183). The symbolic value of the 
constitutional change was that no one believed that the Labour party would pursue 
further nationalisation. The rewriting of Clause Four had no practical logic to it; it was 
mainly symbolic and, paradoxically therefore, consequential.  
“The symbolic act of rewriting the outdated Clause IV (Part Four) of 
the party constitution should assist the party to criticise more 
effectively the market economy’s many shortcomings and to 
develop a credible economic alternative” (Radice, 1993, p. 24 in 
Riddell, 1997, p. 29) 
 
In summary, the rewriting of Clause Four and the commitment to Third Way politics 
meant that Blair had ideologically shifted the party towards the centre-ground in an 
attempt to reach a larger group of the electorate. The policy was reactive as regards 
the opposition (see chapter 5). The abolition of Clause Four and the re-branding of 
the party from Labour to New Labour personalised Blair as the catalyst of change; his 
image was that of a visionary and political moderniser. His perceived character as 
projected in public consciousness was of a bold, confident, self-assured leader and 
politician, an innovator, moderniser, a practical problem-solver, and a risk-taker who 
responded to a changed political environment, pulling his party to both power and the 
mainstream of the political culture.  
 
The following sub-section analyses the Murdoch agreement and its significance for 
the mediation of Blair in the public realm. 
 
 
 
 147 
6.1.2 Murdoch agreement 
The Blair/Murdoch agreement has been covered exhaustively in academic 
biographies of Blair (Rentoul, 2003; Seldon, 2004, 2007), but is downplayed in the 
mainstream media. As the agreement has been downplayed, we analyse not the 
performance itself but the effects of it upon Blair’s image e.g. the significance of 
positive media endorsement i.e. Blair’s nickname by the media as ‘Bambi’, his 
appointment of a press secretary, and the positive media endorsements in the run-up 
to the 1997 General Election.  
 
Within two months of Blair becoming party leader, on 13 September 1994, a meeting 
was held between Tony Blair and Rupert Murdoch. Reports have stated that Blair 
managed to charm the media tycoon so that the major selling newspapers in Britain 
owned by the Murdoch Press (The Sun, News of the World and The Times) would 
support the Labour party and positively endorse Blair leading up to the 1997 General 
Election (see Campbell and Stott, 2008, p. 13,14) . In return for positive media 
endorsement, the Labour party (once in office) would overlook the power and 
influence of Murdoch’s empire (see Rentoul, 2003, p. 313, 338).  
 
Blair’s political actions and relationship with the highly influential Murdoch press, 
though arguably underhand in a negative way, did not have negative effects upon his 
image; the opposite is true; through devious political actions Blair secured positive 
media endorsements at a time in which the mediation of politics and leaders within 
the Westminster context became increasingly personalised (see chapter 5). From 
1994 onwards, three significant effects in terms of Blair’s image emerged from the 
agreement. 
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First, as a consequence of positive media endorsement, Blair’s political nickname as 
the Walt Disney cartoon character, a young, soft and endearing deer ‘Bambi’ was 
revised. The traits associated with ‘Bambi’ i.e. not forceful, commanding or 
domineering became much less associated with Blair’s persona as was hitherto the 
case. Such an image of the leader of the opposition would have proved highly 
damaging if it had stuck as it would have implied that Blair was unable to command 
authority and lead the party, unable to take strategic decisions, and was a push-over. 
Blair negotiated and revised this image of himself as ‘Bambi’, for example, in his 
dispatch box political exchanges with John Major in 1995, Blair was quoted “I lead 
my party. He follows his” (Blair, 1995). Thereafter, Blair undertook bold constitutional 
party reform, and the image of a soft and endearing figure was shed (although the 
image of ‘niceness’ remained). Through 1994 and 1995, however, the Bambi image 
screened out any reference to Blair as the leader of a party that harboured Leftist 
socialists, the demonised trade unions, or the ‘wreckers’ of less than ten years 
earlier. Blair’s ‘Bambi’ nickname offered him opportunities rather than constraints, his 
perceived image was that of a young politician who was not scheming and interested 
in Machiavellian power struggles. The character traits that his nickname projected 
upon the audience were: honest, soft, endearing, gentle; his image was therefore 
that of a trustworthy person – a contrast to the politicians characterised by sleaze 
allegations in John Major’s administration, as well in to his own party’s past. Blair’s 
positive image as an honest, young, potential prime minister was enhanced by his 
family-guy image, him as a loving father and husband. Blair’s revision of his image as 
Bambi towards the 1997 election meant that he lost the nametag but did not lose the 
associated character traits or positive image that this fictional character represented. 
 
Our second point on the significance of the Murdoch agreement is that in the same 
month in which substantial media support was secured, Blair created the role of a 
press secretary which illustrated the importance that he attributed to the media and 
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party communications. The appointment of Alastair Campbell in September 1994 
was politically significant for Blair. The role did not exist in previous Labour 
administrations. Campbell’s trajectory as a former journalist and experience of the 
media industry was formative to the mediation of Blair’s political leadership image 
thenceforth. Campbell’s centrality to the Labour party and proximity to Blair 
highlighted the significance of the media for political outcomes, to iterate Campbell’s 
centrality to Blair, New Labour and at a general level, political modernisation, Blair 
stated “together we could change the face of British politics for a generation, and 
change the world while we’re at it” (Blair, 1994a cited in Campbell, 2010, p. 51). 
During the three years in which Labour was the opposition party, Campbell, along 
with Peter Mandelson, managed the party’s media communications in a holistic 
fashion. They promoted the New Labour brand and adhered to the ‘Millbank model’ 
of command and control (see Kuhn, 2007, p. 124). Following the success of 
Campbell and Mandelson in promoting the Labour party and its leader to the 
electorate and to the media, the 1997 election victory saw Campbell’s promotion as 
Blair’s chief press secretary and official spokesman. The appointment of Alastair 
Campbell and the positive media endorsements secured from Rupert Murdoch were 
also contexts to Blair’s leadership performance post-1997. The emphasis upon the 
media created the conditions upon which government business was centralised and 
emphasis placed upon political leadership. We come back to this point in our analysis 
of the Blair premiership. 
 
The third impact of the Murdoch press upon the Labour party was that in the “1997 
election 6/10 national dailies supported Labour compared with 3/11 in 1992 and 5/9 
national Sunday titles provided their support as against a mere three in 1992” (Kuhn, 
2007, p. 131). (Appendix B pictures the front page of Britain’s biggest selling tabloid 
newspaper, The Sun and its public endorsement of Blair ahead of the 1997 election). 
The quantitative change in the media and its relationship to party politics had tangible 
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qualitative political effects. The 1997 victory for Labour was helped by an uncritical 
media. Blair’s political actions and association with the controversial figure, Rupert 
Murdoch did illustrate negative character traits e.g. Blair as ready to morally 
compromise the Left’s principles. Crucially, however, the Blair/Murdoch agreement 
highlighted Blair’s recognition that the media (and its expansion at this time) can 
affect political leadership performance, not only by mediating his image, but also by 
screening out alternative narratives (see also chapter 5 which references the 
qualitative and quantitative media shift and effect upon political leadership 
performance).  
 
As opposition leader from 1994-1997, Blair had radically changed the historical 
constitution of the party, and the appearance and identity of the party in the public 
realm from Labour to New Labour. The reorganisation of the political party coupled 
with uncritical and sympathetic media coverage meant that Blair was able to mediate 
political discourse towards the middle classes and appeal directly to them on issues 
such as Education and the Economy. Blair’s performance as opposition leader was 
formative of the emergence of his positive political persona as a pragmatist and 
moderniser. As opposition leader, Blair used the self to channel change and 
therefore was the symbolic catalyst of political change.  
 
We now analyse the performance of Blair as Prime Minister. 
 
6.2 The Blair premiership 
Blair became prime minister on 2 May 1997 commanding a House of Commons 
majority of 179 seats. On the day of victory, Blair’s entrance to Downing Street was 
similar to that of a celebrity. At this time, celebrity had become part of the 
Westminster context and offered a range of performative opportunities A huge media 
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presence (reflective of the qualitative and quantitative media shifts) awaited Blair as 
did crowds of supporters waving Union Jack flags as Blair’s official car entered the 
gates of Downing Street (see Appendix C). The unprecedented scale of attention that 
Blair received on victory day emphasised his political popularity and a largely 
sympathetic media. Crucially, Blair took advantage of a new context of news media 
which was directed towards personalities not policies (see Gould, 1998, preface) with 
photo opportunities with his wife and children outside 10 Downing Street. The 
incoming prime minister was perceived as a happy, young, caring, loving father and 
husband; the personal was used to political effect and the conflation of the public and 
private realm was clearly evident. (See also chapter 5 for reference to a leadership-
centred political culture within the polity which provided Blair with opportunities to 
personalise the self).  
 
The following seven performances, during the Blair premiership are analysed:  (6.2.1) 
‘Cool Britannia’, (6.2.2) The Diana moment, (6.2.3) The Bernie Ecclestone scandal, 
(6.2.4) Institutional revisions, (6.2.5) The Good Friday Agreement, (6.2.6) Foreign 
policy: intervention in Kosovo and (6.2.7) Foreign policy: 2003 Iraq War. Each 
performance of the Blair premiership is narrated in context; the analysis 
demonstrates the relationship between political performance and persona, taking into 
account cultural and institutional contexts. 
 
6.2.1 Cool Britannia 
Blair used the conflation of celebrity, media, the personal and the political which had 
gained cultural expression from the late 1980s. At a reception in July 1997, guests 
included footballers, fashion designers, pop stars, television presenters, entertainers 
and socialites. Blair was pictured drinking and mingling with guests such as Noel 
Gallagher, Sven-Goran Eriksson, Charlotte Church and June Sarpong. The media 
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referred to the party as ‘Cool Britannia’ which promoted U.K. ‘Brit Pop’ and British 
talent to the world and afforded Blair huge publicity and the ability to fashion his 
image by way of association with celebrities and socialites (see Appendix D). ‘Cool 
Britannia’ was part of the broader New Labour project: ushering in a new way of 
thinking. However, the drinks reception highlighted somewhat a slight over-
indulgence and a lack of seriousness about the prime ministership, and this rather 
negative effect would be repeated on several occasions in the future. The long term 
effects of Blair’s use of celebrity to political purpose were negative as well as 
positive; contradictory traits emerged: modern, but perhaps over indulgent, and not 
politically focused, the contradictory traits proved somewhat difficult to control during 
his premiership. 
 
In terms of the significance of ‘Cool Britannia’ for Blair’s image, his association with 
celebrities translated into a character that was aware of and was interested in 
popular culture, trendy and in-touch; the antithesis of his predecessor John Major. 
Freedland notes that  
“there was an echo of Harold Wilson about the early Blair. Just as 
Wilson had sought to ride the spirit of the 1960s by posing with the 
Beatles, so Blair wanted to be a man of the 90s and noughties, with 
Noel Gallagher and Chris Evans” (Freedland, 2007).  
 
However, as noted, a range of paradoxical traits emerged from ‘Cool Britannia’ that 
express themselves later in Blair’s premiership.  
 
Blair’s performance in response to the death of Princess Diana is analysed next. 
 
6.2.2 The death of Princess Diana 
On 31 August 1997, the death of Princess Diana presented itself as an event which 
offered Blair – an incoming prime minister who was hugely popular and enjoyed poll 
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ratings of 72% within his first two months in office – political opportunity to emphasise 
publicly – and even invent new – perceived character traits. It was an opportunity to 
enhance his political authority and status, and exploit a defining emotional moment in 
British culture. Alistair Campbell notes that Blair’s response to the death of Princess 
Diana was “going to be a test for him, the first time the country had looked to him in a 
moment of shock and grief” (Campbell, 2011, p. 125). Blair acknowledged the use of 
emotion “what I have to do today is try to express what the country is feeling. There 
will be real shock” (Blair, 1994b cited in Campbell, 2011, p. 126). Blair’s statement on 
the death of Princess Diana was immediate, and preceded any public utterance from 
the Royal Family; highlighting the political significance of parliament and government 
vis-à-vis the Monarchy (see sub-chapter 3.2), and himself vis-à-vis everyone. Blair’s 
statement is analysed as a political performance in terms of: staging which 
constitutes part of the performance (6.2.2a); Blair’s statement and declaration in 
memory of Diana (6.2.1b); and his relationship to the audience (6.2.1c). All three 
areas of analysis allow us to identify the emergent character traits that were 
projected in public consciousness through performance. 
 
6.2.2a Performance and staging 
The location of Blair’s statement was in his Sedgefield constituency, outside a 
Church with a view of a graveyard; the background was grass, a historic stone wall 
and the view of headstones in the distance. The choice of Blair’s constituency 
portrayed him as a leader who remained close to constituents. The staging conferred 
positive character traits upon him: humble and personable, as if returning ‘home’ to 
mourn. 
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6.2.2b Blair’s declaration 
Blair’s statement on the death of Princess Diana was short in duration (1minute and 
30 seconds). The full text of the statement in which Blair evoked the memory of 
Diana was: 
“I feel like everyone else in this country today. I am utterly 
devastated. Our thoughts and prayers are with Princess Diana’s 
family, particularly her two sons. Our heart goes out to them. We are 
today a nation in a state of shock, in mourning, in grief that is so 
deeply painful for us. She was a wonderful and a warm human 
being, although her own life was often sadly touched by tragedy. 
She touched the lives of so many others in Britain and throughout 
the world with joy and with comfort. How many times shall we 
remember her in how many different ways – with the sick, the dying, 
with children, with the needy. With just a look or a gesture that 
spoke so much more than words, she would reveal to all of us the 
depth of her compassion and her humanity. I am sure we can only 
guess how difficult things were for her from time to time. But people 
everywhere, not just here in Britain, kept faith with Princess Diana. 
They liked her, they loved her, they regarded her as one of the 
people. She was the People’s Princess and that is how she will stay, 
how she will remain in our hearts and our memories for ever” (Blair, 
1997a).  
Blair began the statement by positioning himself in front of a bundle of microphones; 
he looked puzzled; his head was tilted slightly to the left as if he were in deep 
thought. A huge media presence awaited Blair’s response; he did not acknowledge 
his immediate media audience, instead, he stood before them in a reflective state. 
Blair’s silence and expression of near disbelief were interrupted by a journalist who 
stated “can we please have your reaction to the news?” The question did not receive 
an immediate answer, a moment of silence followed. Blair’s first interface with his 
immediate audience was a brief glimpse at the cameras followed by his first 
utterance “I feel like everyone else in this country today. I am utterly devastated”. The 
delivery of this first sentence appeared difficult physically, Blair shrugged his 
shoulders in disbelief and was not standing upright, his head was tilted to the side 
and, whilst speaking, he moved his head from left to right as if in disbelief; his hands 
were clasped together in a semi-religious prayer-like gesture. Moreover, close up 
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shots of Blair revealed that his eyes were teary (see Appendix E). Blair’s tone was 
slower than usual and he was hesitant when speaking; the intonational shifts further 
indicated unease. Blair physically and discursively projected grief and disbelief in the 
public realm. His public display of emotion demonstrated that in spite of being head 
of the executive, he was unafraid of expressing his feelings – as if unable to hide 
them – and unafraid of appearing to be either weak or emotional. Blair demonstrated 
a new kind of political persona within British political discourse which was framed 
around emotion. In the statement, there were three significant moments in which 
Blair evoked the image of Diana: 
• “She was a wonderful and a warm human being, although her own 
life was often sadly touched by tragedy. She touched the lives of so 
many others in Britain and throughout the world with joy and with 
comfort”. 
• “How many times we shall remember her, in how many different 
ways, with the sick, the dying, with children, with the needy, when, 
with just a look or a gesture that spoke so much more than words, 
she would reveal to all of us the depth of her compassion and her 
humanity”. 
• “She was the People’s Princess and that is how she will stay, how 
she will remain in our hearts and our memories for ever” (Blair, 
1997a). 
 
Blair’s positive endorsement of Diana fitted with her phenomenal popularity with a 
large swathe of society prior to her death. The ability to re-create her memory and 
demonstrate positive character traits: compassion, humility and moral conviction 
constituted Blair’s invention of her as the ‘people’s princess’. In so doing, Blair 
evoked her memory within the public realm, began the start of mourning, and 
crucially, demonstrated that he too (like her) was one of the ‘people’, therefore 
likening himself to the public and increasing the scope for imagined relationships 
between leader and audience. The public now shared with the persona of the prime 
minister a range of human emotions, even associating her emotions – caring, 
generous-spirited and emotional – with his. 
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6.2.2c Relationship to the audience 
Throughout the statement, there were two audiences that Blair was performing to: 
the media and the viewing public; although this Diana moment is a rare example of 
almost deliberately refracting his emotional persona through and past the media to 
reach – and grieve with – his national audience alone. Blair assumed an implicit 
relationship with the audience based upon mutual grief for Princess Diana, as 
indicated in 6.2.2b. Blair stated “I feel like everyone else in this country today” and 
“we are today a nation in a state of shock, in mourning, in grief that is so deeply 
painful for us”. Similarly, the repeated use of “we” and “our” evoked mutual feelings 
towards Diana that Blair and the viewing public shared.   
 
In sum, Blair’s declaration on the death of Diana as a political performance was 
significant in terms of the perceived character traits that were conferred both upon 
the audience and then upon Blair. Blair’s performance and use of emotion to political 
purpose meant that his persona had started to emerge as a caring, kind, 
compassionate prime minister, unafraid of expressing his emotions and able to act in 
a calm yet emotionally appropriate manner fitting to circumstance. According to Marr, 
by the summer of 1997 Britain had two super celebrities. One was Tony Blair and the 
other was Princess Diana; Blair’s positive endorsement of Diana was  
“sentiments of one natural charismatic paying tribute to another. 
Blair regarded himself as the people’s prime minister, leading the 
people’s party, beyond left and right, beyond faction or ideology, a 
political miracle-worker with a direct line to the people’s instincts” 
(Marr, 2007, p. 518).  
 
Marr goes on to state that after Blair’s impromptu eulogy of Diana, his popularity 
ratings rose to over 90%. Blair’s performance, and positive relationship to the 
audience and use of emotion to political effect did not weaken his position as 
incoming prime minister; the opposite is true; Blair’s use of emotion resulted in 
positive endorsement from the audience, increased his political authority and status 
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and extended his positive honeymoon period. He thus used the institution of the 
premiership to dramatic emotional and personal purpose. 
 
6.2.3 Bernie Ecclestone scandal 
In January 1997, Formula One Racing Chief donated £1,000,000 to the Labour party 
whilst in opposition. Post-May 1997, the party, however, made a commitment to ban 
advertisements for cigarettes. In November 1997, the government exempted Formula 
One, which included Ecclestone, from the advertising ban. Details emerged of 
Ecclestone’s donation and his perceived political influence upon government policy 
making. Blair immediately denied that the donation was a way of changing policy and 
made a public apology on Radio 2’s primetime ‘Jimmy Young Show’. His self-
testimony “I think most people who have dealt with me, think I’m a pretty straight sort 
of guy, and I am” (Blair, 1997b) was self endorsing without being apologetic for 
improper political behaviour. Blair’s self-testimony sought to project to the audience, 
the image of Blair as ‘regular’, that he shared a likeness to the audience, and that he 
was straightforward and accessible, traits which were reaffirmed by virtue, in fact, of 
appearing on a primetime Radio 2 show. In terms of his political persona, Blair’s 
‘regular guy’ image created the persona of a straight-talking prime minister which 
translated as a character that was trustworthy and upfront. Finlayson notes that 
leaders need to undertake a difficult balancing act “on the one hand, they must 
appear more efficient and skilled than anyone else; at the same time they must 
appear ‘one of us’”. He goes on to add that “the contemporary image of leadership, in 
Britain certainly, requires the appearance of extraordinary ordinariness” (Finlayson, 
2002, p. 590) 
 
Despite the public apology, the Ecclestone affair presented a negative side to Blair’s 
perceived character, in that it implied that he might be less than moral, and that 
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policy commitments were characterised by flexibility and covert transactions. The 
Ecclestone scandal, however, did not have immediate negative ramifications as, at 
this time, Blair was still enjoying his honeymoon period which was extended as a 
direct result of his performance in relation to the death of Princess Diana. Blair’s 
positive political character that existed prior to the scandal was important and 
“matters if you make a mistake and the way that the public perceive you shapes their 
response. Tony Blair and the Bernie Ecclestone affair – his character bought him the 
right to say sorry. It matters when things go wrong” (Chief of staff A, Elite interviews, 
see chapter 5). The scandal was “our [New Labour’s] first encounter with ‘sleaze’. It 
boiled down to money and politics” (Mandelson, 2011, p. 241). It did, however, sow 
negative seeds as regards perceived character which would express themselves 
later in response to Blair’s 2003 foreign policy (6.2.7). The effects of the Murdoch 
agreement, Cool Britannia and the Ecclestone scandal began to exist alongside 
Blair’s positive image; consequentially, a shadow persona was being constructed that 
would crash into public consciousness very negatively later on in his premiership. 
 
The analysis of Blair’s response to the Ecclestone scandal has demonstrated that 
political popularity and a previously established character can be powerful and 
persuasive; when political errors are made they can be forgiven, but also – and 
perhaps more importantly – that ‘forgiving’ becomes part of politics because of the 
use of the self to political purpose.  
 
6.2.4 Institutional revisions 
The following points illustrate the reconfiguration of historical political institutions 
undertaken by Blair; they are considered as political performances:  
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• On 6 May 1997, without cabinet consultation, Blair’s chancellor, Gordon 
Brown, announced that the Bank of England would operate independently 
from Government. 
• Throughout 1997 Blair carried out the following reforms: modernisation 
programme of the House of Commons: a change in the format of prime 
minister’s questions, from two 15 minute slots taking place on Tuesday and 
Thursday to one 30 minute slot on Wednesday. Increasing ministerial 
accountability which included the prime minister’s appearing before the 
Liaison Committee twice a year, this 2.5 hour slot allowed for prime ministerial 
scrutiny, although topics for discussion were known well in advance. 
Rectifying the under-representation of women in public life: five women were 
part of Blair’s first cabinet in 1997: Clare Short, Margaret Beckett, Harriet 
Harman, Mo Mowlam and Ann Taylor. 
• Local and regional governments were given greater powers and control of 
budgets. 
• Towards the end of 1997, devolution Bills for Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland were introduced to Parliament and became law in 1998.  
• Throughout 1998 and 1999, Blair reformed the House of Lords, mainly, the 
substantial reduction in the number of hereditary peers in favour of appointed 
peers on a largely party political basis not unconnected to party political 
funds. The institutional revision of Parliament’s legislative second-chamber 
was criticised heavily and seen as a failure. Blair was seen to have weakened 
the second chamber by screening out governmental opposition and scrutiny; 
and, “its supposed ‘packing’ of the Lords with ‘cronies’” (Cowley, 2007, p. 32). 
The House of Lords reforms were problematic for Blair as they were proposed 
at the beginning of his premiership and were still ongoing in 2007 when he left 
office; this affected Blair’s image in that it appeared that he had not thought 
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through the reforms, was hasty and had acted incompetently without regard 
for the history of political institutions. Instead of the traditional scrutiny 
function of the second House, the House of Lords was organised and 
structured around a transactional purpose; for some, it was as if peerages 
were given out in return for financial donations and/or media influence (see 
Cowley, 2007). 
• Centralisation of government: at the beginning of the Blair premiership The 
Ministerial Code was published outlining the creation of the Prime Minister’s 
Department as the central machinery of government; centralisation and 
government control were exercised as MPs and Ministers had to clear any 
media appearances with No. 10. An increase in special advisers was evident 
in the Prime Minister’s Department, the Policy Unit, Research and Information 
Unit and Strategic Communications Unit (see Hennessy, 2001, chapter 18).  
• In relation to cabinet government, Blair had revised the notion of collective 
government, for example, “a decision of momentous importance for the future 
of the nation’s economic policy [Bank of England] and arguably the 
sovereignty of parliament had been taken [without cabinet consultation]” 
(Rentoul, 2003, p. 331). Moreover, the visibility of special advisers in 
government further detracted from the notion of collective cabinet 
government. Hennessy states that “bilateral rather than collective dealings 
with his ministers remained the preferred way of doing business” (2001, p. 
520). In an interview with BBC Radio 2’s The Michael Cockerell Show on 
‘Blair’s Thousand Days’, Blair makes reference to bilateral ministerial 
relationships:  
“people often say in relation to Cabinet government, look I would be 
pretty shocked if the first time I knew a Cabinet minister felt strongly 
about something was if they raised it at the Cabinet table. I would 
expect them to come and on my door and say, “Look, Tony, I’ve got 
a problem here. I disagree with this” or “I disagree with that”” (Blair, 
2000 cited in Hennessy, 2001, p. 520).  
 
 161 
• In 1999, the Greater London Authority Act introduced the principle of an 
Elected Mayor. In 2000, Ken Livingstone, former Labour leader of the Greater 
London Council won as an independent candidate after the party, as it were, 
replaced him as its candidate with Frank Dobson. The Ken Livingstone 
scandal is very complicated; we retain one point on how this affected Blair’s 
image. The fact that Livingstone was replaced by Dobson highlighted Blair’s 
negative shadow persona and the perception that politics was characterised 
by transactions and even vindictiveness, in this case. The initiative of elected 
Mayors was not widely introduced on a regional level.  
 
Kuhn notes that during Alastair Campbell’s tenure as press officer from 1994–2003, 
New Labour government’s strategic approach to media management was 
characterised by three key features:  
 
• Centralisation: co-ordinated government communications so that a single 
message, top down, was presented; ministers were locked into contracts with 
the government communications arm as any media interviews or 
appearances had to be pre-booked. 
• Professionalisation: sound-bites, whose utilisation also saw the favouring of 
journalists that gave New Labour sympathetic coverage over unsympathetic 
ones.   
• Politicisation: Campbell became more partisan with the press; non-partisan 
civil servants acting as ministerial press officers were weeded out; and the 
number of politically appointed special advisers rose, several of whom fulfilled 
a proactive partisan media relations role. (Kuhn, 2007, p. 124), (see also 
Franklin, 2001, p. 130-144). 
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Centralisation, professionalisation and politicisation as indicated by Kuhn contributed 
to a fourth feature, namely, the projection of Tony Blair to suit political purpose. One 
of the caveats of stressing the personality of the leader is that if character and 
personality exist at the centre of politics then these are the issues which become 
central to politics itself, with a whole series of consequences. 
 
Having outlined Blair’s performances in relation to political institutions, we make one 
point on the relationship between performance and political persona. In terms of 
character traits, the institutional reconfigurations that Blair carried out can be 
characterised in terms of centralisation versus dispersal of power. This demonstrated 
opposite character traits, centralisation illustrated Machiavellian style power politics; 
in contrast, power dispersal (devolution, Bank of England, Local government) 
softened (and justified) government centralisation and illustrated pragmatism, 
courage, boldness, conviction, a modern executive unconcerned with the 
concentration of political power. However, reform of the House of Lords e.g. 
substantial reduction in the number of hereditary peers in favour of elected peers and 
as referenced earlier “supposed ‘packing’ of the Lords with ‘cronies’” (Cowley, 2007, 
p.32) began to foreground previous negative character traits that expressed 
themselves during the Ecclestone scandal e.g. possible corruption and dishonesty. 
The institutional revisions carried out by Blair all involved ‘character’ and elements of 
personalisation which had some positive and controlled, and some negative and not 
controlled, effects upon his image and persona.  
 
Despite the developing paradoxes in Blair’s character traits, his persona remained as 
a popular, young, modern prime minister until 2003, in part informed by a 
sympathetic and largely uncritical media. We make one additional point on political 
popularity as formative of the acceptance of institutional change. Setting the Bank of 
England free from Government was an unprecedented move in 1997 in recent British 
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political history. This reflected New Labour’s wider embrace of neoliberalism as a 
form of governance which embraced markets and capitalism. Rentoul states that 
post-election euphoria and “a fresh face and a basic level of competence was 
enough of a contrast to induce a heady change of national mood” (2003, p. 331). The 
widespread acceptance of this institutional reconfiguration (although announced by 
chancellor, Gordon Brown) can in part be owed to Blair’s personal popularity, and his 
ability to use it to political effect.  
 
In this chapter, four performances of Blair as prime minister have been analysed 
(Cool Britannia and Blair’s use of celebrity, the statement on the death of Princess 
Diana, the response to the Bernie Ecclestone scandal, and institutional revisions). 
The conjuncture of all four performances highlighted – and in some cases even 
created – a range of character traits: calm, poised, unafraid to express emotion, 
approachable, brave, yet powerful, as well as the beginnings of others: (just possibly) 
corrupt, (just possibly) dishonest. However, a largely sympathetic media did not 
exploit the possible negative traits and Blair’s positive political persona remained 
more or less unchanged overall.  
 
Blair’s performance in Northern Ireland politics and the Good Friday Agreement are 
analysed in the following section. 
 
6.2.5 Good Friday Agreement 
The Good Friday Agreement, announced on 10 April 1998, was a momentous event 
in Irish political history. Up to this point, Northern Irish politics had been characterised 
for nearly thirty years by political factions, Unionist violence and IRA terrorism, and 
enormous hostility between the Catholic community and the British Army and 
Government. Blair’s centre-stage role in the Agreement marked the perceived end to 
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the violent struggles that had dominated Irish politics; moreover, a positive London-
Dublin connection was reinstated.  
 
The analysis of Blair’s performance is his announcement of the peace deal on Good 
Friday (10/04/1998) as in section 6.5.2a; however, it is also worth stressing Blair’s 
post-election commitment to the peace process, as well as the energy that he 
expended on the peace process in the final week of negotiations (03/04/1998-
10/04/1998) as chronologically indicated, and the effects of these on his political 
persona. The following points are considered as a series of inter-related conditions 
which conditioned Blair’s announcement of the peace deal:  
 
• 16 May 1997: Blair’s first engagement as prime minister outside Westminster 
was a speech delivered in Belfast at the Royal Agricultural Society. The 
speech detailed the Anglo-Irish question and the importance a resolution had 
for him personally, “It is a responsibility that weighs not just upon the mind, 
but the soul” (Blair, 1997c). 
• 14 October 1997: Blair held face-to-face talks with the republican leadership, 
more specifically, with Gerry Adams, the President of Sinn Fein at Stormont, 
East Belfast. In so doing, Blair became “the first British PM for 70 years to 
meet a Sinn Fein delegation” (BBC, 1997). The political breakthrough was an 
achievement for Blair. He urged both Protestant Unionists and Catholic 
Republicans to unite. In a bid to rally support for the peace deal, he stated 
“we can continue with the hatred and the despair and the killing, treating 
people as if they were not parts of humanity, or we can try and settle our 
disagreements by negotiation, by discussion, by debate” (Lyall, 1997). 
• 12 January 1998: multi-party talks resumed at Stormont after the Christmas 
break. The British and Irish governments issue a document entitled 
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‘Propositions of Heads of Agreement’ in an attempt to add impetus to the 
talks (see Blair, 1997c).  
• 18 January 1998: a delegation from Sinn Fein travelled to Downing Street for 
talks on the ‘Propositions of Heads of Agreement’ document (ibid). 
• 29 January 1998: Blair announced ‘The Bloody Sunday Enquiry’, an inquiry 
into the death of civilian protesters in Londonderry, January 1972. This was a 
key demand of Nationalists in the run-up to the political deal. They wanted a 
new fully open public inquiry into the events (BBC, 2006a). Blair’s goodwill 
gesture was seen as a gesture of inclusion rather than the isolation of 
nationalist groups. 
• 4 March 1998: the British Government issued a discussion paper on the 
future of policing in Northern Ireland in response to the Poyntzpass killings 
which took place the previous day in County Armagh (see Blair, 1997c). 
• 12 March 1998: Gerry Adams, President of Sinn Fein met Tony Blair at 10 
Downing Street after their temporary expulsion (from 20 February to 9 
March) from multi-party talks because of alleged IRA involvement. 
• 23 March 1998: Sinn Fein rejoined talks, in part owing to the meeting held 
with Blair on 12 March. 
• 29 March 1998: David Trimble, leader of the Ulster Unionist party, travelled 
to Chequers for private talks with Blair.  
 
The points made above illustrate Blair’s commitment to achieving peace in Northern 
Ireland. As incoming prime minister, Blair’s first official visit outside London was to 
Belfast where he gave a speech in which he outlined the effect of the Anglo-Irish 
question upon him personally: “it is a responsibility that weighs not just upon the 
mind, but the soul” (Blair, 1997d). The speech was well received and Blair’s 
commitment was both personal and formal; talks with the Sinn Fein delegation 
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followed. Blair’s role in the week of negotiations leading up to the Peace Agreement 
(03/04/1998 – 10/04/1998) is narrated; thereafter, his announcement of the peace 
deal is analysed as a discursive performance.  
 
The deadline for reaching a peace deal was set by George Mitchell, Chairman of the 
multi-party talks: Maundy Thursday, 9 April 1998. Events in the week leading up to 
the deadline were accelerated, rich and dramatic. On 1 April 2008, Blair welcomed 
Bertie Ahern, the Irish prime minister, to Downing St for talks on the details of the 
agreement, and talks lasted into the evening. The meeting was followed by another 
meeting on 3 April, the third meeting between Blair and Ahern in three days, in which 
both prime ministers mulled over details of the agreement. Meanwhile, in Ireland, the 
second enquiry into ‘Bloody Sunday’ was opened (3 April 1998) and was headed by 
Law Lord Saville, (see Blair, 1997c).  
 
On Saturday 4 April, The Alliance party of Northern Ireland (APNI) held its annual 
conference in Belfast. John Alderdice, then leader of APNI called on the British and 
Irish prime minister to take personal control of the final stage of the multi-party talks 
at Stormont (see Blair, 1997c), an illustration of the perception by the Northern Irish 
of the importance of Blair’s role in the peace process. On Sunday 5 April, Bertie 
Ahern’s mother died. He was not present at the multi-party talks, thus leaving Blair at 
various points to oversee the process. On Monday 6 April, George Mitchell, 
Chairman of the multi-party talks, presented a somewhat delayed draft settlement of 
the deal late into the evening. Internal party divisions on the peace process were 
expressed with 12 resignations from Sinn Fein. To add to this, the following day 
(Tuesday 7 April), the draft paper was rejected by the Ulster Unionist party, the same 
day that Blair arrived in Northern Ireland for the final stages of the agreement. Upon 
arrival in Northern Ireland, Blair uttered a personal and political soundbite: “this is no 
time for soundbites – but I feel the hand of history on our shoulders. I really do” (Blair, 
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1998b, p. 57). The perceived character traits that this soundbite projected upon him 
was of someone determined, a peacemaker, poised, focused and undaunted, and, of 
course, participating in, making, a moment of history. Later that day, Blair’s 
dedication to the peace settlement was formally restated in a meeting with Bertie 
Ahern and David Trimble, leader of the Ulster Unionist party who had rejected the 
draft paper earlier in the day. In Blair’s autobiography, he positively endorses Bertie 
Ahern’s character and situates both leaders as modernisers as regards the peace 
process “his presence and mine, his personality and mine, in a way symbolised the 
new, modern realities which were extinguishing old attitudes. In a sense we 
personified the opportunity to escape our history, British and Irish, and move on” 
(Blair, 2010, p. 168). Blair’s identification of sameness with the Irish prime minister 
informed his performance as regards the announcement of the peace deal i.e. use of 
association to positive political effect.                                                 
 
On Wednesday 8 April, Hillsborough Castle, County Down was the scene for a 
breakfast meeting between Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern. The two prime ministers 
discussed the settlement amid signs of dissatisfaction from some of the parties 
involved. Talks continued that day at the Parliament building in Stormont, Belfast. On 
Thursday 9 April, the day of the midnight deadline, further discontent were 
expressed, “the Ulster Unionist John Taylor didn’t turn up with his delegation and 
announced that he ‘wouldn’t touch the agreement with a ten-foot barge pole’. He was 
later won back by the prime minister’s handwritten pledges to Unionists” (Boulton, 
2008, p. 54). Blair’s ‘fatherly’ role in the process and his ability to ‘keep it together’ 
was emphasised; a demonstration also of his status in Irish politics. Later that day, 
further disarray was expressed as Jeffrey Donaldson, part of the Ulster Unionist 
party’s team of negotiators walked out and left the negotiations and did not return. 
Late in the evening, after 11pm a march took place outside Stormont, led by Ian 
Paisley, then leader of the Democratic Unionist party (DUP), in protest against the 
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negotiations. Amid the chaos, negotiations continued; the midnight deadline had 
passed and no announcement was made.  
 
Blair’s intense and unrelenting role in the Northern Ireland peace deal was heavily 
reported by the media; particularly that Blair had had no sleep, and that he had 
expressed such commitment to achieving a successful resolution. The media 
coverage of Blair was significant in terms of projecting his publicly perceived 
character and the notion that history was being made and that Blair was the central 
political actor in this decisive moment of the peace process.  
 
Some 36 hours after party leaders were last seen, 18 hours after his deadline, on 
Good Friday at 17:36pm, the Chairman of the talks, George Mitchell, announced the 
successful resolution between both sides. Blair’s contribution and centre-stage role in 
the peace process was particularly evident in the last week of negotiations. His 
hands-on managerial style and emphasis on process was seen to have led to a 
historic political breakthrough in Northern Ireland; political success which was 
attributed to his personal performance and personal efforts. 
 
6.5.2a Announcement of the Peace Deal   
Soon after the announcement by George Mitchell, Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern 
emerged from the 36-hour talks. Both men stood on the steps of Stormont jubilantly 
shaking hands, dismissing tiredness and exhaustion. The firm handshake was over-
extended, but fitting to the euphoric moment that the two prime ministers had 
expended such energy upon. The excitement was shared by the eagerly awaited 
press and the jubilant crowd who cheered the two brave executives who seemed to 
have changed Northern Irish political history. With the meaningful handshake, a self-
assured and confident Blair took to the lectern before the Irish prime minister; 
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preceding Bertie Ahern was an expression of Blair’s status and authority 
(constitutionally, this was a U.K. political event, but irrespective of this, Blair was 
clearly the star of the show). Crucially, he used the performative opportunity to 
political effect and fashioned his perceived character and persona. In his first public 
utterance in 36 hours, Blair’s statement was as follows:  
“In these past few days the irresistible force, the political will has 
met the immovable object, the legacy of the past, and it has actually 
moved it. 
The idea that if one side wins something in Northern Ireland, the 
other loses is gone. The essence of what we’ve agreed is a choice: 
we are all winners or all losers; it is mutually assured benefit or 
mutually assured destruction here. Thank you” (Blair, 1998c). 
 
Three performative moments in Blair’s statement were politically significant. First, in 
his utterance of “political will”, Blair nodded his head and turned to the right to 
acknowledge Bertie Ahern, both executives nodded at each other; a mutual act of 
self endorsement and iteration of ownership of the peace settlement. Second, in his 
reference to the “immovable object” and the claim that the past had met the “political 
will” of the present, Blair’s comportment was self assured and confident, his neck 
was elongated and his posture indicated confidence, he looked out over his 
audience, and assuredly nodded to himself as if he were reading his thoughts out 
aloud and that the “political will” that had moved the “immovable object” was in part, 
in fact, himself. Third, at the end of the statement, Blair stated “thank you” followed 
by an accomplished nod downwards. He then turned to his right and jubilantly 
grinned and nodded at Bertie Ahern, he stepped back a little, Bertie Ahern positioned 
himself towards the lectern and the two prime ministers once again firmly shook 
hands in celebration of their achievement.  
 
Blair’s ability to resolve the politico-religious conflict in Northern Ireland that dated 
back to late-nineteenth century (Gladstone had sought and failed on two attempts to 
achieve home rule for Ireland (1886 and 1893)) – if not to the seventeenth century, 
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demonstrated courage, dedication, a focus upon process, outcomes and diplomacy, 
and, of course, personal success. Blair’s performance in Northern Ireland had 
positive effects for his political persona; courage, persistence, commitment, 
persuasion, successful diplomacy, now historic significance were expressed as 
additional attributes to his already positive persona. In summary, Blair’s performance 
in the Good Friday Agreement demonstrated the following two points:   
 
• Events and circumstances can exist as forms of Machiavellian fortuna and 
offer leaders opportunities for the expression of political persona. 
• Through performance, Blair’s political persona existed beyond the immediate 
polity. He had used performance to generate personal capital. As in Kane’s 
concept of moral capital, by resonating with the audience on the need for the 
Peace Agreement, the successful resolution resulted in the audience 
conferring upon the persona of Blair authority and legitimacy as demonstrated 
in his personal poll ratings (BBC, 2007).  
 
Let us turn to Blair’s performance in relation to foreign policy, specifically, Kosovo in 
1999, the year after the Good Friday Agreement. Up to the Kosovo crisis, Blair’s 
character and persona were seen as positive. His ownership of the Northern Ireland 
Peace Process was a conflict-resolution condition which seemed to condition Blair’s 
political actions in the Balkans War. 
 
6.2.6 Foreign Policy: 1999 Kosovo 
The Balkans War began in 1998 and lasted into 1999. The, essentially, Albanian-
Serbian conflict was over the disputed territory of Kosovo. We list Blair’s interventions 
relating to the crisis (6.2.6a); thereafter, the range of discursive and performative 
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actions cited are analysed in terms of their effect upon Blair’s political persona 
(6.2.6b). 
 
6.2.6a Blair’s intervention in the crisis 
• Blair’s peace-mission for Kosovo was made in his statement to the House of 
Commons on 23 March 1999 in which he stated “autonomy for Kosovo would 
be guaranteed, with a democratically-elected Assembly, accountable 
institutions and locally controlled police forces. After three years Kosovo’s 
status would be reviewed” (Blair, 1999a). 
• On 24 March 1999, on the day that bombing of Serbia started, “Blair took a 
high moral tone from the start” (Rentoul, 2002, p. 525). In a statement in 
Berlin, Blair stated  
“justice is all that those poor people, driven from their homes in their 
thousands in Kosovo, are asking for, the chance to live free from 
fear. We have in our power the means to help them secure justice 
and we have a duty to see that justice is now done” (Blair, 1999b 
cited in Rentoul, 2002, p. 525). 
 
• On 21 April 1999, Blair met U.S. President Clinton for talks on the crisis and 
NATO intervention. The meeting concluded that the 17 members of NATO 
would need persuasion regarding military action. Clinton would lobby half and 
Blair would take the other half (see Rentoul, 2002, p. 525). 
• In a speech in Chicago on 22 April 1999, Blair set out his Doctrine of the 
International Community which set out the justification for international 
intervention. Therafter, Rentoul notes that  
“in a series of interviews with US media, Blair developed the idea 
that regional groups of states, such as NATO, could take action to 
enforce international law, such as that against genocide, without 
express authorisation from the UN, provided that the action were 
consistent with the UN Charter” (Rentoul, 2002, p. 527).  
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• Blair’s appearance on Larry King Live, a U.S. television show, in which he 
likened Milosevic to Hitler in his pursuit of ‘racial genocide’ earned him U.S. 
political support (See Rentoul, 2002, p. 527). 
• Britain and America committed troops to Kosovo. 
• On 25 May 1999, NATO approved the deployment of 50,000 troops. On 2 
June, President Clinton made public that he would be meeting his joint chiefs 
of staff the next day to discuss military options. 
• On 2 June, Milosevic conceded all NATO’s demands. The Serbs started to 
withdraw on 10 June and the bombing campaign was halted (see Rentoul, 
2002, p. 529-30). 
 
6.2.6b Performance as regards Kosovo 
In terms of Blair’s performance and comportment on the international stage (as in 
6.2.6a) and their relationship to traits and persona, we can make the following points. 
 
• Blair’s condemnation of President Milosevic’s’ policy of ethnic cleansing was 
courageous; his action promulgated an humanitarian agenda. 
• Blair’s ability to persuade U.S. President Bill Clinton highlighted the Anglo-
Saxon special relationship but also Blair’s influence upon the U.S. 
interventionist agenda. 
• Blair’s capitalisation of political support and use of popular culture and 
celebrity e.g. appearance on U.S. show Larry King Live was formative of 
gaining U.S. support and credibility. 
• Hennessy states that Blair’s “prominence within the NATO coalition showed 
that any residual notion of Tony Blair as primus inter pares is wrong [in 
cabinet]” (Hennessy, 2001, p. 506). 
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• Blair’s ability to alter the configuration of NATO and empower the organisation 
and its members was a demonstration of diplomacy, political will and resolve. 
• The positive political outcome in Kosovo was attributed, in part, to Blair’s 
leadership of the crisis. “Blair was hailed by the British press as the hero” 
(Rentoul, 2003, p. 530). 
• Blair’s Doctrine of the International Community was a discourse that existed 
at the international level that stressed and linked interventionism and 
humanitarianism. The document justified Blair’s political performance and 
lead role in the crisis; we come back to the document and its relationship to 
Blair’s justification of geo-political interventionist discourse when we analyse 
his performance in the 2003 Iraq War. 
 
Blair’s performance in Kosovo was significant in terms of his ability to persuade a 
foreign power such as America that military intervention was the right course of 
humanitarian action. Blair’s leading role in the crisis and within NATO highlighted 
Britain’s influence in the world. The performance had a positive political outcome for 
Blair’s persona in that his persona as a statesman existed internationally as well as 
nationally.  
 
Thus far in this chapter on the performance of Tony Blair, we have analysed a series 
of performances as opposition leader and as prime minister. In so doing, the 
relationship between performance and political persona has been demonstrated. 
Before analysing Blair’s 2002/3 Iraq War policy as the final political performance, we 
outline Blair’s perceived character traits and political persona which emerged from 
the performances analysed in this chapter:  
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• As leader of the opposition, Blair demonstrated contradictory traits; the 
abolition of Clause Four was bold and courageous. The Murdoch agreement 
illustrated a possibly negative side to Blair which did, however, contribute to 
victory at the 1997 General Election. 
• As incoming prime minister, Blair’s political persona was that of a young, 
popular prime minister. The drinks reception held at Downing St. to celebrate 
victory, ‘Cool Britannia’ demonstrated the conflation of the public and the 
private. Similar to the Murdoch agreement, ‘Cool Britannia’ illustrated a 
negative side to Blair’s character which gradually added to his negative 
persona. 
• Blair’s performance in relation to the death of Diana displayed emotion, 
compassion and grief. 
• The response to the Bernie Ecclestone scandal brought to the fore the image 
of Blair as possibly corrupt and dishonest. 
• The reconfiguration of political institutions demonstrated a modern executive, 
but also, possible insensitivity towards and shortsightedness as regards 
British political tradition and institutions. The range of institutional revisions 
undertaken either concentrated political power in the office of the prime 
minister or dispersed power away from the centre, thus illustrating 
paradoxical traits: accommodating to political opinion e.g. demands for 
devolution, but also, potentially, not thinking through political reforms in terms 
of feasibility (House of Lords). 
• Blair’s ownership of the Good Friday Agreement demonstrated diplomacy, 
problem-solving skills and the ability to persuade political peers. 
• The intervention in the Balkans War hailed Blair as an international as well as 
national peace-maker who was concerned with human suffering but who was 
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militarily decisive. Compassion and conviction were perceived traits that were 
associated with this performance.   
 
The character traits and overall persona as identified through the analysis of 
performance are contradictory and ambivalent; and they are contexts to Blair’s 
foreign policy performance in the Iraq War. Despite the existence of some negative 
traits which gain further expression in the public realm through Blair’s 2003 Iraq War 
foreign policy, initially, Blair’s positive role in the Good Friday Agreement and in 
Kosovo provided the contextual moral justification for international intervention in 
2003. However, Blair’s personal popularity ratings were declining, almost halved from 
the 90% in the immediate aftermath of the Diana moment. The declining poll ratings 
were, arguably, the classic result of the wear and tear of office, but took place in the 
context of an emerging and negative shadow persona. Let us examine Blair’s foreign 
policy initiative on Iraq. First let us preface this with reference to the U.K./U.S. 
‘special relationship’ as a context to his foreign policy performance on Iraq. 
 
6.2.7 Foreign policy: response to 9/11 terrorist attack 
The first utterance of a post-war ‘special relationship’ between the U.K and U.S came 
in Churchill’s 1946 ‘Iron Curtain’ speech which marked the beginning of the Cold 
War. Churchill’s oration called for a closer Anglo-Saxon relationship in which he 
envisaged the two states carrying out a night-watchman role in policing global 
conflict. The original ‘special relationship’ was based on trust and collaboration was 
formed between prime minister Winston Churchill and president Harry Truman after 
the Second World War; in the 1980s, Margaret Thatcher highlighted the relationship 
in the Falklands’ conflict (2 April 1982) as an echo of an earlier alliance. The path-
dependent Anglo-Saxon alliance was a condition of Blair’s relationship to the U.S. 
and his foreign policy performance. 
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On 11 September 2001, America was the target of a terrorist attack, henceforth 
internationally and nationally referred to as ‘9/11’. On the day of the attacks, before 
President G. W. Bush responded to the attacks, Blair immediately expressed a 
positive Anglo-Saxon stance against global terrorism: Britain would stand “shoulder 
to shoulder” (Blair, 2001a) with the United States. Blair repeated this stance in his 
party conference speech on 2 October: “we were with you at the first, we will be with 
you at the last” (Blair, 2001b). Blair’s immediate expression of a positive U.K./U.S 
stance against terrorism was indicative of his forthcoming policy performances as in 
section 6.2.7a. This solidarity with the U.S. was the performed context of his 
subsequent comportment vis-à-vis Iraq. The analysis of Blair’s foreign policy 
performance regarding Iraq focuses on two speeches to the House of Commons (24 
September 2002 and 18 March 2003) in which Blair discursively performed the 
dossier which justified his forthcoming military interventionist stance with the U.S. 
Blair’s relationship to the dossier and discursive invention of it are appraised with a 
view to identifying his character and political persona (6.7.2a). Thereafter, we 
appraise the revision of Blair’s persona as intelligence information contained in Blair’s 
Iraq War dossier was considered to be, at the very least, exaggerated (section 
6.2.7b).  
 
6.2.7a Discursive performance on the Iraq dossier 
Blair presented his dossier on Iraq to the House of Commons on two separate 
occasions. Five main points from his first narrative performance of the Iraq War 
dossier on 24 September 2002 are as follows:  
• “Mr Speaker, thank you for recalling Parliament to debate the best 
way to deal with the issue of the present leadership of Iraq and 
weapons of mass destruction” (hereafter referred to in the text as 
WMD). 
• “Today we published a 50-page dossier detailing the history of Iraq’s 
WMD, its breach of UN resolutions and the current attempts to 
rebuild the illegal WMD programme. I have placed a copy in the 
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Library of the House”. (Blair then provided his audience with an 
overview of the Gulf War, efforts of the U.N. inspectors to ascertain 
the possible threat posed by the regime and its relevance for the 
current terror threat). 
• “I set out the history in some detail because occasionally debate on 
this issue seems to treat it almost as if it had suddenly arisen, 
coming out of nowhere on a whim, in the last few months of 2002. It 
is an 11 year history: a history of UN will flouted, lies told by 
Saddam about existence of his chemical, biological and nuclear 
weapons programmes, obstruction, defiance and denial”. 
• “But let me put it at its simplest: on this 11 year history; with this 
man, Saddam; with this accumulated, detailed intelligence available; 
with what we know and what we can reasonably speculate: would 
the world be wise to leave the present situation undisturbed; to say, 
despite 14 separate UN demands on this issue, all of which Saddam 
is in breach of, we should do nothing; to conclude that we should 
trust not to the good faith of the UN weapons inspectors but to the 
good faith of the current Iraqi regime?”. 
• “To those who doubt it, I say: look at Kosovo and Afghanistan. We 
proceeded with care, with full debate in this House and when we 
took military action, did so as a last resort. We shall act in the same 
way now” (Blair, 2002). 
 
In terms of the effects of the performance upon Blair’s persona, we make the 
following points:  
 
• The opening of the speech was informed by Blair’s context model (van Dijk, 
2008, p. 120 in chapter 4 on methodology) in that he represented his social 
situation as prime minister through discourse. His use of formality e.g. “Mr 
Speaker, thank you for recalling Parliament to debate...” highlighted his 
personal identity and communicative identity as speaker and his political 
status as prime minister. This was the chief executive and leader of the 
country speaking. 
• Blair’s emphasis upon Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) was immediate; 
he cited WMD as illegal and in breach of UN regulations; references to WMD 
were juxtaposed with references to the Gulf War and the immediate threat of 
terror. By citing the present terror threat and its relationship to WMD, Blair 
evoked fear and danger amongst the audience. In so doing, his intention was 
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to persuade his audience that military intervention was justified and that there 
was a grave danger.  
• By presenting the history of the middle-east conflict, Blair highlighted the 11 
year struggle with Saddam Hussein which was characterised by lack of 
international co-operation. By evoking Saddam Hussein’s perceived disregard 
for the U.N., Blair highlighted the threat and danger that were associated with 
Saddam. Blair’s use of fear was created by citing Saddam’s actions as defiant 
and obstructive; by presenting the negative traits of the enemy, Blair 
proposes military action to tackle fear. 
• Blair characterised the struggle against terrorism as the struggle against one 
person, therefore depicting politics being about personalities. Negative 
references to the enemy were overt and personal; depictions of Saddam 
Hussein’s character e.g. “lies told by Saddam”, “obstruction, defiance and 
denial” or “this man” provided a contrast between the enemy and the 
imagined ‘we’ or ‘I’. The personalisation of Saddam personalises the 
character of Blair as concerned with human suffering and injustice. 
• Blair’s positive reference to Kosovo presented “episodic information” (van Dijk 
and Kintsch, 1983, p. 344, see chapter 4 on methodology). The use of 
previous information reminded the audience of the successful humanitarian 
outcome in Kosovo and its attribution in large part to Blair. Moreover, 
references to previous political actions were deployed as the moral basis for 
intervention in Iraq.  
 
In the aftermath of the presentation of his dossier, Blair’s popularity ratings increased 
from 34% (September 2002) to 42% (18 March 2003) (BBC, 2007), an illustration 
that his discursive response to the dossier had some generated agreement which 
impacted upon his popularity ratings. However, there was discontent among the 
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government regarding the dossier and planned military intervention; foreign 
secretary, Robin Cook resigned in March 2003. Members of the cabinet expressed 
their disaffection to the media regarding the lack of consultation but maintained the 
myth of collective government without undermining it. The largest War protest in the 
U.K. took place on 16 February 2003 with an estimated one million protestors. Amid 
criticism towards Blair’s foreign policy and lack of collective government, his second 
discursive performance of the Iraq dossier on 18 March 2003 was highly 
personalised and emphasised ownership of the dossier. The following five points 
illustrate Blair’s highly personalised foreign policy stance:    
• “I beg to move the motion standing on the order paper in my name and those 
of my right honourable friends”. 
• “I believe we must hold firm”. 
• “So let me explain the nature of this threat as I see it”.  
• “This is not the time to falter. This is the time for this house, not just 
this government or indeed this prime minister, but for this house to 
give a lead, to show that we will stand up for what we know to be 
right, to show that we will confront the tyrannies and dictatorships 
and terrorists who put our way of life at risk, to show at the moment 
of decision that we have the courage to do the right thing. 
 
• “I beg to move the motion was Blair’s final utterance” (Blair, 2003).  
Such statements and the use of the self demonstrated Blair’s belief in his actions, a 
sense of righteousness and self confidence. Blair’s explanation of the perceived 
threat was an attempt to persuade colleagues to confront and control terrorism e.g. 
the use of Churchillian discourse: “this is not the time to falter” and “to show that we 
will confront the tyrannies and dictatorships and terrorists who put our way of life at 
risk” see Jenkins, 2001) emphasised Blair’s struggle against the enemy. Blair’s 
persuasive appeal was strengthened because such a tone invites agreement by 
raising all the issues to a moral and visionary level. The contrast between the 
imagined ‘us’ and the enemy was an appeal to the values that define ‘us’ and an 
appeal to confront the “tyrannies and dictatorships” that “put our way of life at risk”.  
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Both speeches in which Blair interpolated, performed the dossier, as it were, in 
particular his latter performance, sought to establish his moral crusade and himself 
as a site of political authority on a global scale. His condemnation of Saddam 
Hussein and terrorism more generally was like a personal challenge and was a 
rallying call to other world leaders. Both performances of the dossier had positive 
implications for Blair as his poll ratings demonstrated an upwards trajectory, 
demonstrating some audience support on this issue despite the protests. On 20 
March 2003, the invasion of Iraq began. However, post-June 2003, Blair’s publicly 
perceived character and persona were revised. The revision of Blair’s character and 
the negative character traits that emerged existed inside his positive image. By 
making the defence of the dossier so personal, and its acceptance dependent upon 
his character, Blair was undertaking a very high-risk strategy, any diminution – let 
alone collapse – of the credibility of the dossier would almost automatically lead to a 
similar diminution in both Blair’s credibility and, perhaps even more importantly, 
integrity. 
 
6.2.7b Revision of character and persona  
In June 2003, reports began to emerge in the media that Blair’s ‘Iraq Dossier’ was 
fundamentally flawed. Reports claimed that the intelligence information had been 
‘sexed up’ (The Guardian, 2003) in a bid to garner support for the invasion of a 
foreign power.  
 
The emergence of the falsification of intelligence claims (specifically, the falsification 
of the claim that WMD could be deployed in 45 minutes) (ibid) and Blair’s deep and 
personally interpolated relationship to the dossier initiated the gradual but relentless 
revision of his publicly perceived persona. Negative character traits quickly became 
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associated with Blair, and were amplified because of his previously established 
character. It was not long before that the following character traits were associated 
with Blair: mistrustful, deceitful, scheming and dishonest. 
 
Blair’s political persona from 1997-2003 was that of a young, modern, in-touch prime 
minister. Post-2003, it was revised into a villain-like Judas, and as someone who was 
prepared to deceive everyone. From 1997 and up to 2003, Blair’s appeal was based 
upon the personal and the persuasive. The revision of his character contrasted with 
the traits that previous performances, analysed in this chapter projected within the 
public realm. We should stress that in many ways the former traits (1997-2003) 
create the latter ones (post-2003), that is to say that the dramatic fall in his popularity 
was crucially linked to his personalisation of his role over the previous decade. 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
In conclusion to this chapter, we make the following point on Blair’s deployment of 
character to political effect. The response to the Bernie Ecclestone scandal 
highlighted negative character traits e.g. possible corruption and dishonesty. At the 
time, Blair was able to deal with these; his public apology and self-testimony as a 
‘regular guy’ and his popularity meant that his negative ‘character’ did not at the time 
present itself as a difficulty. A sympathetic media also helped avoid negative press 
and coverage. Post-2003, the traits of dishonesty, deceit, and even corruption re-
emerged in relation to the Iraq War Dossier and other moments. As the War began to 
go seriously wrong, Blair began to appear as the negation, the very opposite of what 
he had seemed. This could only happen on the scale it did because of Blair’s own 
emphasis upon and deployment of character.   
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7a Overview 
As theorised in sub-chapter 3.1 and demonstrated in chapter 6, the development of 
celebrity and personalisation within the British polity stresses leadership and the 
deployment of the self to political purpose. Institutionally, advances in the media, 
especially recently the advent of 24 hour news coverage and development of the 
Internet, now offer prime ministers, party leaders, and political elites more generally, 
scope through multiple media to personalise the self, much more than in the post-war 
period. There is also now greater scope for the political persona to be exploited by 
the media. One of the political consequences of the conjuncture of celebrity culture, 
personalisation of the prime minister and media advancement is that image, style, 
performance, character, personality have become accessible and important aspects 
of contemporary British politics (see also chapter 5).   
 
This chapter applies the framework of political performance to the premiership of 
Gordon Brown and analyses how performance and persona are factors in the 
political process. The following performances are analysed: 
 
• (7.1) First utterance as prime minister (27/07/07): 
Including Brown’s arrival in Downing St, performance of the statement and 
use of the self as a political resource. 
• (7.2) Events of the summer recess (July 2007-September 2007): 
Four crisis moments characterised the summer recess; we do not analyse 
Brown’s performance in each crisis moment, as they projected the same traits 
in public consciousness. We analyse Brown’s flirtation with the idea of an 
early election towards the end of the summer recess as a form not of political 
action but of political inaction which revised his positive political persona as 
incoming prime minister. 
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• (7.3) Global financial crisis (September-December 2008): 
Including reference to the emergence of the crisis and policy initiation e.g. 
Bailout package. 
• (7.4) Expenses Scandal (May 2009): 
Brown’s immediate and longer-term responses to the crisis as a series of 
discursive performances are analysed. 
• (7.5) Leadership crisis (June 2009):  
The leadership crisis was an attack upon Brown’s character; Brown’s first 
media interview after the crisis began is analysed as a discursive 
performance.   
 
The analysis of each performance will enable us to a) establish Brown’s publicly 
perceived character traits and political persona; b) identify the role and effects of 
persona upon the political process; c) understand the ways in which political action is 
informed and/or limited by cultural and institutional contexts; and d) identify the 
impact of performance upon cultural and institutional contexts. 
 
As leadership performance takes place within a given culture and configuration of 
institutions, the performances above are informed and/or constrained by culture and 
institutions. We retain from sub-chapters 3.1 and 3.2 one point on culture (7b) and 
institutions (7c) as contexts/conditions which facilitate or constrain political action. 
Brown’s political trajectory (7d) is also referred to as a context which conditions his 
performance as prime minister. Thereafter, the performances are analysed and 
situated within identified cultural and institutional contexts.  
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7b Culture as a condition of leadership performance  
The deployment of a highly personalised style of leadership has become the 
dominant practice of a British prime minister and incorporates aspects of celebrity. 
The Blair premiership exemplified this practice which used celebrity culture and the 
media to political purpose. Leaders who work within this narrative may enjoy political 
advantage provided that they personalise the self and adopt aspects of celebrity. 
Conversely, leaders who work against the grain of established cultural narratives 
may find themselves rejected by the culture and presented with a series of negative 
constraints.  
 
Foley (2000) argues that the precedent set by Tony Blair’s dominance of government 
represents a standard against which his competitors and successors will be judged. 
As Blair’s successor, the culture that Brown inherited provided ‘space’ for a dominant 
prime minister to perform. According to Foley, Brown’s style of leadership, whether 
dominant or not, would be one of the areas that he would be judged against. We 
come back to the question of predecessors in the concluding chapter of this thesis 
and make reference to Blair and Brown as an example. The “leadership-centred kind 
of political culture” (see chapter 5) that Brown inherited was a condition of his 
performance as prime minister. 
 
7c Institutions as conditions of leadership performance  
Brown inherited a dominant relationship between prime minister and cabinet. His 
predecessor, Tony Blair, deployed personal authority to command and control the 
cabinet as well as centralising government communications e.g. establishing a prime 
minister’s office (see Hennessy, 2000). Blair’s management of the cabinet has been 
referred to as ‘sofa-style’ government in which the business of government was 
conducted informally with individual members of the core executive, as opposed to 
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with formally minuted cabinet meetings (see Hennessy 2005, p. 10 and King, 2009). 
A powerful prime minister can exercise personal authority to dominate, command 
and control the core executive. Moreover, under the leadership of Tony Blair, the 
relationship between executive and cabinet was a contested one. The overlap of 
competing political/economic spheres of influence between prime minister Blair and 
chancellor of the Exchequer Brown created a dual leadership situation, described by 
Hennessy as a “diarchy” (2000), or as a “duumvirate” by King (2009, p. 318). 
Paradoxically, although Brown inherited a divided institution of prime minister and 
cabinet; as prime minister, he had more room to perform within this institution as he 
did not initially have a strong and powerful chancellor to compete with (see King, 
2009). 
 
7d Political trajectory as a condition of leadership performance  
The one essential point that we retain on Brown’s political trajectory as a condition of 
his performance as prime minister is that as chancellor (1997-2007) Brown’s 
perceived character demonstrated paradoxical qualities. His tenure as chancellor 
was characterised by economic stability, growth and prudence; and thus brought to 
the fore positive character traits: strong and competent (see also Bower, 2007).  
Post-1997, the alternative interpretations of the ‘Granita deal’6 were formative of a 
dual prime ministership/power struggle between Blair and Brown, to the point where 
the institution of the cabinet was divided into ‘Blairites’ and ‘Brownites’. The cleavage 
within the core executive had a serious implication for Brown’s character and 
                                                 
6 The Granita deal has been covered mainly in biographies (see Bower, 2007), academic 
literature on Blair and Brown and texts written by political advisors and spin doctors. The 
Granita deal was an agreement between Blair and Brown regarding the 1994 leadership of 
the  Labour party, and the roles that they would occupy thereafter. Marquand states that ‘Blair 
promised his rival that he would be Chancellor of the Exchequer if Labour won, with effective 
control over social as well as economic policy. He may or may not have added that when he 
gave up the prime ministership, Brown would be his preferred candidate for the succession’ 
(2008, p. 357). See also Mandelson, 2011, p. 170, 171, 182, 338 for an account of the 
Granita deal and effects upon Brown. 
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persona in the public realm. The Blair/Brown power struggle was intensified 
institutionally as, nominally, both prime minister and chancellor were “First Lords of 
the Treasury” (see Hennessy, 2001). Brown’s powers over the institution of the 
Treasury could be overruled, although in practice rarely were. The relationship 
between Blair and Brown was expressed, nevertheless, in the ownership and 
coveting of policy fiefdoms (see Hennessy, 2001 p. 526 and Hennessy, 2005, p. 10), 
Brown’s coveting of the prime ministership portrayed Brown as impatient, power-
hungry and jealous. Moreover, Tony Blair in his last performance at PMQs made 
reference to Brown as the “big clunking-fist” (Blair, 2006), highlighting both a positive 
and a negative side to Brown’s character.  
 
Bearing in mind the points made on culture, celebrity and personalisation; on 
institutions; and on trajectory as contexts of leadership performance, the following 
sub-sections analyse the premiership of Gordon Brown.  
 
7.1 First utterance as prime minister 
Brown’s statement upon arriving in Downing Street is analysed according to three 
areas. First, we identify the political significance of Brown’s arrival, as this constitutes 
part of the performance; second, we analyse Brown’s discursive performance of the 
statement in terms of his first utterance and key moments which demonstrate the 
relationship between performance and persona; third, we identify Brown’s use of the 
self to political effect.  
 
7.1.1 Arrival in Downing St 
Brown emerged from his official car with his wife Sarah. They held hands and at a 
gentle pace walked towards a microphone that was placed in the middle of the street 
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with a backdrop of the door of Number 10 in view. The image of Gordon and Sarah 
had a function beyond iterating the role of the personal in politics. She in a cream 
jacket and red and cream skirt, softened his image. By virtue of her presence and 
femininity she gave his often dour character and persona warmth. As the couple 
walked towards the microphone, Brown positioned himself in front of it and Sarah 
stood to his left. She gave him ‘room’ to perform his new image to the people of 
Britain as prime minister; her posture was elegant and upright, her hands were 
clasped, her head tilted slightly to the left as she looked at him while he spoke (see 
Appendix F). 
 
The media presence that greeted Brown was modest, and certainly not comparable 
to that of Tony Blair’s entrance in 1997, with large crowds waving union jack flags. 
The restrained media representation illustrated the non-triumphalist notion of Brown’s 
inheritance as prime minister; reinforced his lack of personal/political mandate; and 
dumbed down the integration of aspects of celebrity in mainstream British politics. 
The positive side of this was that it afforded him an image of modesty. Brown’s arrival 
in Downing St was his first performance as prime minister; the performance was not 
treated as a media event which incorporated aspects of celebrity culture, but did 
include personalisation with Sarah Brown softening his image as prime minister. 
 
7.1.2 Performance of the statement 
Brown began by acknowledging the media presence before him with a look from left 
to right. He paused for a couple of seconds and cusped his hands into one another; 
his expression can be described as a mixture of disbelief and contained joy. The first 
paragraph of the statement reads:  
“I have just accepted the invitation of Her Majesty The Queen to 
form a Government. This will be a new Government with new 
priorities, and I have been privileged to have been granted the great 
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opportunity to serve my country, and at all times I will be strong in 
purpose, steadfast in will, resolute in action in the service of what 
matters to the British people, meeting the concerns and aspirations 
of our whole country” (Brown, 2007a). 
 
Brown’s first utterance as prime minister: “I have just accepted the invitation of Her 
Majesty The Queen to form a Government” was spoken with a deep voice, his head 
was held high, neck elongated whilst scouting the press from left to right. At the end 
of the sentence, Brown nodded down and quickly looked back up, an illustration of 
self content, joy, and the affirmation of his place in British politics. The utterance was 
formal yet self reinforcing and illustrated that he believed that he was the rightful 
successor to Tony Blair.  
 
He then made reference to his government as a new government with new priorities. 
A ‘new’ government and premiership projected through the following personal traits: 
“I will be strong in purpose”, “steadfast in will” and “resolute in action”. Such character 
traits illustrated Brown’s projected character as well as the character of the new 
government, as responsive to citizens, pragmatic, powerful and dependable. 
 
Brown emphasised ‘change’ and progressive politics, and described forthcoming 
political actions that would create a new kind of politics illustrating his vision and 
inclusive programme for Government: 
“and this need for change cannot be met by the old politics. So I will 
reach out beyond narrow Party interests, I will build a government 
that uses all the talents, I will invite men and women of goodwill to 
contribute their energies in a new spirit of public service to make our 
nation what it can be” (Brown, 2007a). 
 
Let us now analyse Brown’s use of the self. 
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7.1.3 Use of the self  
In spite of the ‘modesty’ of the staging, the use of the self in Brown’s statement was 
strong. A total of 21 personal pronouns were used within a short statement which, 
paradoxically, was delivered in under three minutes. Brown’s use of the self included 
“I have” or “I will”; such references positioned him in path dependent political space 
as chancellor (I have) as well as situating him in the future as prime minister (I will). 
Such references iterated Brown’s political experience and referred to the future and 
his new government’s forthcoming programme for change e.g. “I will continue to 
listen” or “I will try my utmost” and “resolute in action in the service of what matters to 
the British people”. The positioning of the self in the past, present and future 
projected Brown as an experienced yet modern politician.  
 
In the third paragraph of the statement ‘I’ was used a total of 9 times. The personal 
pronoun served two functions: firstly, it situated Brown amongst the British people 
and their calls for change e.g. “I have listened”, “I will continue to listen” or “I have 
heard the need for change”. Secondly, change was evoked through belief in him: 
“this need for change cannot be met by the old politics. So I will reach out beyond 
narrow party interests. I will build a government that uses all the talents”. Moreover, 
Brown outlined his plan of action for government; in so doing, he articulated the need 
for change. Brown endorsed himself as the person who would replace old politics 
with new politics and his vision for change.   
 
In summary, Brown’s first performance as prime minister was personalised by virtue 
of Sarah’s presence, and by the clear demonstration of personal emotion (see 
Appendix G) but did not heavily embrace aspects of celebrity culture. The statement 
was short and meaningful; Brown projected himself as a progressive prime minister 
and outlined his ‘new’ politics which would be responsible, pragmatic and responsive 
 191 
to individuals. His references to ‘new’ politics replacing ‘old’ politics created space 
between his premiership and that of his predecessor, Tony Blair. By separating old 
and new politics, thereby almost implying that Blair represented the past and old 
politics, Brown implied that he represented change, progressive values and new 
politics. After the performance, Brown’s persona as a strong conviction politician 
began to emerge; he distanced himself from the Blair premiership and his political 
trajectory by iterating the paradoxical need for change and progressive politics.  
 
7.2 Events of the summer recess (July-September 2007)  
Five events moments characterised the summer recess period: 
 
1. July 1 2007 a terrorist car bomb in a 4x4 was driven into Glasgow Airport. 
2. July 7 2007 Britain suffered the worst flooding for over 60 years. 
3. August 2007, Foot and mouth disease broke out in Surrey. 
4. Mid-September 2007: Northern Rock banking crisis emerged. 
5. Mid-September 2007: Courting of the idea of an autumn election. 
 
The first four crisis moments constitute a stream of events that we refer to but do not 
analyse in detail, as Brown’s performance in each crisis conveyed similar positive 
traits. The last event of the summer in which Brown courted the idea of an early 
election is analysed, as the traits that emerged from this performance revised his 
established character and had negative and lasting political effects in terms of his 
status and political authority. The first four events of the summer period presented 
themselves as crisis moments within the polity and had positive ramifications for 
Brown’s publicly perceived character. Brown’s pragmatic and calm response to each 
crisis: denouncing terrorism and holding immediate talks with security experts; 
pledging extra funding for areas affected by flooding; cancelling his summer break to 
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chair the government’s emergency ‘Cobra’ committee meeting on foot and mouth; 
and guaranteeing the savings of Northern Rock customers, all projected positive 
character traits in the public realm. Brown’s performance in the four crisis moments 
projected strong, pragmatic, decisive, and competent aspects of character. Brown’s 
role in the Northern Rock crisis illustrated his performance both as prime minister and 
as chancellor. Against the backdrop of four crisis moments, Brown’s persona 
emerged as a strong and pragmatic prime minister. This was reinforced by positive 
poll ratings (see BBC poll tracker, 2007). However, political inaction in clarifying 
speculation of an early election led to the revision of Brown’s character. This event is 
narrated in more detail in order to demonstrate political action versus inaction and the 
negative impact upon political persona. 
 
7.2.1 Election speculation 
Approximately one week before the start of the annual Labour party conference, from 
mid-September, the following actions by members of the cabinet created speculation 
that an early autumn election was imminent: Ed Miliband, minister for the cabinet 
office and a loyal Brownite, began drafting the party manifesto. Other practical 
aspects of approaching an election too were expressed: “Labour had booked 
advertising hoardings; inquiries were made about the Queen’s movements to ensure 
she would be in London if Brown needed to seek dissolution of Parliament, and 
television slots were reserved” (Cracknell and Schofield, 2007). 
 
The half hidden ‘secrecy’ of political actions added weight to growing speculation 
within the polity that an early election would be held by the end of 2007. Brown 
neither denied nor confirmed the developing situation, and avoided any direct 
questions on the election by the media. In so doing, he failed to clarify claims and 
end speculation. Upon questioning in a live interview by the BBC’s Andrew Marr 
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Show on the first day of the Labour party conference (23 September 2007), Brown 
did to some degree quash election speculation but not completely. When asked by 
Marr whether his advisers were telling him to call an early election, Brown responded 
“No. I’m actually getting on with the job” (Brown, 2007b). Brown’s response can be 
read as a denial; however, media speculation continued and he did not assertively 
put an end to speculation. Brown’s political inaction in failing to end speculation 
demonstrated a long period of indecisiveness once the speculation was ended 
decisively.  
 
Election speculation dominated the five days of Brown’s first party conference as 
prime minister (23/09/08-27/09/08). On 30 September 2008, The Sun “a mass-
market paper” (Mandelson, 2011, p. 489) had switched its support from Labour to 
Conservative. The significance of the Murdoch press and political outcomes has 
been demonstrated in chapter 6. Politically, this was significant for Brown and 
presented itself as a negative institutional condition to performance hereon in. Post-
Labour party conference, Brown’s inability to use language and discourse to political 
effect e.g. clarifying election speculation, continued as the Conservative party 
conference began. Approximately two weeks had gone by with neither full 
confirmation nor complete denial of an election; Brown’s indecisiveness was 
emphasised (and was, paradoxically, highlighted by decisiveness in announcing the 
withdrawal of troops in Iraq). Against the domestic political background of Day 2 of 
the Conservative party conference, on 2 October 2007 Brown flew to Iraq, his first 
visit to Basra as prime minister. He announced the withdrawal of 1,000 troops. Brown 
was criticised by former prime minister, John Major, for his surprise visit to Iraq which 
was seen as a political strategy to overshadow the Tory party conference (see Major, 
2007). He was also criticised by Shadow Justice Secretary, Nick Herbert, for not 
announcing the troop withdrawals to the House of Commons but to the media (see 
Herbert, 2007). Brown’s visit to Iraq and the negative reactions that he received 
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implied that his politics were not that dissimilar from the politics of spin that had 
characterised the Blair administration. Brown’s arrival back to Britain gave the 
opposition party greater scope to launch personal criticisms. 
 
On 5 October 2007, Brown held an election summit at Number 10. This action added 
weight to election speculation. Brown’s public political silence continued amid a “Tory 
bounce which now put both parties at 38% and cut the Labour lead by 4%” (see 
Cracknell and Schofield, 2007). The Tory bounce in opinion polls can be attributed in 
large part to David Cameron’s performance at the Conservative party conference 
which was positively received by the media; Cameron’s persona was positively 
refracted through the media as prime minister-in-waiting (The Telegraph, 2008). 
Cameron’s speech emphasised defiance and personalisation of Brown; negative 
characterisations of Brown and hostility towards him were then reiterated by the 
media which further undermined Brown’s fragile political persona (see BBC poll 
tracker). During this period, criticism from David Cameron was fierce, accusing 
Brown of “great weakness and indecision”; (Cameron, 2007a) and soon helped 
establish an image of the prime minister as weak and indecisive. Cameron’s attacks 
highlighted Brown’s lack of action. 
 
On Sunday 7 October, three weeks after signs of an early election, Brown ended his 
silence and invited the BBC’s Andrew Marr Show to 10 Downing Street. In the 
interview with Marr he revealed his decision, stating: 
“I will not be calling an election, and let me say why. Over the 
summer months we have had to deal with crises – we have had to 
deal with foot and mouth, terrorism, floods, financial crises. And yes, 
we could have had an election based on competence, and I hope 
people would have understood that we acted competently. But what 
I want to do is show people the vision that we have for the future of 
this country in housing and health and education, and I want the 
chance, in the next phase of my premiership, to develop and show 
people the policies that are going to make a huge difference and 
show the change in the country itself” (Brown, 2007c).  
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The three week election speculation was officially over as Brown politicised his 
‘voice’. Brown attributed the crisis events over the summer and forthcoming policies 
as a justification for his three week silence on the issue. What had begun as a 
strategy to gain a legitimate personal mandate had turned into a major political 
miscalculation. Brown’s three week political silence had negative consequences for 
his character from then on. His inability to discursively express his position on the 
possibility of an early election demonstrated uncertainty, weariness and 
indecisiveness; a contrast to the image of the new, strong prime minister that Brown 
had cultivated prior to this event. Brown’s political inaction relating to the election 
illustrates three points:  
 
• Political inaction: silence, lack of clarity or the inability to add ‘voice’ to a 
particular situation/event can have negative political consequences for one’s 
image, status and authority. Political inaction can therefore be as potent, 
damaging and irreversible as action. 
• The expression of negative traits can define a leader’s premiership thereafter 
and have a dramatic impact upon status and authority. In the case of Brown, 
before the election debacle emerged, he had enjoyed steady poll ratings of 
39%. An ICM opinion poll conducted immediately after the election fiasco (10 
October 2007) placed the Tories at 43% and Labour at 36% (Sparrow, 2007). 
• Political errors of judgement can leave leaders vulnerable, and can give 
opposition parties, rivals and adversaries political momentum. John 
McDonnell, the Left-wing Labour MP, claimed:  
“This has been a complete fiasco from start to finish. It will do us a 
lot of damage. After weeks of political game-playing by the 
inexperienced, testosterone-fuelled young men in Brown's team we 
have presented the Tories with an own goal, making a Labour 
leader look weak, and re-associating the party with spin” 
(McDonnell, 2007).  
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Errors of judgement can weaken the position of the leader from within the party and 
can weaken internal support (see Powell, 2010, p. 37, 38 who describes Brown’s 
public display of indecision and negative impact upon his leadership thereafter and 
the party). Moreover, during Brown’s first term in office, on 6 November 2007, the 
day of the Queen’s Speech, David Cameron and acting leader of the Liberal 
Democrats, Vince Cable, attacked Brown’s persona negatively. David Cameron 
stated:  
“That is what Britain needs: solving long-term problems, not short-
term political tricks; a clear vision for the future, instead of a tired 
and cynical Prime Minister who has forgotten what he is trying to 
achieve; and consistent, strong leadership, instead of a weak Prime 
Minister who cannot stick to anything for longer than five minutes. 
That is the change that people want, and that is the change that our 
party will deliver” (Cameron, 2007b) 
 
Vince Cable stated:  
“The Queen’s Speech has been long in anticipation. The Prime 
Minister has been waiting for it for 10 years. He has had a 35-year 
political career distilling many of the ideas that have come forward 
today. He postponed the election in order to inject more vision, but 
the sense of anticlimax is deafening. We have heard little new, no  
ideas and little vision. Is that really what we were waiting for? I fear 
that the Prime Minister now cuts a rather sad figure. He was 
introduced to us a few months ago by his predecessor as the great 
clunking fist, but the boxing story has gone completely awry. Like a 
great boxing champion, as he once was, he has somehow made 
himself unconscious falling over his own bootlaces and is now 
staggering around the ring, semi-conscious and lost, and hanging 
on to the ropes. What is certainly absent is any forward movement 
or new ideas”. (Cable, 2007a) 
 
Both Cameron and Cable continued to critique Brown. Cameron continued 
characterising Brown as ‘a bottler’ and Cable, on 28 November 2007 at PMQs 
ridiculed and demeanoured Brown by making reference to him as ‘Mr Bean’ – a 
hapless satirical comedy figure: “The House has noticed the Prime Minister’s 
remarkable transformation in the past few weeks from Stalin to Mr. Bean [Laughter] 
creating chaos out of order, rather than order out of chaos” (Cable, 2007b). 
Throughout Brown’s first term in office, Cameron and Cable’s criticisms involved 
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major attacks upon the persona. References cited above by Cameron and Cable e.g. 
Brown as “a weak Prime Minister”; “the Prime Minister now cuts a rather sad figure”; 
and “from Stalin to Mr Bean”, were attacks upon Brown’s political persona. Such 
criticisms brought to the forefront of British politics the question of political leadership 
and character traits. Such personal criticisms by rivals and adversaries served as a 
constant reminder of Brown’s political inaction over election speculation, sought to 
diminish Brown’s political authority, and provided negative conditions for Brown’s 
forthcoming political actions.  
 
During Brown’s first year in office, his political popularity decreased (see BBC Poll 
Tracker), and hostility towards him increased from within the party, from opposition 
leaders and from the media commentariat. Media hostility towards Brown iterated the 
‘pack mentality’ of the media and its ability to act in a concerted fashion (see chapter 
5). At this time, David Miliband, then foreign secretary, published an article in The 
Guardian before the summer recess entitled ‘Against all odds we can still win, on a 
platform for change’ (Miliband, 2008). The article by Miliband was perceived as a 
criticism of Brown’s leadership and the beginning of a possible leadership contest, 
thus further diminishing Brown’s authority and internal support from the party.  
 
In sum, Brown’s inaction relating to the election revised his political persona as a 
strong and competent prime minister into an indecisive and fearful leader. Against 
overwhelmingly negative personal attacks upon Brown’s character, his performance 
in the global financial crisis managed to, albeit temporarily, restore some status and 
authority. 
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7.3 Global financial crisis 
The global financial crisis emerged dramatically in September 2008. Before narrating 
the scale of the crisis, we make reference to two conditions which conditioned 
Brown’s financial policy performance. The first condition of Brown’s performance in 
the global financial crisis was his political trajectory. As chancellor, Brown’s ten year 
leadership of the Treasury was characterised by stability, growth and prudence. He 
had a positive reputation for managing the economy (see Bower, 2007). Brown had 
accrued international political capital with fellow leaders and chancellors and finance 
ministers; his personal capital was arguably greater internationally than nationally 
and conditioned the overwhelmingly positive international response to his policy 
proposals as in section 7.3.2. The second condition was that during the 2007 
summer recess, the first major expression of a banking crisis within the polity 
emerged. Northern Rock, Britain’s biggest mortgage lender, was in extreme financial 
difficulty. Brown’s pragmatic response in guaranteeing customer deposits and then 
the nationalisation of Northern Rock in February 2008 demonstrated political action 
fitting to unexpected circumstances. Brown’s response to Northern Rock was a 
prelude to financial policy making in response to the international crisis. Bearing in 
mind the two positive conditions referred to, the global financial crisis is narrated 
(7.3.1), Brown’s response to the crisis and policy performance is detailed (7.3.2) as is 
the international endorsement and replication of Brown’s bailout policy package and 
effect upon political persona. 
 
7.3.1 Emergence of the global financial crisis  
The first major expression of the global crisis within the British economy was in the 
early hours of 15 September 2008. At approximately 05:30am, news that U.S. Bank, 
Lehman Brothers had collapsed was reported; staff at the Canary Wharf 
Headquarters were told that morning that the company had gone into administration. 
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On the day of the collapse, the reverberations domestically and internationally were 
significant: a loss of confidence in markets, plummeting share prices, at “4.30pm 
BST: FTSE 100 closes almost 4% lower at 5,202.4, a 210 point drop, wiping out 
£50bn of value” (The Guardian, 2008), which contributed to a raft of job losses and 
growing insecurities. All of these developments iterated the functioning of markets 
within (and not separate from) a system of global finance, the suddenly fragile 
triumphalism of western capitalism, deregulation and the embracing of the free 
market economy, policy positions that New Labour had embraced post-Thatcher (see 
sub-chapter 3.1). The impact of the crisis within the polity was job insecurity, 
companies announcing redundancies and reduction in working hours, and 
liquidations. 
 
7.3.2 Policy response to the crisis 
Brown’s policy position as a response to the crisis was set out on 13 October 2008 in 
two separate but related performances. The first policy performance was a joint press 
conference at Downing Street with the chancellor, Alistair Darling. The second 
performance was a speech on the Global Economy on the same day at The Reuters 
Building, Canary Wharf, the location serving as a reminder of the financial crisis, as 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008 in the U.K. had emerged 
from within Canary Wharf. We should stress that Alastair Darling was rarely seen as 
in charge of economic policy, Brown operated a dual role – as prime minister and as 
chancellor. The following points illustrate Brown’s policy response to the crisis:  
 
13 October 2008: Joint press conference with Alastair Darling at Downing St: 
• “The action we are taking is unprecedented but essential for all of   
us”. 
• “British banks are being strengthened today through the injection of 
nearly £50 billion of new capital from the government and from the 
markets. There is not a bank in the world that has not been affected 
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by the global storm, some more than others, but at this time of 
uncertainty we want British banks to be able to lead the world and to 
be as strong and as well capitalised as any across the globe”. 
• “I believe that only by global action can we fully restore the 
confidence that is needed and build the international financial order, 
and I will put forward proposals for major reform of the international 
institutions in a speech in the City later this morning”. 
• “To let the chips fall where they may would be the height of 
irresponsibility, it would be a failure of leadership at precisely the 
moment vigorous action is needed to protect people who need that 
help most. And if we pull together as a country we can come 
through these times stronger and not weaker” (Brown, 2008a).  
 
Before we analyse the above as policy responses to the crisis, we highlight one 
significant quotation from Brown’s second policy performance on the global crisis 
which he set out in a speech on Global Economy at the Reuters Building, Canary 
Wharf:  
“We will not shirk from our responsibilities and are prepared to go 
beyond the conventional thinking by taking the decisive action that 
is necessary to support British families and business through difficult 
times. But let me repeat, we have no interest in running British 
banks, we do have an interest in strengthening their position. And 
this has always been the way for Britain. The British people have 
always risen to the challenge of a crisis and we must do so again, 
and to pull together as a community and to show that spirit, 
resilience and determination which has defined Britain to the world 
as a nation for generations.  And by maintaining that British spirit, 
working in partnership with our friends across the globe, I believe 
we can come through these tough times together as a global 
community as well as a Britain that is stronger, not weaker. And we 
have to recognise that the action we need is not just national, but 
global” (Brown, 2008b).  
 
Having set out key quotations from Brown’s policy responses to the financial crisis, 
we make the following points. The Bailout package proposed by Brown, injecting 
British banks with nearly £50bn worth of “new capital from the government and the 
markets” (Brown, 2008a), prevented the collapse not only of the banking sector but 
the economy. The scale of monies involved was far bolder and braver than the 
nationalisation of Northern Rock in February 2008 and reflected the depth of the 
crisis which Britain faced. Brown’s pragmatic response to the crisis illustrated 
decisive leadership at a time when the U.K. economy faced the prospect of collapse 
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and mass inflation.  Brown described the domestic policy position as “unprecedented 
but essential” (ibid). His endorsement of the policy reflected the depth of the crisis but 
crucially, it reinforced leadership, responsibility and courage; traits which reflected 
the character of the British prime minister. Brown’s description of the policy as 
“essential” indicated that he was operating on a known area of financial expertise and 
that the policy decision would be a corrective to the immediate crisis that British 
banks faced; as well as a corrective to deregulated financial institutions of the 
Thatcher period that had continued under the premierships of Blair and Brown. 
Brown stated that the injection of new capital would enable “British banks to be able 
to lead the world” (ibid), in so doing, reaffirming their and his status and authority. 
Brown’s policy action served as a model for international financial crisis 
management. The positive reception internationally resulted in the replication of 
Brown’s policy (see Borger, 2008). Policy replication internationally meant that the 
traits associated with the policy internationally were reflected back on to Brown, but 
underreported by the media. 
 
Throughout the crisis, Brown had successfully managed to use the economic context 
to political advantage. His Keynesian policy position of quantitative easing provided a 
pragmatic solution to the crisis and reflected his experience in the area of finance, 
markets and the economy. Consequentially, his ability to avoid an economic crisis 
brought to the fore positive traits that existed as chancellor, and during the Northern 
Rock banking crisis as in 2007. Through policy performance, Brown managed to 
restore some political status and authority, and the positive persona that existed at 
the beginning of his premiership regained public expression (see BBC poll tracker).  
 
The analysis of Brown’s policy performance as a response to the financial crisis has 
demonstrated four points. First, the context which conditioned Brown’s performance 
in the financial crisis (political trajectory as chancellor and response to the smaller 
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scale, Northern Rock banking crisis in 2007) demonstrated political experience in the 
area of financial management; Brown’s previous positive character traits provided a 
positive context for financial policy performance. However, there was a negative 
aspect to the character of Brown related to whether or not he had foreseen the crisis, 
given his apparent economic expertise. Second, crisis moments can offer prime 
ministers scope to fashion and/or re-fashion their publicly perceived character, image 
and political persona. Brown’s experience of financial management seemed to fit well 
with the context of unprecedented national and international financial chaos. The 
financial crisis existed as Machiavellian fortuna; and enabled Brown to use context 
(financial crisis) to evoke his expertise in finance and refashion his publicly perceived 
character. Third, the scale of the crisis and Brown’s positive actions in managing 
global finance (evoking of a new financial architecture, global organisation of the G8 
and then G20) demonstrated his pragmatic response and proposal to help solve 
global financial mis-management through the creation of regulatory frameworks and 
innovative policy. The replication of Brown’s policy internationally was an 
endorsement of his strong leadership and calm yet effective policy response. Fourth, 
policy decisions are one aspect against which the performance of a leader is judged. 
In this case, policy ownership had a positive impact and elevated his political status 
and authority at the time within the polity. As in chapter 5, Policy maker A stated that 
in this crisis Gordon’s Brown’s policy position was “a good example of an innovation 
that boosted the reputation of the person who took it”. Policy positions and their 
reception can have positive political consequences for the practice of political 
leadership.  
 
In sum, the financial crisis had positive political effects for Brown; he had deployed a 
policy which was innovative and responsive to the crisis. In so doing, he fashioned 
his character and persona nationally and internationally as a pragmatic statesman.  
We now analyse Brown’s performance in the Expenses Scandal of May 2009. 
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7.4 Performance: Expenses Scandal 
The Expenses Scandal emerged on the evening 7 May 2009 through several 
evening News bulletins which reviewed the following days’ newspapers. Details of 
the breaking scandal were published in The Daily Telegraph the following day (8 May 
2009). The front page of the paper led with a picture of Brown and his brother; his 
expenses claim form which detailed cleaning payments for a flat that they had both 
shared. Brown’s involvement in the scandal was damaging for his authority and 
status as a conviction politician; the scandal presented Brown as someone who had 
cheated at a petty level despite his positive financial reputation at the national and 
international level. In this section, we refer to the Expenses Scandal with a view to 
appraising Brown’s performance at this time. For the purposes of analysis we focus 
on the following responses:  
 
• (7.4.1) Brown’s immediate response: BBC interview (8 May 2009), and  
• (7.4.2) Brown’s longer-term response in an article written in The Independent 
newspaper (27 May 2009).  
 
7.4.1 Immediate response to the Scandal 
Brown’s response to the Scandal was immediate (even though he was not in 
London). On the evening that the story became news (7 may), Downing St issued an 
immediate statement that the Prime Minister has acted with the full approval of the 
parliamentary authorities. The focus upon the system, institutions and procedure was 
formative to Brown’s responses to the Scandal. The following day (8 May) in a train 
interview, Brown, returning to London, told the BBC that 
“this is a system that’s got to change. You probably remember that 
I’ve been trying to make big changes in this system which abolished 
this allowance, to make sure that everything is properly registered, 
even receipts of £25 are registered by MPs. MPs have to live in two 
places at once, they have to live in constituencies and also in 
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London to do their work in London. There’s got to be some 
recognition of that. But the system doesn’t work; I’ve said it doesn’t 
work, it’s got to be changed, we voted for change and that change 
has got to come quickly” (Brown, 2009a).  
 
Brown condemned the institutional structures which had allowed MPs to claim 
expenses without registering every single claim, and emphasised that he had been 
“trying to make big changes” that would have encouraged accountability. He evoked 
a sense of urgency that the system was not fit for political purpose and that “change 
has got to come quickly”. His utterances demonstrated forthcoming reform of the 
institutions. When asked about public anger on the issue, Brown replied 
“the system’s got to be changed. I’ve been determined over these 
last few months that the system’s wrong, the system is not the way 
to work, the means by which you compensate people for having to 
live in two different places and its got to be better than what we 
have got at the moment. I’ve tried to persuade other MPs of that, we 
are making progress, there will be a new system in place over the 
next few months” (Brown, 2009a).  
 
Brown reiterated that the Expenses Scandal was caused by the system and the 
institutional structures; deflecting blame from the political elites and the culture that 
had existed within the institutional structures. However, his response was 
contradictory; he pontificated but was seen as personally compromised. Accusations 
that Brown had himself wrongfully claimed expenses limited his response to the 
Scandal. He was unable effectively to condemn the actions of political elites as he 
too stood accused of wrongdoing. Involvement in the scandal limited Brown’s political 
voice, and prevented him from using his political persona to advantage. 
 
Brown’s immediate political response to the Expenses Scandal focused upon the 
institutional structures, inadvertently perhaps failing to show contrition and 
acknowledge public anger. Moreover, he created ‘space’ for political rivals to 
outperform him. On 11 May, opposition leader David Cameron, made a public 
apology to BBC News for the Expenses Scandal. Brown followed suit the same day 
in a speech made to the Royal College of Nursing Conference in Harrogate. Brown 
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stated “I want to apologise on behalf of politicians, on behalf of all parties for what 
has happened in the events of these last few days” (Brown, 2009b). Brown’s apology 
was still not, however, a personal one as he did not acknowledge that he had acted 
irresponsibly. The fact, moreover, that Brown had followed the precedent set by the 
opposition leader and apologised (almost) after and not before Cameron projected 
Brown as reactive and not proactive. Brown’s timing in displaying some contrition, but 
the lack of a full personal apology elevated the position of his political rival whilst at 
the same time undermining his own image, authority and status as prime minister. 
Also there were others who were spotless.  
 
In summary to Brown’s immediate political response to the Expenses Scandal, we 
can say he focused upon the system and evoked the need for change, as opposed to 
acknowledging the concerns of voters, condemning wrongdoing and showing 
contrition. Brown’s lack of emotion provided space for rivals and adversaries to 
outshine him. And they did. Brown had also elevated the position of David Cameron 
by following him in terms of an apology. Brown’s involvement in the Scandal had the 
effect of limiting his political voice and, therefore, limiting the scope to positively 
fashion his character and persona. We must stress that up to this point, the 
Expenses Scandal and the performances analysed in this chapter had, with the 
temporary – and arguable – exception of the financial crisis, become a relentless and 
accumulating series of negative character issues for Brown. 
 
7.4.2 Longer-term response to the Scandal 
Brown’s second and longer term response to the Expenses Scandal was an article 
published in The Independent on 27 May 2009 entitled ‘Campaign for Democracy: I’ll 
consider anything that makes the political elite accountable to citizens’. The 
juxtaposition of democracy (which is universal) and the (in comparison, petty and 
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minute) Expenses Scandal in the same article was significant in terms of Brown 
putting the Scandal into wider political perspective. Brown’s article began by 
endorsing public anger: 
“revelations about the unacceptable practices in MPs expenses 
have angered and appalled me. They have shown that the British 
people want to be proud of our democracy and are furious when it is 
undermined” (Brown, 2009c).  
 
In his previous utterances (interview with the BBC), Brown had attributed the Scandal 
to political institutions. He now extended this to the political elites. In so doing, he 
acknowledged public outrage, and demonstrated, or attempted to demonstrate, the 
affinity between his and the audience’s views. As pointed out earlier, Brown’s 
involvement in the Scandal limited his voice and possibilities for the condemnation of 
the wrongful actions of others. Brown’s endorsement of public outrage “I will not 
tolerate behaviour that is against everything I believe in” (ibid) was ineffective given 
his – albeit minor – involvement in the scandal. In terms of outlining a vision for 
change, Brown referenced previous episodic information i.e. his support for Charter 
88 and the freedom of information upon becoming prime minister:  
“transparency is the foundation of a modern democracy and I 
strengthened the public’s right to secure information free of charge’ 
and ‘the strengthening of Parliament against the executive was 
merely the first part of a rolling programme of constitutional reform’ 
were juxtaposed by setting out future actions. References to the 
past, present and future demonstrated that Brown is aware of 
history and is able to outline forthcoming plans without being 
historically insensitive i.e. ‘in a few weeks, Jack Straw will announce 
the outcome of a long period of consultation on our constitutional 
renewal Bill. Most MPs enter Parliament to serve the public but that 
consultation will now have to take into account the revelations of the 
abuse of the system” (Brown, 2009c).  
 
Brown’s vision for reform was based upon citizenship:  
“since March we have been consulting on a Green Paper on a Bill of 
both rights and responsibilities – about how to entrench the rights 
and freedoms of the British people in relation to the state. In the 
months ahead we will move in all these areas”. In addition to the 
evoking of individual rights and responsibilities, Brown proposed 
redistribution of power so that agency would have greater control 
over decision-making and structure: “I will be talking about how by 
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recall, redress and better representations all local people can have 
far more influence on local budgets and local decisions, from 
policing to schooling”. 
“Everyone must know that they are being heard. We will shortly 
publish proposals which reform the Commons and put more power 
where it belongs – in the people's hands. There is no option I will not 
consider if it redistributes power. What has always been clear to me 
is that we must look at new ways in which the political elites can be 
made accountable to serve more effectively the single most 
important person in our democracy – the citizen” (Brown, 2009c). 
 
Brown’s article on the Expenses Scandal and democracy suggested personal anger 
and outrage, endorsed previous actions e.g. Charter 88 and the Bill of Rights and 
Responsibilities. Brown’s vision for change was evoked through references to the 
redistribution of power in which agency can fashion political debate and structure, 
and create the possibility of recall, a bold move which would place power in the 
hands of citizens, greater transparency and accountability with the strengthening of 
parliament against the executive, and a system in which politicians serve citizens. 
Brown’s discursive persona as a progressive politician who believed in redistributing 
power to enable agency to fashion structure was evoked in the article by setting out 
public consultations and the Constitutional Renewal Bill. 
 
The analysis of Brown’s political performances relating to the Expenses Scandal 
(BBC interview and article in The Independent) demonstrates the following three 
points:  
• Brown’s involvement in the Scandal (though minute compared to other 
political elites) limited his political voice and political action. 
• Brown’s vision for changing political institutions can be seen as hypocritical 
given his (albeit small) involvement in the Scandal. 
• Brown’s lack of contrition and of emotional intelligence offered scope for 
opposition leaders to outshine Brown thus weakening his status, image and 
authority as prime minister. 
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In this chapter we have analysed four moments of political performance and 
appraised Brown’s persona. Before analysing the final performance, let us briefly 
chronologically recap his political persona.  
 
Brown’s statement upon arriving in Downing Street as prime minister was not related 
to aspects of celebrity but did incorporate use of the personal to political effect e.g. 
Sarah Brown’s presence softened Brown’s image as a loving husband. He used the 
statement to establish dividing lines between old and new politics; in doing so, he 
distanced himself from his predecessor, Tony Blair. At this stage, Brown’s positive 
persona was starting to emerge.  
 
The events of the summer recess, specifically Brown’s response to four simultaneous 
crisis moments projected a calm and pragmatic prime minister, undaunted by 
unexpected dramas in the polity. Through performance, Brown developed a positive 
political persona, as was reinforced in poll ratings. Towards the end of the summer 
recess period, Brown created speculation of an early election. The claim was 
plausible given Brown’s newness to the job, positive political persona and good poll 
ratings. However, he allowed election speculation to continue for three weeks. His 
lack of judgement and decisiveness was significant as it subsequently revised his 
positive persona into a negative one. Colleagues, rivals, adversaries and the media 
attacked him, undermining the ‘persona’; personal criticisms therefore dominated 
Brown’s first year in office (2007-2008). 
 
In September 2008, Brown’s policy response to the global financial crisis illustrated 
strong leadership at a time in which the U.K. economy faced the prospect of collapse 
and mass inflation. The replication of Brown’s Bailout policy package internationally 
(temporarily) revised his political persona. However, a relatively neutral media 
assessment of his actions did not enable Brown’s positive persona to gain much 
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expression in national consciousness, most of his advantage operating at the 
international level. 
 
The Expenses Scandal which emerged in May 2009 had negative effects for 
incumbents of the wider political system. However, the Scandal was particularly 
negative for Brown as, the day that the story broke, he was characterised as one of 
the main political actors who had taken part in illegitimate acts involving public 
finance. As he was the prime minister, this was particularly damaging for Brown’s 
already negative persona; his inability to express contrition further developed his 
negative persona. It is not our role to speculate in this thesis. We should not perhaps 
speculate, but might venture here, that a ‘clean slate’ for Brown in the Expenses 
Scandal might have had a stunningly positive effect upon his persona, adding to and 
actually enhancing his dour Protestant, Scottish image.  
 
Bearing in mind the negative political culture as informed by the Expenses Scandal 
and Brown’s negative persona, in June 2009, Brown was the subject of a leadership 
crisis in which five cabinet members resigned. Of the high profile resignations, James 
Purnell’s was the most politically damaging for the status and authority of Brown. The 
former Blairite initiated a personal attack upon Brown’s leadership and called for him 
to stand down as prime minister. Purnell’s resignation letter was published on the 
front page of The Times newspaper and publicised by the media on the eve of the 
Local Election results (4 June 2009) and published the following morning. The letter 
stated “I now believe your continued leadership makes a Conservative victory more, 
not less likely” (Purnell, 2009). The following section analyses Brown’s first interview 
since the leadership coup and failed backbench rebellion which was published in the 
Guardian Weekend magazine. We should also stress that the leadership crisis was 
essentially about Brown’s character and leadership qualities. 
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7.5 Leadership crisis interview 
Brown’s interview entitled ‘It’s a strange life really’ was published on 20 June 2009 in 
the Guardian Weekend magazine. Brown was interviewed by Katherine Viner on two 
separate occasions during “the week in which he saw off dramatic attempts to unseat 
him” (Viner, 2009, p. 18). The 6-page interview as a discursive performance was 
framed by what Brown referred to as two earthquakes “one economic, unparalleled 
since the war, one political, the biggest parliamentary scandal for two centuries” 
(Brown, 2009d, p. 23). Throughout the interview, Brown made reference to these two 
contemporary contexts and his relationship to them. The interview with Viner was not 
presented in a question and answer format; rather, the interview was informal and 
conversational in that Viner’s reflections and responses were also included. Brown’s 
interview in the Guardian Weekend was aimed at an elite audience (like his article in 
The Independent), and had little effect in terms of restoring his authority and status 
beyond this readership profile. Our main analysis of the interview is based upon the 
two main themes that Brown alluded to: the political with reference to the personal 
and the economic. 
 
7.5.1 The political sphere 
The interview began with reference to the political and, inevitably, reference to the 
personal. Brown’s first reference to the leadership coup was through the use of 
humour, Viner notes that “he jokes about the Hotmail plot, brushing off suggestions 
that his political career is all but over” (Viner, 2009, p. 18). Throughout the interview, 
Brown made three indirect references to the coup (and the two of them using 
humour):  
 
• “I wouldn’t exaggerate how bad it’s been”. 
• “Interesting. Challenging. It feels like any other week”. 
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• “When things are difficult, you have to be sure of who you are and what you 
want to achieve. When people criticise you, you’ve got to listen to that 
criticism and to learn from it, which I’ve tried to” (Brown, 2009d).  
 
The evoking of normality when referring to the attempted coup was interesting as 
Brown appeared to project calmness. He emphasised “learning from criticisms” and 
evoked humility; thus fashioning his character as a political survivor who remained 
focused upon governing, and devoted to the mantra of “I’ve got a job to do” (Viner 
citing Brown, 2009, p. 18). Brown’s sense of political drive was strong and 
emphasised his ethos of hardwork, commitment and resilience. When questioned 
further about the leadership coup, Brown stated that he had “been through lots of 
things before”; as bad as this asked Viner, to which he replied “yeah”. His response 
explained the sense of normality that was evoked earlier in the three indirect 
references to the coup. He stated “but this is one that’s been more in the public eye. 
But you stop thinking about who you are and think about what you’ve got to do”. The 
sense of political drive and ambition was highlighted, projecting Brown as 
hardworking, determined and focused. The sense of political duty was further 
highlighted in the interview; politics was referred to “as a purpose and a mission” and 
that “it’s the big causes that matter, that drive you on” (ibid).  
 
Apart from the leadership crisis which Brown alluded to in passing, he made 
reference to politics and the use of the self as a political resource: “it was quite a 
revelation to me that politics was less about ideals and more about manoeuvres” 
(Brown, 2009d). Brown also made reference to personal weaknesses, “I’m not as 
great a presenter of information or communicator as I would like to be”, a partial 
apology for his style and its fitting ill with the political culture which encouraged a 
highly personalised comportment of the prime minister. The fact that Brown alluded 
to personal weaknesses was in itself admission that the ‘character’ of Brown did not 
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correspond to the political culture; a perhaps trick to make the impersonal personal. 
Brown made some attempt at personalisation which was quickly politicised “I think 
Britain’s Got Talent [reality TV show] is really interesting… surely the future for our 
country is more that Britain has got talent than it is Britain is a broken society”; thus 
indicating Brown’s sense of optimism, in contrast to David Cameron’s pessimism and 
characterisation of Britain as a broken society.   
 
When questioned on whether or not he had been upset by the last nine months in 
which his image had changed from the man who saved Britain from financial 
meltdown – to a pariah, Brown responded “however much you feel responsible, and 
however much your integrity is… is… and you feel hurt by what people are saying, 
you’ve got to deal with it”. The admission of hurt had the function of softening 
Brown’s image and attributing emotion to him, even though the pragmatic reference 
to “you’ve got to deal with it” implied a greater guiding political mission and sense of 
political duty.  
 
In sum, Brown’s references to politics inevitably, and deliberately, included 
references to the personal; the leadership crisis was alluded to in passing, and 
Brown did attempt to evoke a series of new character traits: humility, responsibility 
and the ability to listen and learn from criticism. References to the political were thus 
framed around the notion of character traits and leadership qualities. Brown 
attempted to reconstruct the persona and used his perceived lack of charisma to 
good effect; however, the interview did not have a particularly positive impact in 
terms of restoring at a national level his political authority as prime minister.  
  
As we pointed out earlier, the interview was framed around what Brown referred to as 
two earthquakes – one economic and one political. Let us turn to Brown’s references 
to the economy. 
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7.5.2 The economic sphere 
In the interview, Brown made reference simultaneously to “private and public worlds 
[that] have both shown themselves to be irresponsible” (ibid). He also referred to the 
embracing of markets and capitalism, the rise of individualism, consumption and the 
pre-eminence of political elites as symptomatic of the Expenses Scandal. Brown 
attempted to distance himself from the irresponsibility of private and public worlds: 
“one thing I didn’t cause is the expenses crisis” or “I was calling on the rest of the 
world all the time to create a global supervisory regime” (Brown, 2009d). The evoking 
of distance from the economic crisis had the reverse effect; Brown highlighted his 
political trajectory as chancellor and asserted that he was not the cause of the crisis 
but had oversight of the economy and then made reference to the crisis as a global 
financial crisis:  
 
• “Every government in the world is having trouble”. 
• “It’s easy to find an individual to blame, and make that person the source of 
the trouble, but we’ve been hit by a world economic hurricane, by an 
expenses crisis unparalleled in the history of Westminster”. 
• “The international ambitions of these banks made them take risks that nobody 
could ever have contemplated” (Brown, 2009d). 
 
By situating the crisis within the global context, Brown highlighted the international 
rather than national dimension of the crisis and created distance between the ‘self’ 
and the context; in this case, he attempted to separate Machiavellian virtu and 
fortuna. The fact, however, that – as in the article in The Independent and this 
interview in the Guardian Weekend – the Expenses Scandal and the wider crisis 
were so discursively intertwined, made Brown’s dissociation from each extremely 
difficult. 
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In the latter part of 2009, the media claimed that Brown was suffering from 
depression (see Lewis, 2009). His mental health became the source of negative 
characterisations which were previously alluded to by some of the core executive. In 
early 2010, author Lance Price, former Downing St Aide published Where Power 
Lies. Prime Ministers v The Media, and Andrew Rawnsley, a journalist and 
Westminster insider, published The End of The Party (2010). Both books accused 
Brown of bullying staff. The negative characterisation of Brown and the over-
serialisation of both books by the press and broadcast media emphasised a negative 
side to Brown’s personality which some of the core executive had alluded to at the 
time of the leadership coup, and before that. The books and the media comment on 
Brown’s personality implied that he was an unstable prime minister, unable to 
command authority, and was suffering from depression, and possibly taking anti-
depressants (see Lewis, 2009). The highly personalised attacks upon Brown were 
major political factors, as politics seemed to be inordinately at this time depicted and 
organised around personalities. Chapter 5 made reference to the pack mentality of 
the media and, effects upon the mediation of political personality; this was clearly 
demonstrated in the Brown premiership.  
 
Brown’s performance in each of the leaders’ debates’ is analysed in sub-chapters 
9.1, 9.2 and 9.3. Brown’s performance and persona as demonstrated in this chapter 
is a context to his leadership performance in the live televised Debates. 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
Four concluding points are made. First, as incoming prime minister, the culture 
presented Brown with the challenge of conforming to a celebrity/personalised 
leadership style that had been deployed by his predecessor, and became a trend that 
was accepted by the culture within the polity. Brown’s deployment of an anti-
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celebrity/personalised narrative throughout his premiership did have an effect upon 
the culture temporarily as he did manage to reverse the personalised/semi-
presidential culture that had characterised the last decade on two separate 
occasions. During the first few months of Brown’s premiership, his anti-cultural 
narrative was accepted by the culture within the polity and enhanced his status and 
authority; however, this was soon rejected as the culture itself reverted to the 
discourse of personalisation within which Brown was uncomfortable. The second 
occasion in which Brown’s anti-celebrity narrative was accepted by the culture was at 
the time of the financial crisis of 2008/9. The crisis provided political space for Brown 
to project seriousness, boldness, pragmatism, and decisiveness, as opposed to 
celebrity-style leadership comportment. The projection of seriousness and 
pragmatism by Brown and some positive media coverage was endorsed by the 
culture; however, soon the political culture rejected Brown’s leadership style which 
de-emphasised celebrity and personality at a moment when a series of negative 
personality traits seemed to enter the public perception, one after another. Such a 
development suggests that leadership is culturally embedded and that if executives 
work against the grain of political culture this can have often quite negative political 
consequences. Conversely, the functioning of leaders within established cultural 
narratives can offer opportunities and predominantly positive political outcomes. A 
second and related conclusion is that a personalised polity can become dramatically 
negative to leadership in adverse circumstances. 
 
Our third conclusion is that Brown’s actions and policy performance as a response to 
the financial crisis enabled him to fashion his character and persona within the polity 
and beyond. Brown’s international character and persona differed from that that 
existed within the domestic polity. In order to theorise and explain the cleavage in 
Brown’s character and persona within two different political contexts (national and 
international) we can refer to the work of John Kane and his concept of moral capital. 
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In chapter 2, Kane refers to moral capital as “moral prestige” which is established by 
individuals “avowing their service to some set of fundamental values, principles or 
goals, that find a resonant response in significant numbers of people” (Kane, 2001, 
10). Arguably, as chancellor, Brown accrued a greater stock of moral capital by 
resonating with international political actors on issues relating to finance, economic 
management and prudence than he did domestically as prime minister-in-waiting. 
Brown’s stock of moral capital internationally was considerably higher because  
“when such people judge the agent or institution to be both faithful 
and effective in serving those values and goals, they are likely to 
bestow some quantum of respect and approval that is of great 
political benefit to the receiver. This quantum is the agent’s moral 
capital” (2001, p. 10).  
 
In the case of Brown, world leaders positively endorsed Brown’s commitment to good 
economic management and prudence and thus bestowed on him the quantum of 
moral capital.  
 
Our fourth concluding point is that the performances analysed in this chapter evoked 
a range of contradictory character traits associated with Brown’s persona in public 
consciousness. Machiavelli’s description of leadership refers to the relationship 
between political disposition and circumstance. This fits our description of Brown’s 
contradictory traits. We should also point out that the trait of indecision was repeated 
in several of Brown’s performances e.g. election indecision and two other 
performances not analysed in this chapter for the purposes of space: policy on 
Gurkhas settlement rights in the U.K. and the 10p Taxation policy. The repetition of 
indecision further negated Brown’s publicly perceived character.  
 
Essentially, throughout the Brown premiership, the question of character became 
predominant and relentless; and raised questions as to whether Brown was actually 
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able to cope with the question of character and the role that it had assumed in 
contemporary British politics. 
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8a Overview 
Highly effective political performance was the basis for David Cameron’s political 
prominence within, and beyond, the Conservative party. During the 2005 party 
leadership campaign, Cameron’s speech against his main rival, David Davis, 
emphasised talented personalisation, concerted use of the self as a political 
resource, and an image of youthful and dynamic leadership. Through the 
performance of himself, as it were, Cameron established his own persona as a site of 
political authority, and changed the configuration of the leadership campaign. Prior to 
the performance, Cameron had been consistently behind David Davis in opinion polls 
(see Wells, 2005).  
 
The structure of this chapter applies the framework of political performance to David 
Cameron. Cameron’s performance during the campaign for leadership of the party 
(September-December 2005), and the first two years as party leader (December 
2005-December 2007) are analysed in order to demonstrate the relationship between 
performance and persona. Post-2007, Cameron’s persona developed but was not 
that dissimilar to the persona that emerged during 2005-2007. In order to analyse 
Cameron’s performance during the time periods identified, we stress context and 
tradition as central conditions of performance in his case. In section 8b, we refer to 
Cameron’s immediate context; he was the fifth post-Thatcher leader of the 
Conservative party, a party characterised by factionalism and infighting. His three 
immediate predecessors, Michael Howard (2003-2005), more so, Iain Duncan Smith 
(IDS) (2001-2003), and William Hague (1997-2001) iterated the Right/wing nature of 
the party (and its negative perception in the public realm) (see Bale, 2010). In section 
8c, therefore, we refer to the tradition of Conservatism that existed, arguably up to 
and not including Thatcherism, a long tradition informed by the ideas and the 
memory of figures such as Edmund Burke, Benjamin Disraeli, and more recent 
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thinkers like Michael Oakeshott (1978), and the notion of ‘One Nation Conservatism’. 
Particular attention is drawn to Oakeshott’s work which describes Conservatism not 
as an ideology but as a series of dispositions. We adopt Oakeshott’s description of 
Conservatism as a series of dispositions and set out five New Right Conservative 
dispositions that were immediate contexts to Cameron’s leadership performance. 
The Westminster context as referred to in chapter 5 is also relevant to Cameron’s 
performance e.g. a personalised political culture and the media emphasis upon 
political personality. 
 
The following leadership performances are analysed: 
 
• (8.1) The 2005 campaign for leadership of the party: 
Cameron’s leadership speech is analysed, particularly in terms of his 
relationship to Conservatism, policy and relationship to the audience. 
• (8.2) Performance as party leader from December 2005-December 2007: 
Within this period we appraise Cameron’s relationship to Conservatism and 
the evoking of modern ‘Compassionate Conservatism’, and focus upon three 
performances. 
• (8.2.1) Relationship to policy:  
One of Cameron’s first acts as leader of the party was setting up six policy 
groups which would report back in 18 months time. This provided Cameron 
with time and space to define a policy agenda and space to change the 
appearance of Conservatism through performance. We identify the 
significance of the policy groups and their impact upon Cameron’s persona. 
• (8.2.2) Insistence upon the environment:  
Cameron’s discursive and performative actions relating to the environment 
are identified; it was through these that he evoked the values that underpin 
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‘Compassionate Conservatism’ and thus inflected some aspects of New Right 
Conservatism. We also identify Cameron’s use of photo opportunities in 
which he used conflation of the public and private realms and aspects of 
celebrity culture to enhance his political persona.  
• (8.2.3) (Expressions of) commitment to equality, including gender equality 
and homosexuality.  
 
The analysis of each performance makes reference to the way in which Cameron 
appeared to inflect the immediate post-Thatcher disposition of New Right 
Conservatism by drawing upon and integrating aspects of One Nation Conservatism 
in order to constitute modern ‘Compassionate Conservatism’. While drawing upon a 
range of dispositions that already existed within the party, Cameron created the 
perception of a new type of Conservatism. Fundamentally, none of the post-Thatcher 
leaders blended different strands of Conservatism. Cameron was therefore able to do 
many things, in particular to distance himself to a certain and consequential degree 
strategically, but more importantly discursively, from the Right/wing party leadership. 
In conclusion, the relationship between performance and ‘ideology’ and relationship 
between culture and institutions is elaborated. 
 
We begin this chapter by referring to Cameron’s immediate context (8b); to the 
tradition of Conservatism, and the post-Thatcherite disposition of Conservatism (8c); 
we shall then analyse the performances. 
 
8b Context: the party and immediate predecessors 
Post-Thatcher, through to 2005, the Conservative party had four leaders, John Major 
(1990-1997); William Hague (1997-2001); Iain Duncan Smith (IDS) (2001-2003) and 
Michael Howard (2003-2005). All four leaders were unable to reconcile a 
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fundamental tension that existed within the party, namely, whether to pursue New 
Right Conservatism as exemplified by Thatcher, or not. The party was thus 
characterised by cleavages and factionalism, and viewed in the public realm as a 
predominantly Right-wing political party (see also Bale, 2010; Beech, 2009). One of 
the problems that Cameron faced was that he too was a post-Thatcher leader and of 
similar age and educational background to both Hague and IDS (Eton public school, 
Oxford University, and the Bullingdon Club – Hague did not attend Eton but did 
attend Oxford University and was part of the Bullingdon Club) who were considered 
as representing the Right of the party. In order to differentiate himself from the 
negative connotations associated with his predecessors, Cameron began to draw 
upon pre-Thatcherite narratives that existed within the party e.g. One Nation 
Conservatism, without critiquing its opposite: New Right Conservatism associated 
with Hague, IDS and Howard. Fundamentally, Cameron appeared to distance himself 
from his post-Thatcher predecessors by evoking a new narrative that had been 
unfamiliar to them and the party for more than two decades, without critiquing New 
Right Conservatism.  
 
The second context of Cameron’s leadership performance was the tradition of 
Conservatism which has been alluded to above. In the following section we identify 
One Nation Conservatism, typified by Disraeli in the 19th century, as the main 
tradition which had existed, arguably, up until the deployment of Thatcherism, and 
which Cameron drew upon in order to create a new performative and discursive 
narrative ‘Compassionate Conservatism’. 
 
8c Context: tradition of Conservatism 
One Nation Conservatism as a Conservative political ideology was typified by 
Benjamin Disraeli in the 19th century, both as opposition leader (1868-1874) and as 
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prime minister (1874-1880). Disraeli’s approach emphasised “the elevation of the 
condition of the people” (Norton and Aughey, 1981, p. 109). The essence of 
Disraelian Conservatism combined paternalism, national identity and Empire; the 
conjuncture of all three implied a society that was not informed by (antagonistic) 
class divisions, and a society which had regard for helping the (deserving) poor. “One 
Nation progressive Toryism was determined to prevent the retreat behind the privet 
hedge into a world of narrow class interests and selfish concerns” (ibid, p. 79). Post-
Disraeli, One Nation Conservatism was continued by 20th century Conservative 
leaders. The tradition was particularly evident in the post-World War Two War 
leaders: Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, Harold Macmillan, Alec Douglas-Home, 
and Edward Heath.  
 
In order to understand the practical day-to-day working of Conservatism, Oakeshott 
(1978) refers to Conservatism not as an ideology but as a disposition or series of 
dispositions, as a set of attitudes or a worldview that exists within a particular 
organisation and contributes towards its identity. Oakeshott states  
“to be Conservative is to be disposed to think and behave in certain 
manners; it is to prefer certain kinds of conduct and certain 
conditions of human circumstances to others; it is to be disposed to 
make certain kinds of choices” (1978, p. 23).  
 
Let us reference the range of dispositions that Oakeshott expresses in order to 
capture the essence of the Conservative worldview. Quintessentially, Oakeshott’s 
contribution to our research is that Conservatism exists not as an ideology but as a 
series of attitudes: 
“The general characteristics of this [Conservative] disposition… 
centre upon a propensity to use and to enjoy what is available rather 
than to wish for or to look for something else; to delight in what is 
present rather than what was or may be”. 
“To be Conservative is to prefer the familiar to the unknown, to 
prefer the tried to the untried; fact to mystery, the actual to the 
possible, the limited to the unbounded, the near to the distant, the 
sufficient to the superabundant, the convenient to the perfect, 
present laughter to utopian bliss”. 
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“The man of Conservative temperament… will find small and slow 
changes more tolerable than large and sudden; and he will value 
highly every appearance of continuity. To be Conservative is not 
merely to be averse from change (which may be an idiosyncrasy); it 
is also a manner of accommodating ourselves to changes, an 
activity imposed upon all men. For change is a threat to identity, and 
every change is an emblem of extinction” (Oakeshott, 1978. p. 25).   
 
Oakeshott’s approach is helpful to us in that David Cameron operated within and 
upon this Conservative disposition to create and establish his persona. By its nature, 
a disposition is nebulous and not tangible; changing the appearance of a disposition 
or set of attitudes is perhaps easier – and arguably more consequential – than, say, 
changing a party’s constitution, for example. Inflecting dispositions within the party 
made Cameron’s performance rich and dramatic, as it was through discursive and 
performative actions that he changed the appearance and the projection of the party, 
and moved it to the centre-Right of British politics. We use Oakeshott’s idea of 
Conservatism as a disposition and refer to five quintessential post-Thatcher party 
dispositions/attitudes which typify New Right Conservatism and which existed 
immediately before Cameron’s rise to political prominence, and which are contexts to 
his leadership performance. Cameron acts within and upon a series of post-Thatcher 
Conservative dispositions: attitudes towards national identity, and attitudes towards 
Europe, institutions, immigration, women and sexuality. The following five 
dispositions are the opposite of Oakeshott’s approach (some of the following 
dispositions were also part of Disraeli’s One Nation Conservatism); for our purposes, 
they highlight New Right Conservatism as an immediate context to Cameron’s 
leadership performance:  
 
1. Attitude to national identity and immigration:  
In March 2000, at the party’s spring conference on immigration, Hague 
“suggested that, under a second-term Labour government, Britain would 
become a ‘foreign land’. He also promised voters no less than eight times in 
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the same speech that “we will give you your country back’” (Bale, 2010, p. 
123). Hague was viewed as flirting with extremism. In February 2004, Michael 
Howard visited Burnley and stressed that “the BNP [British National party] are 
a stain on our democratic way of life” (Howard, 2004). Howard’s visit was 
considered as contradictory in that he advocated a tough stance as regards 
asylum seekers (immigration controls and cutting benefits) yet was perceived 
as both critiquing the BNP yet flirting with its electorate. 
2. Attitude towards institutions:  
The Conservative attitude towards institutions (political or social e.g. the 
family, the church) was one of respect, preservation and rule bound 
behaviour. 
3. Attitude towards Europe:  
Post-Thatcherism, Europe was an issue that divided the party. Leadership 
stances on Europe (e.g. pro, anti, anti, anti, corresponding to Major, Hague, 
IDS, and Howard) reinforced the broader contradictions of the party. 
4. Attitude towards sexuality:  
Under the leadership of Hague, at the end of July 2000, the party had tried to 
block in the House of Lords the government’s attempts to repeal Conservative 
Legislation (Section 28) that prevented local authorities ‘promoting’ 
homosexuality (see Bale, 2010, p. 117). At about the same time, Michael 
Portillo was marginalised by the party as his sexuality was highlighted; 
subsequently he was not a contender in the 2001 leadership election.  
5. Attitude towards women:  
In July 2002, as part of Iain Duncan Smith’s reshuffle, Theresa May was 
appointed party chairman, this was viewed by many as tokenism (Bale, 2010, 
p. 160). In 2003, the male/female ratio in Michael Howard’s shadow cabinet 
was 12:1, even worse than the previous 27:3 in 2001.  
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The five post-Thatcher dispositions constituted Cameron’s immediate context and 
were contexts to his performance. Through performance, Cameron inflected such 
contexts and established his political persona in the public realm. We demonstrate 
this by focusing on the following performances detailed in our introduction: (8.1) 
Leadership speech during the 2005 campaign for party leadership. (8.2) Performance 
as party leader from December 2005-December 2005 including: (8.2.1) Relationship 
to policy; (8.2.2) Insistence upon the environment; and, (8.2.3) Commitment to 
equality. 
 
8.1 Leadership campaign speech 
In this section, Cameron’s speech to the party (4 October 2005) during the leadership 
campaign is analysed. The speech constituted a significant part of the campaign, 
captured the essence of performance, and established Cameron’s publicly perceived 
political persona. Cameron organised his performance around the party and his 
discursive relationship to Conservatism, this is our main area of analysis; thereafter, 
Cameron’s relationship to policy and to the audience and the impact of performance 
upon the emergence of his political persona is analysed. 
 
8.1.1 Relationship to Conservatism 
At the beginning of the speech, Cameron endorsed three of his immediate 
predecessors; in doing so, he did not critique New Right Conservatism, and therefore 
appeared not to have a negative and confrontational relationship to it. This was 
particularly significant as Cameron started to evoke the values of ‘One Nation’ and 
‘Compassionate Conservatism’ without critiquing its opposite:  
“And there’s something I want to say at the start. Being leader of the 
opposition is one of the most difficult jobs in Government. And this 
party owes a huge debt and gratitude to three people who have 
given it their all and worked their heart out over the last eight years. 
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And you’re fight has not been in vain. William Hague who 
campaigned so hard to keep to keep this country out of the Euro 
and who put that issue on the map, I saw to William, you helped 
save the pound and we should thank you for that. Iain Duncan 
Smith got this party to focus on public services and on social justice. 
And Iain you showed that this party does care about the weak, 
about the poor, about the vulnerable, about the dispossessed, about 
those who get left behind and we thank you for that. And Michael 
Howard, Michael you gave this party a sense of disciple, a sense of 
unity, a sense of purpose that we must thank you for. And we must 
never ever lose” (Cameron, 2005a). 
 
The gesture of generosity to Hague, IDS and Howard was strategic in that it 
projected humility; crucially, however, by not critiquing New Right Conservatism he 
created space to make subtle references to its opposite, One Nation Conservatism, 
and more importantly, modern Compassionate Conservatism.  
 
Throughout the speech, Cameron used Conservative dispositions e.g. the family, 
national identity and (a contemporary version of) ‘Empire’, and Britain’s standing in 
the world, to evoke values of fairness, duty and compassion. In so doing, he gave 
old/existing dispositions new discursive reality and emphasised the values that 
constitute ‘Compassionate Conservatism’ which blended the dispositions of ‘One 
Nation’, ‘New Right’ and modern Conservatism. The following five examples from the 
speech illustrate this:  
“I want to be able to say to the mother who’s worrying How to for 
Christmas? and how to get the kids to school: “Yes, we want to 
leave more money in her pocket, but we also know that we’ve got to 
have good public transport, too, so we’ll share – that’s right, we’ll 
share - the proceeds growth so that we keep taxes down on the one 
hand and better public services on the other”. 
“I want to be able to say to the family that’s worrying about paying 
for childcare and seeing enough of the family that we support the 
family because we know that’s the best way to bring up children in a 
loving and caring home. 
“I want to be able to say to the young mother, to the first time 
mother whose worried about the air she breathes, about the food 
that she puts into her child’s mouth, the park that she walks in, the 
public spaces that she lives in. that we understand, a modern 
Conservative party understands that quality of life matters as well as 
the quantity of money”. 
“I want to say to the student whose horizons extend far beyond this 
country, far beyond Europe and into the wider world that we are not 
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isolationist or xenophobic. We are a self confident, proud, outward 
looking country that believes Britain does best when she engages 
ethically and enthusiastically with the rest of the world”.  
“And when we talk about foreign affairs, we don't just stand up for 
the rights of people in Gibraltar and Zimbabwe, but we’ll stand up for 
the people of Darfur and sub-Saharan Africa who are living on less 
than a dollar a day and getting poorer as we get richer” (Cameron, 
2005a). 
 
By making references to the values that constitute ‘Compassionate Conservatism’: 
duty, responsibility, morality and fairness, Cameron began to inflect the prevailing 
dispositions of Conservatism. In so doing, he implied, even discursively created, a 
kind of dependency upon himself, in that the party could only become a modern party 
through belief in him. By evoking the values of Compassionate Conservatism, 
Cameron gave old discourses, such as One Nation Conservatism, new reality. In 
doing so, he suggested alternative dispositions for Conservatism and an alternative 
identity for the party in the public realm. And through its not being contested (he 
alone was ‘discoursing’) he appeared discursively to have appeased all sides of the 
party while maintaining its unity. By blending two older narratives he seemed to be 
creating a new, modern one, a quintessentially Conservative – reflective yet implying 
no radical breaks – ‘disposition’.  
 
In the speech, Cameron made subtle references to the ‘One Nation Conservatism’ 
and the values that underpin modern ‘Compassionate Conservatism’; such 
references were as if, and doubtless in reality were accepted by the audience as he 
did not critique the immediately preceding New Right Conservative disposition 
associated with Hague and IDS; by endorsing and not critiquing predecessors, 
Cameron retained aspects of New Right Conservatism and enfolded them within 
Compassionate Conservatism. 
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8.1.2 Relationship to policy 
Significantly, Cameron’s speech did not contain any specific policy proposals. He did, 
however, insist upon critiquing the Labour Government’s Education policy, as well as 
making negative references to the then chancellor, Gordon Brown. In doing so, 
Cameron expressed an awareness of policy making and its inextricable link to the 
economy and demonstrated the appearance of some policy depth. The following six 
examples illustrate our point:  
“And what is the governments answer? What is Labour’s answer? 
We now have an exam system where 16%, 16 out of every 100 is a 
pass. We have a system where parents with children in failing 
schools have no means of escape and no means of redress”. 
“Everyone knows, everybody knows that our education system just 
as health system needs radical reform. But there’s one man, one 
man standing in the way? His name is Gordon Brown and he’s the 
great roadblock”.  
“And also, everyone knows that we need to have a much simpler tax 
and benefit system. But one man stands in the way. Gordon Brown. 
The great tax riser, the great complicator, Gordon Brown”. 
“Everyone knows that we need to deregulate to set our business 
men and women free to compete with and giants of India and China 
and East Asia. But one man stands in the way. Gordon Brown. The 
great regulator in chief”. 
“How are we going to stop him? Who’s going to stop him? Tony 
Blair can't do it. God knows, he's tried hard enough. There is only 
one group of people that can stop Gordon Brown and it’s us here in 
this room”. 
“And do you know there's one thing he fears more than anything 
else: and that is a Conservative party that has the courage to renew 
and change itself. So I say let’s give Gordon the fright of his life” 
(Cameron, 2005a).  
 
Cameron’s critique of the then chancellor, Gordon Brown, and not the then prime 
minister, Tony Blair, was strategic. He preferred not to critique Blair as, at this time, 
performative similarities between Blair and Cameron were beginning to express 
themselves in the public realm, particularly through newspapers (see Letts, 2007). 
Had he critiqued Blair, stylistically he would have inadvertently negated himself. In 
Cameron’s delivery of the critiques of Brown, he appeared stern, his tone of voice 
appeared slightly aggressive; his comportment displayed anger and disbelief at the 
current government’s policies – he stood still at this point in one place, tilted his head 
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in reflection and then shook his head. Cameron’s serious disposition illustrated anger 
with the current administration, and in particular, Brown, even though he did not 
present the audience with any policies that would rival those of the Labour 
government. Let us examine Cameron’s relationship to his audience. 
 
8.1.3 Relationship to the audience 
Cameron had three audiences he performed his speech to: 1) the immediate 
audience in the conference hall which comprised party members, colleagues and 
leadership rivals, 2) the media, and 3) the viewing public. For our purposes, let us 
focus upon Cameron’s relationship with the immediate audience in the conference 
hall as during the campaign for leadership of the party, the party itself was his main 
audience.  
 
Cameron’s performance to the party was crucial to his endorsement as party leader; 
in the speech he did two things: he developed a positive relationship with the party, 
and he established the self as a site of (potential) political authority. In order to 
demonstrate this, we identify the proximity between Cameron and the audience; the 
use of humour; invention of interactivity, and the emergence of Cameron’s political 
persona within the party.  
 
Throughout the speech, Cameron developed close proximity between himself and 
the party audience through the following: 
 
• Not having a lectern, Cameron walked around the stage, increasing the 
proximity between himself and the party faithful, ‘entertaining’ their eyes. 
Whilst walking he would sometimes stop and look directly at party members 
(see Appendix H). 
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• Physically, Cameron’s comportment was relaxed and not tense; he walked 
around the stage casually, at times with one hand in his pocket. Cameron’s 
energy conveyed youthfulness and dynamism; traits that his immediate 
predecessors had previously lacked.  
• Perhaps most importantly, Cameron delivered his entire speech without 
notes; speaking without notes and not appearing to be nervous or hesitant in 
delivery of the speech illustrated self-confidence. More significantly, it made 
redundant the suggestion and role of political speechwriters and emphasised 
‘authorship’ of the speech, Cameron therefore appeared as genuine and 
truthful. In contrast, in David Davis’ performance to the conference, he had a 
fixed position at the lectern and made continuous reference to his notes; in 
doing so, he highlighted the role of the speechwriters and therefore appeared 
not as genuine as Cameron. And we cannot underline too strongly how much 
more interesting to listen to a speaker is when talking rather than reading 
from a script. Simply in this, Cameron implied a new kind of leadership.  
• Speaking without notes increased Cameron’s ability to positively engage with 
the audience and invent dialogue and interactivity. In doing so, he projected 
himself as a potential party leader who was concerned with dialogue and the 
views of the party (albeit imagined dialogue) and would offer a different style 
of leadership. Cameron delivered the entire speech without notes. This 
iterated his conversational style with the audience and facilitated imagined 
dialogue.  
In addition to the projected close proximity between himself and the party faithful, 
Cameron made other more striking illusions of proximity. He did this through the use 
of humour on two separate occasions, at the beginning and end of the speech: 
“There’s something else I should probably say at the start of this 
speech. It’s becoming almost obligatory and that is that if there is 
out there an 82 year old, or a 42 year old or a 22 year old that at any 
stage in this speech wants to shout out ‘nonsense’ you just go for it 
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because I’ll will tell you something about this party, we’re not 
frightened about debate, we don’t mind having an argument and we 
believe in free speech. But I would be grateful if you wouldn’t shout 
‘nonsense’ the whole way through”. 
“Change just isn’t about policies or presentation or organisation or 
even dare I say it, having a young, vigorous, energetic leader – 
although come to think of it, that might not be such a bad idea” 
(Cameron, 2005a). 
 
Cameron’s use of humour was positively received by the audience. The use of light 
sarcasm and slight narcissism; endorsing the self as “a young, vigorous, energetic 
leader” did not have a negative impact upon his persona; conversely, Cameron’s use 
of humour to make positive references to the self projected self-confidence and 
friendliness, and quite strikingly, through irony, even slight self parody, brought the 
self centre stage.   
 
Cameron’s invention of interactivity between himself and the immediate audience 
was further highlighted by three rhetorical questions: 
“I don’t want to sit around and wait and lose again in four more 
years. Do you?” 
“There are some who say, you’ve just got to attack the government 
with more vigour and they will just fall apart. But I say that’s not the 
answer, people know they have failed; they want to know how we 
are going to succeed. I don’t want to let them down again. Do you?” 
“Some say that we should move to the right. I say that would be 
wrong. I don’t want this party to turn into a fringe party, never able to 
challenge for government again. I don’t want to let that happen to 
this party. Do you?” (Cameron, 2005a).  
 
Rhetorical questions engage an audience (see Atkinson, 1984, p. 75 cited in chapter 
4, methodology); the interactivity complemented Cameron’s previous use of humour; 
in doing so, he constructed a rich discursive relationship between himself and the 
audience.  
 
At the end of the speech, Cameron thanked his immediate audience; this was 
performatively reinforced by his standing in the middle of the stage and taking a bow 
down towards the party. Symbolically, almost theatrically, the bow represented 
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Cameron asking the audience for their approval, and a recognition that this truly was 
a ‘performance’. 
 
Three points summarise the analysis of Cameron’s leadership campaign speech to 
the party. First, in the speech, Cameron inflected post-Thatcher dispositions while not 
critiquing his predecessors (Major, Hague, IDS and Howard), who constituted such 
dispositions. This allowed him in a subtle way, to evoke the values that constituted 
modern Compassionate Conservatism. Second, Cameron drew upon the 
values/dispositions of One Nation Conservatism in order to constitute modern 
‘Compassionate Conservatism’, a particular type of 21st century conservatism which 
blended a tradition that had existed within the party, even within aspects of 
Thatcherism. In doing so, he gave discursive reality to his pre-Thatcher as well as 
pro-Thatcher audience and did not isolate himself within one tradition. Third, one of 
the immediate contexts of his performance was that he was behind in opinion polls 
(see Wells, 2005). Through performance, Cameron revised this image dramatically 
by outperforming his main rival, David Davis, and, in so doing, altered the discourse 
of leadership within the party. Cameron’s lively and energetic performance 
established his political persona and led to his victory in the party leadership election 
on 6 December 2005.  
 
As follows, Cameron’s performance as party leader is analysed. 
 
8.2 Performative comportment as party leader 
As party leader, Cameron’s relationship to Conservatism, specifically the evoking of 
Compassionate Conservatism, is analysed through the following three performances:  
 
• (8.2.1) Relationship to policy: 
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One of Cameron’s first acts as leader of the party was to set up six policy 
groups which would report back in 18 months time. We analyse the six 
groups as combining One Nation and New Right Conservatism; more 
importantly, the policy groups provided Cameron with political time and space 
to alter the disposition of Conservatism, and to express ‘Compassionate 
Conservative’ in the wider public realm. 
• (8.2.2) Insistence upon the environment: 
Cameron’s Commitment to Climate Change and the promotion of an 
environmental agenda is analysed as a series of performances which altered 
traditional notions of Conservatism. 
• (8.2.3) (Expressions of) commitment to equality:  
Including gender equality and homosexuality. 
 
8.2.1 Relationship to policy  
During Cameron’s first week as party leader (5 December -12 December 2005), six 
policy groups were set up under the following headings: economic competitiveness; 
quality of life (including the environment); public service reform; security; global 
poverty; and the social justice policy group. All six would report back in 18 months 
time (July 2007). The immediacy of setting up of a range of policy groups, each with 
a different set of priorities, meant that Cameron was not bound by policy 
commitments as were his predecessors, Hague, IDS and Howard. The focus of each 
policy group, which combined One Nation and New Right Conservatism is 
elaborated: 
 
• The Economic Competiveness policy group reflected New Right 
Conservatism and suggested the continuation of neoliberalism as a form of 
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governance. The remit of the group was to investigate economic 
competitveness and taxation and highlighted the role of markets in politics. 
• The title of the Quality of Life policy group suggested a modern idea and 
appeal to post-industrial generations. The remit of this group included the 
environment and explored how to make Britain a safer place to live, e.g. safer 
public spaces. 
• The Public Service Reform group would report on improving public services in 
terms of cost effectiveness and offering greater freedom and control for 
service users as well as public servants. Both ‘One Nation’ and ‘New Right’ 
Conservatism were evoked through this policy group. 
• The remit of the National and International Security policy group as evoked in 
Cameron’s leadership acceptance speech were responses to international 
terrorism, safety, dignity, discipline and re-civilising society (Cameron, 
2005b). This group evoked the Conservative disposition of national identity 
and even ‘Empire’, as well as caring for the elderly; both ‘One Nation’ and 
‘New Right’ traditions co-existed in the priorities of this policy group. 
• The Global Poverty policy group also dealt with globalisation and highlighted 
‘One Nation Conservatism’. 
• The Social Justice policy group was headed by former party leader, Iain 
Duncan Smith. This policy group would report on “social action to ensure 
social justice, and a stronger society” (Cameron, 2005b). A modern approach 
was evoked in terms of rebuilding communities, dealing with the issues 
associated with “drug abuse, family breakdown, poor public space, chaotic 
home environments, high crime” (ibid). 
 
Each policy group had a launch event and ensured that Cameron had media 
coverage to promote his policy agenda and use the personal to political effect. The 
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leadership-centred political culture as outlined in chapter 5 was significant in terms of 
Cameron using the self to political purpose. In summary, three points are made on 
Cameron’s policy groups and use of context and tradition: 
 
• First, initiating six policy groups gave Cameron time to develop a policy 
agenda that fitted contemporary political culture. The culture was relatively 
unresponsive to Right-wing Conservatism, as had been illustrated by three 
post-Thatcher election defeats (1997, 2001 and 2005). In order to reverse 
this, his own persona was used to channel discourses, dispositions and 
audience reactions, to create new opportunities. 
• Second, the priorities of all six groups represented the conjuncture of One 
Nation and New Right Conservatism; by marrying both traditions, Cameron 
enabled the values that underpin Compassionate Conservatism expression 
e.g. a Disraelian concern for “the elevation of the condition of the people” 
(Norton and Aughey, 1981, p. 109) and a Thatcherite emphasis upon 
neoliberalism. In doing so, he appealed to pre-Thatcher as well as post-
Thatcher audiences, but more importantly, gave the impression that the post-
Thatcher factionalism that had characterised the party no longer dominated. 
The combination of One Nation and New Right Conservatism illustrated that 
the party was moving from the Right to the centre-Right of British politics. 
• Third, the range of policy groups indicated a forthcoming broad and inclusive 
as opposed to limited and exclusive policy agenda, as was the case 
particularly with Hague and IDS. The policy groups provided Cameron with 
political time and political space to reinforce the discourse of Compassionate 
Conservatism with physical and performative realities.  
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We now turn to Cameron’s emphasis upon the environment and equality as two 
discourses through which Compassionate Conservatism as a disposition gained 
traction in public consciousness and changed the appearance of the previous version 
of Conservatism. 
 
8.2.2 Commitment to the environment 
We narrate six of Cameron’s discursive and performative acts as party leader relating 
to an environmental/Green ‘disposition’, and appraise the relationship between his 
performance and Conservatism:  
 
• In January 2006, “Cameron announced that the rock-star/anti-poverty 
campaigner, Bob Geldof, would act as an advisor to the policy group on 
globalization and global poverty” (Bale, 2010, p. 291). The recruitment of 
Geldof “suggested that Cameron’s Conservatives (as the Party’s instantly 
revamped website now billed them) weren’t the same old Tories” (ibid). 
• Throughout 2006, Cameron demonstrated a personal commitment to the 
Green agenda by using the media as a conduit to announce that he had 
commissioned an eco-architect to remodel his new house, plans for which 
included solar-panels, water-harvesting, and a roof-mounted wind turbine 
(Booth, 2006). Moreover, Cameron was pictured with sellers of the Big Issue. 
He and his wife, Samantha, were often pictured recycling; he was also 
regularly pictured cycling to work (though followed by his official car), and 
making use of new technologies e.g. ‘Webcameron’ – a video journal which 
he used to personalise his persona. The conflation of the public and private 
realm gave Cameron space to express the personal through the political. 
• On 20 April 2006, Cameron visited the island of Svalbard in Norway to see 
the effects of global-warming. He exploited photo opportunities in which he 
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was pictured viewing the Norwegian glacier by sledge (see Appendix I). His 
trip was criticised for coinciding with the United Nations speech on climate 
change by then chancellor, Gordon Brown, and for emphasising personality 
rather than policy. The trip expressed Cameron’s personal commitment to a 
Green agenda. 
•  In order to reinforce the performative act of visiting Norway, Cameron 
outlined his relationship to the environment in an article for The Independent 
on the same day (20 April 2006). The article, entitled ‘We need a greater 
sense of urgency on climate change’, began by personally outlining his 
environmental disposition:  
“since becoming leader of the Conservative Party I have sought to 
push the environment up to the top of the political agenda. Not only 
is it something that I feel strongly about, but I am aware that my 
position has given me a unique opportunity to stimulate national 
debate on an issue that we cannot afford to ignore. I intend to take 
it” (Cameron, 2006a).  
 
• Throughout 2006 Cameron continued lobbying the Government to introduce a 
Climate Change Bill which was advocated during his leadership campaign. 
On 1 May 2006, Cameron attended ‘Koko’ – an Indi club in Camden which 
hosted a Friends of the Earth concert. The aim of the concert was to promote 
the Climate Change Bill. Cameron’s participation in the event emphasised his 
personal commitment to the Green agenda as well as his wider engagement 
with Friends of the Earth. (After almost two years of lobbying, the Climate 
Change Bill and Energy Bill were passed as legislation in November 2008). 
• Towards the end of 2006, Cameron convened a Conservative Local Green 
Energy Summit. 
 
Cameron’s insistence upon the environment enabled a constituent part of modern 
‘Compassionate Conservatism’ to gain public expression. By emphasising the 
environment, Cameron also repeated an old policy position that existed in 1990: the 
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Thatcher administration, though not radically committed to the environment, did 
publish the first Government White Paper entitled ‘The Common Inheritance’. By 
bringing these strands together, Cameron:  
 
• Appealed to traditional Tory values of duty, pragmatism and rightful action. 
• Started to detoxify the brand of Conservatism.  
• Highlighted his commitment to the Disraelian ‘Quality of Life’ policy group.  
• Evoked ‘Compassionate Conservatism’ as a disposition, and enfolded 
Thatcherism within it by referring to the 1990 White Paper. 
 
Cameron’s commitment to the environment was symbolic of modern Conservatism: 
he combined discourses on the environment with performance, e.g. cycling to work 
or forging alliances with Friends of the Earth. His commitment was unlike his 
predecessors. His focus on the environment illustrated pragmatism.  
 
We now refer to Cameron’s commitment to equality and the effects of this upon the 
disposition of Conservatism and his political persona. 
 
8.2.3 Commitment to equality 
Cameron’s (expressions of) commitment to both gender and sexual equality 
countered a series of extremist and stereotypical dispositions that existed within the 
Conservative party. Cameron evoked traditional Tory values of fairness and equality, 
values that underpinned modern Compassionate Conservatism. We identify his 
commitment to gender and to sexuality in sections 8.2.3a and 8.2.3b. 
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8.2.3a Commitment to gender equality 
Cameron’s commitment to gender equality was evident at the start of his leadership 
of the party. In his leadership acceptance speech on 6 December 2005, he stated:   
“we will change the way we look. Nine out of 10 Conservative MPs, 
like me, are white men. We need to change the scandalous under 
representation of women in the Conservative party and we’ll do that” 
(Cameron, 2005b).  
 
In his first week as party leader, on 12 December 2005, in a speech delivered in 
Leeds on candidate selection, five positive actions (and not “crazed political 
correctness” (Cameron, 2005c)) that would increase the number of women and 
minority Conservative MPs were announced. First, candidate selections would be 
frozen “until we have established a system that guarantees increased diversity, 
fairness and meritocracy” (ibid). Second,  
“a priority list of ‘our best and brightest’ would be drawn up by the 
Party’s Board Committee on Candidates from the existing candidate 
list, but at least half the people on it would be women and a 
significant proportion would be disabled or ethnic minority 
candidates” (Lee, 2009, p. 8).  
 
Third, there would be a review of progress after three months, and any further action 
taken if needed. Fourth, there would be an intensive head-hunting programme for 
new women and minority ethnic candidates, which would be supported by a 
mentoring programme led by Theresa May. Fifth, non party members such as local 
community stakeholders would engage in candidate selection in a bid to engage local 
communities in selection processes (Lee, 2009, p. 8-9).  
 
Throughout 2006, Cameron’s discourse on equality relating to women and ethnic 
groups, specifically his five ‘positive actions’, were publicised by the mainstream 
media (BBC, 2006b). Moreover, in photo-opportunities, Cameron did not 
demonstrate an awkward or fabricated disposition towards women or ethnic groups. 
He positively engaged with both groups. In 2007, he appointed five women to his 
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shadow cabinet, in contrast to the 12:1 ratio in Michael Howard’s shadow cabinet. In 
May 2007, Cameron stayed overnight with a Muslim family in Balsall Heath in 
Birmingham in order to understand the issues that ethnic communities faced. 
Cameron posted a photo journal as well as writings on his Web profile entitled 
‘Webcameron’ detailing his experience and engagement with the ethnic community. 
Photos of this period demonstrated Cameron’s relaxed disposition and positive 
engagement with the Muslim family he stayed with (see Appendix J). Chapter 5 on 
the Westminster context refers to the importance of photos in terms of leadership 
image. Cameron used the self and photographic imagery to political effect. 
 
Cameron’s discursive and performative engagement with women and ethnic 
communities started to inflect the party’s previous disposition towards minority 
communities. He appealed to the values of tolerance and fairness and started to 
change the image of the party from narrow-minded Conservatism to a party that was 
modern, accepting and outward-looking.    
 
The following section refers to Cameron’s performance relating to sexual equality 
and the effects of this upon the prevailing and traditional disposition of Conservatism. 
 
8.2.3b Commitment to sexual equality 
The first major expression of Cameron’s commitment to equality towards 
homosexuality was in his first conference speech as party leader (4 October 2006). 
In references to the importance of marriage as an institution, Cameron stated: “and 
by the way, it means something whether you’re a man and a woman, a woman and a 
woman or a man and another man” (Cameron, 2006b). The discourse of supporting 
Gay marriages was radical given the party’s previous homophobic disposition 
towards sexuality. By discursively supporting Gay marriages, a position that the party 
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had avoided, Cameron projected the appearance of equality and the acceptance of 
diversity, without overtly endorsing homosexuality; he made reference to 
homosexuality through light humour. Cameron’s disposition towards homosexuality 
can be read as a direct response to the party’s disposition of extremist attitudes 
towards homosexuality, as was expressed in the marginalisation of Michael Portillo 
during the 2001 party leadership campaign. However, and this is crucial, Cameron’s 
discourse on sexual equality was not complemented by performative acts. He did not 
positively engage with the homosexual community or representatives of Gay rights. 
He had started minimally to inflect the discursive disposition of Conservatism relating 
to homosexuality, but not through positive political actions. The party’s attitude 
towards homosexuality remained largely unchanged, or certainly not radically 
challenged.  
 
In summary to this section in which we have identified Cameron’s commitment to 
both gender and his perceived commitment to homosexuality, we can make the 
following point. Cameron’s commitment to gender equality was much easier to 
deploy and personalise than the party’s disposition towards homosexuality. The 
discursive and performative insistence upon gender equality overshadowed the 
commitment to sexuality. Cameron’s engagement with women and ethnic 
communities had positive ramifications for his persona as a modern, responsive and 
pragmatic leader. The lack of progress on sexual equality, however, was an 
illustration that some aspects of New Right Conservatism were still active and 
constituent elements of Compassionate Conservatism. 
 
8.3 Conclusion 
Four conclusions on the performance of David Cameron are made. 
 
 243 
First, in light of our reference to Oakeshott that Conservatism exists as a series of 
dispositions; given that dispositions are nebulous and sometimes incoherent, their 
appearance can be changed relatively easily. The first major expression of 
Cameron’s relationship to Conservatism was in his leadership speech to the party 
conference against his rival, David Davis on 4 October 2005. In the speech, 
Cameron outperformed Davis and, subsequently, started to inflect Conservatism in a 
subtle way. He did so by appealing to traditional Tory values of fairness, 
responsibility and moral duty. The appeal to such values that underpinned 
Compassionate Conservatism, however, blended Disraelian One Nation and New 
Right Conservatism. By appealing to both, Cameron critiqued neither. During the 
campaign, the values that underpinned ‘Compassionate Conservatism’ were evoked 
in a subtle way and were accepted by party members, as expressed in the party’s 
endorsement of Cameron as party leader on 6 December 2005. As party leader, 
Cameron had a legitimate internal mandate which enabled him to express modern 
Compassionate Conservatism as a complex series of dispositions thereafter. 
 
Second, as party leader from 2005 onwards, through discursive and performative 
actions, Cameron integrated aspects of ‘One Nation’ Conservatism and ‘New Right’ 
Conservatism i.e. pre-Thatcher and post-Thatcher, in order to constitute modern 
‘Compassionate Conservatism’. By integrating two Conservative traditions, by 
discursively blending their dispositions, he had broad appeal and was not 
ideologically isolated within one group. Implicitly, he started to appease the post-
Thatcher factionalism that had characterised the party. Cameron evoked 
‘Compassionate Conservatism’ without renouncing the values of New Right 
Conservatism or the values that characterised One Nation Conservatism.  
 
Third, political trajectory is considered as one of the reasons that none of the post-
Thatcher leaders evoked ‘One Nation Conservatism’ apart from Cameron (and in 
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some respects, John Major). Cameron’s ability to downplay his political trajectory (he 
was special advisor to Chancellor Norman Lamont in 1993 during ‘Black Wednesday’ 
– the day that Sterling was devalued) meant that he was not defined by trajectory but 
managed to present himself as a political outsider. One advantage of being a political 
outsider is that the persona is less developed (apart from ‘outsiderness’). 
Downplaying his political trajectory offered Cameron political advantage and space to 
develop the persona through discursive and performative actions.   
 
Fourth, Cameron’s performances fitted with a political culture which placed emphasis 
upon the personalisation of political actors. His reading of the culture e.g. conflation 
of the public and private realm and celebrity-status of politicians, was reflected in his 
performance during his campaign for leadership of the party and thereafter as party 
leader. Thus he used aspects of the Westminster context to political purpose. 
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9a Overview 
In the following three sub-chapters (9.1, 9.2 and 9.3) we use our analysis of political 
leadership and the elaboration of a framework of political performance to analyse the 
performances of Gordon Brown, David Cameron and Nick Clegg in each of the three 
Leaders’ Debates; we shall concentrate upon the demonstration of the relationship 
between performance and persona, upon the role of persona in performance. The 
insights derived from the interview material on the Westminster context are 
conditions of political performance in the Leaders’ Debates. 
 
Sub-chapter 9.1 takes a detailed approach compared to 9.2 and 9.3 in order to 
provide a full account of the context of the Debate and its performative significance 
for political leadership. The analysis of each political leader in the first Debate (sub-
chapter 9.1) has a tripartite structure. First, we analyse the significance of the 
opening statements and refer to Gladwell’s (2005) assertion that audiences cast 
snap judgements upon actors (see chapter 4, methodology). Second, we analyse the 
ways in which policy is given discursive reality and deployed rhetorically (or not) by 
each political actor. Third, we analyse the relationship of each political actor to the 
audience i.e. immediate studio audience, viewing public and the two opponents.  
 
In sub-chapter 9.2, the second Debate was organised around the theme of foreign 
policy; thus we analyse each leader’s discursive interpolation of foreign policy. 
However, the second Debate thematically diverged from foreign affairs to domestic 
affairs and was more similar to than distinct from the first Debate. Our analysis 
therefore focuses upon one significant moment for each leader which highlighted 
performance and persona.  
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As the third Debate focused on the economy, in sub-chapter 9.3, we analyse the 
relationship of each political actor to the economy and economic policy positions.  
 
As we stated in sub-chapter 3.3, political performance is twofold. First, performance 
is a physical act; including the comportment, gestures, and facial expressions of 
political figures. Second, political performance is verbal and discursive; this includes 
the physical, but stresses the role of language and rhetoric and its deployment to 
political effect. Physical performance can exist without discursive performance (e.g. 
walking into a room), and discursive performance can exist without the physical (e.g. 
a communiqué) but they usually complement each other. So we focus particularly 
upon what is said and how it is said. Bearing this in mind, the practice of 
contemporary British political leadership is increasingly oriented towards not only 
performance in this sense, but also the image and style of political actors. Arguably, 
everything that political actors say and do can be considered as performance and 
therefore as forms of political action which have intended and unintended political 
consequences.  
 
Our analysis of the political actors in the Debates identifies existing persona – that is 
persona at the moment of performance – and appraises the iteration, interpolation, 
counteraction or revision of persona through performance. 
 
Having referred to the cultural significance of the Leaders’ Debates in sub-chapter 
3.1, let us make two brief points on the setting (venue, stage, lectern etc) as offering 
political opportunities and/or constraints. (Appendix K pictures all three political 
actors at the first Debate).  
 
First, the three Debates were hosted by different broadcasters: ITV, Sky and the 
BBC. Each broadcaster decided upon the location of the Debate and stage design. In 
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all three Debates, each political leader had a lectern; the proximity between the 
actors was a matter of stage design for each broadcaster and did impact upon 
political performance, as we shall see in the following three sub-chapters. 
 
Second, each Debate was themed i.e. the first focused upon domestic affairs, the 
second on foreign affairs and the third on the economy. Each Debate offered 
opportunities to discursively emphasise policy positions, and equally fashion the 
persona. However, in practice, the second Debate thematically diverged and thus 
limited each political actor’s ability to fashion political persona through the discourse 
of foreign policy.  
 
In sub-chapter 9.4, we conclude our analysis of all three Debates and use our 
analysis of British politics and the practice of leadership to understand the qualitative 
shift in the comportment of the 2010 election compared to that of 2005, including 
analysis of cultural and institutional contexts which have facilitated this shift. 
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9.1 First Leaders’ Debate 
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9.1a Overview 
This chapter analyses the performances of Gordon Brown, David Cameron and Nick 
Clegg within the context of the first Leaders’ Debate which focused upon domestic 
affairs. As follows, we set out a detailed structure of analysis for each leader. Each 
political actor, by virtue of his presence and participation in the live televised Debate 
had a political persona that existed in public consciousness, in part constituted by the 
self, rivals and adversaries, colleagues and the media. This preceding persona is a 
context that is formative to political performance and is referred to. The structure of 
this sub-chapter is as follows: 
 
• (9.1.1) Our analysis of Nick Clegg’s performance throughout the Leader’s 
Debate makes reference to his preceding persona and the role of a political 
outsider. We analyse Clegg’s opening statement (9.1.1a) which exploited the 
distinction within the culture of old and new politics. He gave old and new 
politics discursive reality by using this characterisation to establish dividing 
lines between himself and his rivals. In section 9.1.1b, we analyse Clegg’s 
discursive interpolation of policy and the effect of this upon his persona and 
the persona of his rivals. Section 9.1.1c identifies Clegg’s relationship to the 
audience.  
• (9.1.2) The analysis of Gordon Brown’s performance takes into account his 
premiership and the relentless issue of character and leadership qualities. 
Section 9.1.2a analyses his opening statement and dependency upon the 
language of the economy. We analyse Brown’s appeal to the audience 
through the use of syllogism. Section 9.1.2b analyses his relationship to 
policy in which he attempted to reinstate a previous persona through the 
discourse of healthcare, defence, political reform and education. In section 
9.1.2c we appraise Brown’s relationship to each of the three audiences: 
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immediate studio audience, the viewing public and his political opponents, 
Cameron and Clegg.  
• (9.1.3) Our analysis of David Cameron’s performance in the Debate highlights 
the impact of his preceding persona upon his performance in the Debate. 
Section 9.1.3a analyses his opening statement which made reference to a 
range of issues apart from policy. In 9.1.3b we appraise Cameron’s 
relationship to policy throughout the Debate. In doing so, we identify a) the 
lack of policy detail as confirming the existing weakness in his persona; and 
b) negative references towards Brown and Clegg as a way of deflecting policy 
questions. 9.1.3c analyses Cameron’s relationship to the audience and takes 
into account his reputation as a confident political performer.  
 
We now analyse the performance of each leader and follow the format outlined. The 
order of our analysis follows the sequence of opening statements in the Debate; we 
begin with Nick Clegg, thereafter, Gordon Brown and David Cameron. 
 
9.1.1 Nick Clegg 
Before analysing Clegg’s opening statement, discursive interpolation of policy, and 
relationship to the audience; let us focus upon Clegg’s preceding persona as a 
context to his leadership performance in the Debate.  
 
Prior to the Debate, Nick Clegg, leader of the third largest party in Britain, had 
struggled to assert himself as a credible political actor and as a site of political 
authority within his party and within the polity. We can identify five reasons for this. 
First, the dominance and authority of his deputy leader and shadow chancellor, Vince 
Cable, during the initial global financial crisis of late 2008 and throughout 2009, 
meant that Cable was perceived as a site of wisdom and political authority and 
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overshadowed Clegg (in fact, he overshadowed virtually everyone at certain 
moments). Second, the lack of ideological distinction between party policies meant 
that the Liberal Democrat party found difficulty in occupying a policy position that was 
distinct from Labour and Conservative. Third, the two-party dichotomy between 
Labour and Conservative has been a dominant feature of British politics and 
therefore limited the voice of the third party. Fourth, the media had not given Clegg or 
his party the same level of attention as Labour or Conservative, with the exception of 
Vince Cable. The conjuncture of the above contributed to the lack of visibility that 
Clegg had within the polity and beyond. Fifth, and perhaps most significant of all, 
Nick Clegg’s political persona prior to the Debate was virtually non-existent. His 
political image as it existed, moreover, came close to ridicule with his revelation of, 
arguably, sexual promiscuity in an interview for men’s magazine GQ in March 2008 
in which Clegg admitted to having slept with “no more than 30 women” (Clegg, 2008). 
Clegg’s youthful appearance and good looks reinforced his admission, but made him 
seem laddish and vain. Perhaps sexually successful but politically lightweight. Such a 
frank admission highlighted political inexperience and projected Clegg as enjoying a 
nominal title as party leader but not as a site of political authority within his party and 
within the polity. Moreover, Clegg had misjudged the culture within the polity; had 
Clegg been a political leader in a polity such as France, the admission of a highly 
active sex life might in fact have elevated his status and authority. The revelation in 
Britain did not enhance his status, especially given that he was married with small 
children. 
 
The inclusion of Clegg in the Debates meant that he had a ‘stage’ and ‘voice’ of 
equal significance to Brown and Cameron which provided space for his political 
persona to emerge and manifest itself within national consciousness.  
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Like David Cameron, Nick Clegg lacked political experience; he became leader of the 
Liberal Democrat party in 2007. Liberal Democrat party policies pursued ‘liberalism’, 
namely, opposition to the invasion of Iraq, electoral and constitutional reform which 
favoured proportional representation, emphasis upon civil liberties and environmental 
issues. Although Clegg was vocal in the immediate aftermath of the Expenses 
Scandal, his policy assertions (reforming political institutions) did not have positive 
ramifications for his persona as party leader. He was a party leader nominally but 
commanded little political authority, even attention. 
 
The analysis of Clegg in the Debate will enable us to appraise the emergence of 
Clegg’s persona and the role of the political outsider. We begin by analysing his 
opening statement.  
 
9.1.1a Opening statement 
Clegg’s statement was the first utterance of the debate. This offered political 
advantage in that he had some scope as the first speaker to frame the terms of the 
Debate and nature of the political exchanges between the three participants, but also 
as the first speaker and the least known, was the most ‘noticed’ of the three leaders. 
More importantly, Clegg had the opportunity to assert himself as a credible political 
actor as well as shape the character and image of his rivals.  
Clegg’s opening statement was as follows:  
“I believe the way things are is not the way things have to be. Now 
you’re going to be told tonight by these two that the only choice you 
can make is between two old parties who’ve been running things for 
years. I’m here to persuade you that there is an alternative. I think 
that we have a fantastic opportunity to do things differently for once. 
And if we do things differently we can create a fair society, the fair 
country we all want. A fair tax system, better schools, an economy 
no longer held hostage by greedy bankers. Decent open politics. 
Those are the changes I believe in. I really wouldn’t be standing 
here tonight if I didn’t think they were all possible. 
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So don’t let anyone tell you that the only choice is old politics. We 
can do something new. We can do something different this time. 
That’s what I’m about, that’s what the Liberal Democrats offer”  
(Clegg, 2010a).  
 
As a political outsider, Clegg used the opening statement to effect. He emphasised 
discourses of old and new politics that existed within the culture and gave them 
discursive reality. In doing so, Clegg used this characterisation to establish dividing 
lines between himself and his rivals as well to define the political leaders in the 
debate, including himself. He referenced his political rivals, Brown and Cameron, as 
“these two” or as “two old parties who’ve been running things for years”, and implied 
that they represented old politics. The characterisation of Brown and Cameron as 
more similar to than distinct from one another had the function of dissociating Clegg 
from them both. The political outsider, by virtue of his definition, was less well known 
than Brown or Cameron and therefore represented new politics. In the case of Clegg, 
being less well ‘known’ was a political advantage as he was able to distance himself 
from both Brown and Cameron who were well known and therefore at a 
disadvantage as their persona was much more developed than Clegg’s. Clegg 
presented the audience with a bold choice: old versus new politics, with Clegg the 
embodiment of the latter. Physically, as Clegg’s lectern was positioned to the left of 
both Brown and Cameron, he gestured ‘old politics’ e.g. when referring to Brown and 
Cameron as “these two” he used his left hand to present the audience with the 
opponents which represented ‘old politics’ (see Appendix L). The synchronisation 
between the physical and the discursive performance appeared to be genuine in that 
the physical reinforced the discursive and vice-versa. Clegg’s use of contrastive pairs 
e.g. old and new politics, was effective as he was able to fashion the persona of his 
rivals as well as himself. 
 
Throughout the opening statement, Clegg had projected himself as a political leader 
who was able to articulate his opinions, someone who was at ease with performance 
 255 
and not intimidated by his rivals. Clegg’s comportment illustrated self confidence. He 
looked straight into the camera, in doing so, he established an unmediated 
relationship with the viewing public and created a sense of perceived immediacy 
between speaker and audience which is often the basis of imagined relationships 
between leader and led. Throughout the opening statement, Clegg spoke slowly and 
projected the publicly perceived character traits of honesty, reflection, thoughtfulness 
and sincerity. 
 
By the end of the opening statement, Clegg had physically and discursively 
established dividing lines between old and new politics. He had fashioned the image 
of his rivals and portrayed them as representing old politics. The appeal to ordinary 
voters to “do things differently for once” was an appeal to the immediate and viewing 
audience to participate in new and open politics which depended upon him. Clegg’s 
political persona as a straight talking politician and as a site of political authority was 
starting to emerge and manifest itself. 
 
We now turn to the second part of our analysis of Clegg’s performance in the Debate 
and appraise his relationship to policy. 
 
9.1.1b Relationship to policy 
In a somewhat similar way to Cameron, prior to the Debate, Clegg lacked ‘policy 
depth’. The format of the Debate and its emphasis upon domestic affairs was an 
opportunity for Clegg to project policy depth and gravitas.  
 
Throughout the Debate, Clegg continuously made reference to policy. He outlined a 
range of Liberal Democrat policy positions and critiqued the policy trajectories and 
current policies of both Labour and Conservative parties. Clegg’s discursive 
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interpolation of policy throughout the Debate counteracted the previous image of him 
as lacking policy depth. For the purposes of space, the following four examples 
illustrate the way in which Clegg showed awareness of policy and, by making 
continuous reference to Liberal Democrat policy positions, he projected policy depth 
and breadth: 
 
• In response to a question on immigration, Clegg endorsed restoring exit 
controls and proposed regional immigration similar to that of Australia and 
Canada. Clegg also proposed an amnesty for illegal immigrants. 
• On Law and Order, Clegg proposed more police on streets which would be 
funded by scrapping Identity Cards and deploying the £3Billion worth of 
savings to frontline public services. 
• In response to how to improve Education, Clegg proposed an ‘Education 
Freedom Act’ which would ban government from micro-managing schools 
and proposed smaller class sizes and a National Curriculum based upon the 
Swedish Education system. 
• In response to a question on long term choices on economic stability, Clegg 
proposed a radical Defence policy to get rid of the costly £100 Billion Nuclear 
Missile, Trident. On the issue of Trident, Clegg reinforced the sameness of 
Brown and Clegg as they both opposed his policy position; he stated “I think 
the world has moved on and you two need to move with it”. As a cost saving 
measure, this policy position fitted with the Liberal Democrat Party trajectory 
which pursued liberalism and soft as opposed to hard power. Clegg’s 
discursive interpolation of Defence policy was striking given that prior to the 
Debate he had been a political outsider.  
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Clegg demonstrated a positive relationship to policy by detailing policy positions e.g. 
outlining policy costs, savings and implications, endorsing Liberal Democrat policies 
by making reference to other polities which had deployed similar measures. When 
discursively referencing policy, physically Clegg appeared to be relaxed and not 
intimidated by his rivals. He was at ease with the format of the Debate and did not 
stutter or hesitate when speaking; moreover, he did not have a dependency upon his 
notes as did Cameron and Brown. In addition to Clegg’s invention of policy depth and 
breadth through the discourse of education, defence, law and order or immigration, 
he used policy to differentiate himself from his opponents. Policy was used to negate 
and portray both Brown and Cameron as outdated and tired; and to establish the self 
as a site of political authority. To illustrate this we refer to Clegg’s correction of Brown 
who had claimed ownership of reforming the House of Commons and Lords through 
forthcoming referendums and the right to recall MPs. Clegg was asked by the 
moderator to clarify Brown’s assertion, to which he responded:  
“I am absolutely dismayed about this. This is something I actually 
put forward in the House of Commons. We already could have had 
that Law. People could have had the right to sack MPs. Labour MPs 
voted against it. Conservative MP’s didn’t vote” (Clegg, 2010a).  
 
Clegg’s immediate assertion and correction of policy ownership was a brave 
exchange from a political outsider to the prime minister. By claiming that he, Clegg, 
was the leading proponent of reforming political institutions, his exchange with Brown 
raised questions about Brown’s integrity. Physically, Clegg’s comportment illustrated 
disbelief, whilst correcting Brown he answered him directly by looking straight at him, 
eyes wide open and hands out to his sides in disbelief as if trying to comprehend 
something. He also appeared not to be intimidated by Brown as he did not falter at all 
when speaking. Clegg’s correction of policy ownership demonstrated two things: first, 
that he was very attentive during the Debate; second, that he was not intimidated by 
Brown. 
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In summary to this section in which we have appraised Clegg’s relationship to policy, 
we make the following three points:  
 
• Clegg had invented a positive relationship to policy through his comments on 
immigration, law and order, defence or education. By outlining a range of new 
policy positions he had appeared to possess policy depth and breadth. 
Clegg’s insistence upon and defence of Liberal Democrat policy positions 
illustrated that he had a positive relationship to policy as well as confidence 
and self belief.  
• Clegg’s physical comportment when discussing policy was self assured and 
confident; he articulated his opinions well and was not intimidated by his 
rivals. He addressed his opponents and spoke to them directly and was not 
hesitant in speech. 
• Clegg had invented a positive relationship to policy through a range of policy 
discourses. His insistence upon policy detail reinforced his invented 
relationship to policy; he had revised his previous image of lacking policy 
depth. 
 
We now turn to the final area of our analysis of Nick Clegg and appraise his 
relationship to the audience.  
 
9.1.1c Relationship to the audience 
Each political actor in the Debate had three types of audience: the immediate studio 
audience, the viewing public, and the two political opponents. In this section, we 
appraise Clegg’s relationship to each audience.  
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Clegg’s relationship with the immediate studio audience was personal and 
immediate. By referring to questioners by first names he increased the 
personalisation, between himself and the questioner e.g. “Gerard, what I would say 
is…” or “you won't believe this, Jacqueline”. Furthermore, Clegg physically moved 
around the lectern to facilitate dialogue between himself and the questioner; he 
positioned himself so that he faced the questioner and looked directly at them. 
Through the combination of personalised discourse and physical movement, Clegg 
invented and gave the impression of interaction between himself and the studio 
audience; the audience did very little apart from pose the question. Nevertheless, the 
invention of interactiveness as constructed through the physical and the discursive 
was used to project the persona of a leader who was able to have meaningful 
dialogue with a range of followers. In order to reinforce the interaction between 
himself and the questioner, on one occasion Clegg used humour and stated 
“apparently I’m not allowed to ask you questions… so just nod your head”. Clegg 
iterated his positive relationship with the studio audience in his closing statement. He 
referred to the name of five out of the seven questioners and the questions that they 
had posed: “whether it is on the questions from Alan on care, Jacqueline on crime, 
Helen on politics, Joel on schooling, Robert on the deficit, I believe we can answer all 
of those questions”. Naming his questioners was politically significant as it 
demonstrated that Clegg was an attentive listener and had engaged with the 
audience throughout the Debate. Clegg reinforced the five discursive references to 
the questioners by using his hand to gesture where in the audience they were sitting. 
The physical hand gesture reinforced the discourse as well as the illusion of 
interactivity between himself and the audience.  
 
Clegg’s relationship to the viewing public watching the Debate was personal and 
immediate. Throughout the opening and closing statements and the time allocated to 
contest the arguments put forward by opponents, Clegg addressed the viewing public 
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by looking straight into the camera and created an unmediated relationship between 
leader and potential followers and created the illusion of immediacy (see Gaffney, 
2001). The scope for imagined relationships with the viewing public was extended 
beyond the immediate studio audience. Clegg used the physical and the discursive to 
create a sense of immediacy between himself and the studio and viewing audience. 
Throughout the Debate it was clear that Clegg had outperformed both Brown and 
Cameron and had projected himself as representing ‘new’ politics which was based 
upon dialogue with the audience.  
 
Clegg’s relationship with Brown and Cameron throughout the Debate was based 
upon the dichotomy of old and new politics. The use and repetition of such 
references served the function of projecting Clegg as the political outsider who 
embodied new politics. Clegg’s interventions and characterisations of Brown and 
Cameron as being more similar to than distinct from one another occurred when both 
Cameron and Brown were debating policy positions; for example, “I don’t know about 
you but the more they argue the more they seem alike” or “I think the world has 
moved on and you two need to move with it”. Such strategic interventions reinforced 
Clegg’s political status as an outsider who embodied new politics and change. Clegg 
listened attentively to the exchanges of his opponents and reinforced his relaxed 
composure as his head was tilted slightly to the right and his left hand was in his 
trouser pocket. When Clegg was in dialogue with both Cameron and Brown, his 
disposition was relaxed. He faced his opponents directly whilst challenging a range of 
Labour and Conservative policy positions, he was not hesitant in his exchanges with 
them and therefore appeared not to be intimidated by Brown and Cameron. In so 
doing, he appeared to be a confident and measured politician who was able to 
articulate his opinions.  
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Clegg’s performance and relationship to each of the three audiences (studio 
audience, viewing public and the two opponents) was the same throughout the 
Debate. Clegg had used both the physical and the discursive to political effect, he 
had invented an interactive relationship with the studio audience, established an 
unmediated relationship with the viewing public and appeared not to be intimidated 
by his two rivals. Had Clegg’s performance and relationship to each type of audience 
been different, this would have affected the emergence of his political persona. 
We now analyse the performance of Gordon Brown. 
 
9.1.2 Gordon Brown 
Our analysis of Brown’s performance in the Debate focuses on the opening 
statement and appraises his dependency upon the language of the economy and use 
of syllogism. Second, we analyse Brown’s relationship to policy, particularly his use 
of policy to reinstate a previous persona. Third, we appraise Brown’s relationship to 
each of the three audiences: studio audience, viewing public and his two opponents, 
Cameron and Clegg. Let us first make reference to Brown’s persona and its impact 
upon his performance.  
 
Prior to the Debate, Gordon Brown’s persona was that of a deeply unpopular prime 
minister. The persona was constructed or existed in the public mind through a series 
of misguided errors but also bad political fortune. This characterisation of Brown 
within the polity was exacerbated by a hostile press and included an overall and 
somewhat devastating portrayal of him as: unstable, controlling, power-driven, a 
bully, dour, indecisive, lacking in emotional intelligence, and, if this were not enough, 
calculated, and possibly on the edge of a breakdown. Brown had difficulty in revising 
such negative characterisations with the exception of his role in the financial crisis of 
late 2008 which did restore some political and moral authority, moreso internationally 
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than nationally. Post-2008, up to the live televised Debates, Brown’s premiership was 
characterised by a series of negative discussions regarding his character traits and 
suitability as prime minister. The three Debates’ offered political opportunity to 
restore some political authority and status but also constraints e.g. his perceived lack 
of ‘charisma’ and personable character. This chapter analyses his performance in the 
first of the three Debates. 
 
9.1.2a Opening statement 
Brown’s role in the global financial crisis – stabilising the economy and markets 
nationally and internationally through policy making – temporarily enhanced his 
status and authority, more so internationally than nationally. Throughout the opening 
statement, Brown deployed episodic information as a corrective to his current 
negative persona, and sought to re-establish his reputation for micro and macro fiscal 
and economic management. Brown’s opening statement was as follows:  
“These are no ordinary times and this is no ordinary election. We’ve 
just been going through the biggest financial crisis in our lives and 
were moving from recession to recovery and I believe we’re moving 
on a road to prosperity for all. Now every promise you hear from 
each of us this evening depends on one thing, a strong economy 
and this is the defining year. Get the decisions right now and we can 
have everybody better off. Get the decisions wrong now and we 
could have a double-dip recession and because we believe in 
fairness as we cut the deficit over these next few years we will 
protect police, your national health service and we will protect your 
schools. I know what this job involves; I look forward to putting my 
plan to you this evening” (Brown, 2010a).   
 
Brown’s opening statement was constructed around the economy. The insistence on 
the economy emphasised his belief in the integral role of the economy in everyday 
social and political life, and the sense that that is what really mattered.  
 
Brown appealed to his audience through implied syllogism e.g. “a form of reasoning 
in which a conclusion is drawn from two propositions” (Soanes, 2001, p. 920). The 
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first proposition: ‘the economy is important’ is followed by: ‘I am connected to the 
economy’; both propositions lead to the conclusion: ‘I am important’, demonstrated 
below: 
 
Proposition 1: The economy is important: 
“These are no ordinary times” or “every promise you hear from each of us this 
evening depends on one thing, a strong economy”. 
Proposition 2: I am connected to the economy: 
“This is the defining year” or “we’re moving from recession to recovery” or “get the 
decisions right now and we can have everybody better off. Get the decisions wrong 
now and we could have a double-dip recession”. 
Conclusion: I am important: 
“I know what this job involves” (Brown, 2010a). 
 
The syllogism served the following functions: the audience was presented with a view 
of politics that is hinged upon economic policy making. By extension, this highlights 
Brown’s financial expertise and positive and dominant role in the 2008 global 
financial crisis. Moreover, the syllogism projected the following publicly perceived 
character traits: experience, wisdom, ability to grasp complex micro and macro 
economic issues, knowledgeable and pragmatic. Brown had used the opening 
statement to re-establish his reputation for fiscal management and to present himself 
as a credible political leader that could provide economic, social and political stability. 
It is clear, however, from his use of syllogism, that it is Aristotellian logos rather than 
pathos that Brown is displaying in order to persuade others that there is no logical 
alternative to him. 
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9.1.2b Relationship to policy 
Throughout the Debate, Brown used each of the seven questions posed by the 
audience to re-instate his previous decisive and authoritative persona that had 
existed at the time of the global financial crisis. The following eight examples 
illustrate our point:  
 
• In response a question on law and order: “we will continue to fund the police 
force and spending on police will continue to rise so that we have enough 
police there on the beat for you”. 
• On re-establishing the credibility of MPs: “I would cut one thing. I would cut 
the House of Lords not by 10% but by 50%, a small House of Lords directly 
accountable”. 
• On education “we say it’s so important for our country while we cut the deficit 
we will maintain our investment in education per pupil now” or “we’ve got to 
face up to this fact about policy”. 
• On the economy, Brown appealed to the audience by stating “I say to the 
whole audience here and to the nation it is important at this moment to take 
no risk with the economy”. 
• On the armed forces “we use to spend £600 million on Afghanistan three or 
four years ago, it is now £5,000 million this year”. 
• On healthcare “we will use the National Insurance to pay for healthcare, to 
pay for policing and to pay for schools”. 
• In relation to care for the elderly “I want carers to be able to manage their own 
budgets as well”. 
• Brown began his closing statement by stating “I’ve got to come to this central 
problem that we’ve got at the moment. We’ve got to make a decision now 
about how we secure the recovery this year” (Brown, 2010a).  
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Brown used a range of policy positions such as law and order, healthcare, defence 
and education to emphasise his previous authoritative persona; in so doing, he 
deployed economic terminology such as budgets, outlining costs, spending or 
referring to the recovery. Brown’s dependency upon the language of the economy 
throughout the Debate when discussing policy had three functions: first, to remind the 
audience of his reputation for financial management; second, to replace his current 
negative persona with a previous positive one; third, to re-establish the self as a site 
of political authority. By extension, the overuse of economic references also 
highlighted the weaknesses in Cameron’s persona e.g. his negative relationship to 
economic and political policy in comparison to Brown.  
 
In summary, Brown’s relationship to policy throughout the Debate depended upon 
the language of the economy. The emphasis upon quantity and numerics highlighted 
Brown’s knowledge and experience in relation to the economy and his positive role in 
the financial crisis. Brown was attempting to reinstate a previous persona. However, 
the memory of him as saving the financial system from collapse was not a prominent 
memory within the polity, given that it was as if screened from view by the financial 
crisis itself, thus making it difficult to revise his negative persona.  
 
We now appraise Brown’s relationship to the audience.  
 
9.1.2c Relationship to the audience 
Brown’s relationship with the studio audience was at times personal and at other 
times not. Of the seven questions posed by the studio audience, Brown personalised 
his responses on two occasions and named questioners. On one occasion he began 
his response by stating “our questioner”. Physically, Brown did not move around the 
lectern in order to facilitate dialogue between himself and the questioner. At times he 
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faced the questioner, at other times he looked into the camera or depended upon his 
notes. Brown’s lack of personalisation, limited interactivity and dialogue with the 
studio audience throughout the Debate limited the relationship between speaker and 
audience and projected an anti-personal style of communication. However, we 
should add that at the end of the Debate, Brown was the first of the three to walk off-
stage into the audience. He shook hands with the audience and both Cameron and 
Clegg followed suit.  
 
Brown’s relationship with the viewing public was both positive and negative. In the 
opening statement, Brown discursively used the imagined ‘we’ to invent dialogue 
between himself and the audience. However, his physical actions (lack of eye 
contact, not looking straight at the camera, dependency on notes, and lack of facial 
expressions other than a somewhat grim one) contradicted his discursive relationship 
to the audience. The lack of synchronisation between the physical and the discursive 
limited the potential of Brown’s efforts.  
 
Brown’s relationship with his two political opponents was characterised by informality, 
as well as a disagreeable and negative disposition towards Cameron and an 
agreeable relationship with Clegg. Of the three political leaders in the Debate, Brown 
was the first political actor who referred to his opponents by first names. His 
references to Cameron and Clegg as ‘David’ and ‘Nick’ were politically significant as 
they illustrated informality and a lack of hostility towards them. The use of first names 
countered Brown’s perceived dour, hostile, character. More significantly, both 
Cameron and Clegg followed suit and the exchanges between all three political 
leaders from then on were on first name terms. The introduction of informality by 
Brown demonstrated concession, even humility and respect for political opponents. 
Throughout the Debate, however, Brown’s relationship to Cameron was based upon 
exposing the weakness in his persona e.g. a lack of policy depth and gravitas. Brown 
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probed Cameron on the Conservative party policy on deficit reduction, namely, the 
proposed £6Billion worth of spending cuts. Let us look at Brown’s relationship with 
Cameron and the use of humour to criticise Cameron. 
 
Brown was the first of the three political actors to inject humour into the Debate; he 
used sarcasm on three separate occasions to negate and expose Cameron’s 
negative relationship to policy, expose Conservative party funding by Lord Ashcroft, 
and mock Cameron’s election posters:  
• “I’m grateful by the way for David for putting up all these posters 
about me and about crime and about everything else. You know, 
there’s no newspaper editor who has done as much for me over the 
last two years because my face is smiling on these posters. I’m very 
grateful to you and Lord Ashcroft for funding that”. 
• “You can’t airbrush your policies even though you can airbrush your 
posters”. 
• “It’s not question time it’s answer time David” (Brown, 2010a). 
 
Brown’s use of light sarcasm served two functions. First, to negate and expose the 
policy weaknesses in Cameron’s persona. Second, to counteract the negative image 
of Brown that had existed in national consciousness (anti-personal, reserved), and 
project a humorous and sociable political figure. The physical and discursive 
performance of humour: laughter and a relaxed composure: stepping away from the 
lectern or smiling whilst speaking, projected Brown as humourous and light-hearted; 
traits which were the opposite of his publicly perceived character as serious, dour or 
calculated. Brown used humour to project himself as sociable and humorous. 
Brown’s use of humour, however, increased a difficulty that he had i.e. the effect of 
his unfortunately wooden smile. Brown’s use of humour was not a trait that existed 
publicly and appeared to be ‘put on’ as opposed to being natural, and therefore 
negated his character further. 
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Brown’s relationship with Clegg was positive and agreeable compared to his 
relationship with Cameron. Brown expressed his positive relationship towards Clegg 
on three occasions:  
 
• “You see, I agree with Nick, an arbitrary national cap [on immigration] will not 
work”. 
• “You see, I agree with Nick. There’s got to be a right of recall for people who 
are in a constituency and find their MPs corrupt and parliament doesn’t act”. 
• [on care for the elderly] “I agree with Nick, we want consensus on this, we 
want to proceed in a way that every party, that every part of the country is 
with us”. 
 
The endorsement of Clegg elevated his status; he was no longer a political outsider. 
By agreeing with Clegg, Brown implied a positive relationship between the two. In the 
context of speculation of a hung parliament Brown had projected both Labour and 
Liberal Democrats as more similar than distinct from one another. Brown then 
reversed the terms of endorsement. He invented Clegg’s endorsement of him on 
three separate occasions:  
• “I think Nick also agrees with me about a new House of Commons 
and a new House of Lords, properly accountable, with a new system 
of election that will be put to referendum next year”. 
•  “Now, Nick supports me in reforming the House of Commons and 
the House of Lords”. 
• “Where Nick and I are agreed is that to give an inheritance tax cut to 
the 3,000 richest estates in the country, of £200,000 each, the 
biggest manifesto promise that the Conservatives made, is totally 
unfair to the rest of the population of this country” (Brown, 2010a). 
 
Brown’s assertion and suggestion of Clegg’s relationship to him was presumptuous. 
On the issue of political reform, Clegg immediately corrected Brown of policy 
ownership and denied that he agreed with Brown. In so doing, Clegg distinguished 
himself from Brown and any association with old politics. Brown’s agreeable 
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disposition towards Clegg was altered by Clegg’s intervention and assertion of 
difference from Brown. This had negative effects for Brown in terms of policy 
ownership as his integrity as a politician and his moral authority were fragile and the 
subject of criticism by the media commentariat, colleagues and rivals. Being 
countered by Clegg probably had more negative effect than agreeing with him had 
positive effect. 
 
In summary, Brown’s relationship to his two opponents, and the use of first names 
projected informality and a sociable character which contradicted his previous 
character and persona. Brown’s relationship to Cameron existed in part in Brown’s 
use of sarcasm to expose the weaknesses in Cameron’s persona. In contrast, his 
relationship to Clegg was positive and agreeable. In the context of speculation of a 
hung parliament, Brown’s relationship to Clegg can be perceived as strategic and 
presumptuous. Brown’s relationship between himself and Clegg was, however, 
quickly corrected by Clegg himself. We shall conclude Brown’s performance in the 
Debate in sub-chapter 9.4 which concludes all three Debates.  
 
We now appraise David Cameron’s performance in the Debate.  
 
9.1.3 David Cameron 
Cameron’s endorsement as leader of the Conservative party in 2005 was based 
upon his performance against his main opponent, David Davis. Cameron’s speech 
was delivered without notes and was a politically significant moment within the polity 
as it embodied aspects of celebrity and mass appeal. It even set a norm for 
politicians afterwards. From then on, as leader of the opposition, Cameron 
established a reputation as a confident and self assured political performer. As 
opposition leader, Cameron’s relationship to policy was particularly significant for his 
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persona as it demonstrated political inexperience. Prior to the first Debate, Cameron 
performed what seemed to be, a series of policy u-turns and lacked clarity on the 
implications of policy nationally and internationally. The repetition of such actions in 
the first Debate confirmed Cameron’s inexperience and implied a lack of political 
depth compared to his main political rival, Gordon Brown. Additionally, Cameron’s 
self assured manner and wealthy Etonian public school, Oxford University and 
Bullingdon Club background permanently threatened to constitute an image of him as 
privileged and elitist. The Leaders’ Debates offered Cameron an opportunity to revise 
the above persona and project himself as a prime minister-in-waiting who had policy 
depth and vision.  
 
We now analyse Cameron’s performance during the Debate and begin with his 
opening statement.  
 
9.1.3a Opening statement 
Cameron’s opening statement: 
“I think it’s great that we’re having these Debates and I hope they go 
some way to restore some of the faith and some of the trust into our 
politics because we badly need that once again in this country. The 
Expenses saga bought great shame on Parliament and I’m 
extremely sorry for everything that happened. Your politicians, 
frankly all of us let you down. Now there is a big choice at this 
election. We can go on as we are or we can say no, Britain can do 
much better. We can deal with our debts, we can get our economy 
growing and avoid this jobs tax and we can build a bigger society. 
But we can only do this if we recognise we need to join together. We 
need to come together; we need to recognise that we are all in this 
together.  
Not everything Labour has done over the last 13 years has been 
wrong, they have done some good things and I will keep those. But 
we need change and it’s that change that I want to help to lead” 
(Cameron, 2010a). 
 
Unlike the opening statements of Nick Clegg and Gordon Brown, Cameron’s 
statement had no theme or narrative. He acknowledged a range of issues within the 
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space of 1 minute: the Leaders’ Debates, trust in politics, the Expenses Scandal, the 
economy, choice at the election, creating a bigger society, and Labour’s record in 
office. The range of political references was over ambitious within the limited time-
frame. Cameron’s ‘big society’ narrative which had been his guiding political idea up 
to this point was referred to but largely substituted with references to trust in politics, 
the Expenses Scandal and 13 years of a Labour government. Cameron did not use 
the opening statement to outline his ideas on governing Britain; references to the 
past rather than the future situated him with old politics and emphasised Clegg’s 
characterisation of Brown and Cameron as representing old politics. Cameron’s 
opening statement was unlike that of Clegg or Brown. The range of topics alluded to 
meant that the opening statement lacked coherence. Moreover, in terms of 
Gladwell’s (2005) assertion that audiences reach snap judgements, Cameron did not 
present himself as prime minister-in-waiting. His fragmented opening statement was 
similar to his negative relationship to policy. Let us turn to our analysis of Cameron’s 
relationship to policy.  
 
9.1.3b Relationship to policy 
Policy-making, or rather its interpolation, is one avenue through which the political 
persona gains expression in national (and international) consciousness. The focus of 
the first Leaders’ Debate upon domestic affairs provided Cameron with space to 
elaborate a range of policy discourses and to address the policy weakness in his 
persona. Our analysis of Cameron’s relationship to policy has two strands. First, we 
identify the similarity to previous policy dispositions, e.g. an unwillingness to 
elaborate policy detail, specifically, the use of anecdotes as policy substitutes; 
second, we identify the use of negative references towards Brown and Clegg as a 
way of deflecting policy questions. 
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Throughout the Debate, Cameron repeated his previous policy disposition and used 
anecdotes as substitutes for policy detail. The following three examples illustrate this:   
• On immigration: “I was in Plymouth recently, and a 40-year-old 
black man made the point to me. He said ‘I came here when I was 
six, I've served in the Royal Navy for 30 years. I'm incredibly proud 
of my country. But I'm so ashamed that we've had this out-of-control 
system with people abusing it so badly”. 
• On law and order/ drugs misuse: “We’re not really dealing with the 
problem, which is to get these people to confront their problems and 
lead drug-free lives. I even went to a drug rehab recently in my own 
constituency, and met a young man who told me that he committed 
a certain amount of crimes so he could get in front of a judge who 
could then get him a place in a residential rehab centre”. 
• On education: “The Department of Children, Schools and Families – 
a lot of teachers actually call it the Department of Curtains and Soft 
Furnishings because it’s so beautifully done up – they recently spent 
£3 million improving their own building, and putting in a – I’m not 
making this up - a contemplation suite and a massage room. As a 
parent of children at state schools, I want every available penny to 
go with the child into the school so the teacher can actually provide 
great education for our children”. 
 
Cameron’s use of anecdotes demonstrated and confirmed the existing weakness in 
his persona i.e. lack of policy depth and gravitas. The failure to specify policies called 
into question both Cameron’s previous and potential relationship to policy. We should 
add, however, that Cameron’s use of anecdotes was effective overall in that they 
were of the newspaper headline-grabbing type, in spite, perhaps indeed because of, 
their lack of substance; and in subsequent press coverage, some of his points were 
taken up. 
 
Throughout the Debate, Cameron deflected policy questions by personally and 
politically criticising Brown and Clegg. For the purposes of space in this chapter the 
following five examples illustrate our point:  
• “We do need to reform welfare, but again, 13 years have gone by 
when welfare hasn’t been properly reformed”. 
• “Gordon Brown is trying to make you believe he can protect health 
spending, he can protect education spending, he can protect police 
spending. He cannot do any of these things because he’s given this 
country the biggest budget deficit of any developed country in the 
world”. 
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• “I want to see a reformed House of Lords. The House of Lords 
should be predominantly elected. Gordon, you’ve had 13 years to 
sort out the House of Lords. If you’re not happy with the House of 
Lords, if there’s still hereditary peers sitting in the House of Lords. If 
you’re not happy with the House of Lords then why on earth have 
you not done anything about it? You’ve had all this time”. 
• “Let me take Nick back to his manifesto and one pledge that’s in 
there that worried me a lot. My mother was a magistrate in Newbury 
for 30 years. She sat on the bench, and she did use those short 
prison sentences that you're talking about. I’ve got to tell you, when 
someone smashes up the bus stop, when someone repeatedly 
breaks the law, when someone's found fighting on a Friday or 
Saturday night, as a magistrate, you’ve got to have that power for a 
short prison sentence when you’ve tried the other remedies”. 
• “Nick keeps saying he’s being very straight with you. In his 
manifesto is a promise for a £17 billion tax cut. It is a great idea. I’d 
love to do it but we don't have £17 billion for a tax cut” (Cameron, 
2010a). 
 
Cameron’s criticism of both Brown and Clegg brought to the fore his negative 
relationship to policy. The unwillingness to specify Conservative party policies 
illustrated that Cameron still did not have a positive relationship to the policies of the 
party that he represented. His portrayal of both Brown and Clegg as incompetent 
political actors was not striking as Cameron did not present himself as a credible 
alternative, as he did not specify policy detail, implications and costs. 
Throughout the Debate, Cameron avoided policy discussions; in the context of the 
Conservative party £6Billion deficit reduction plan, and upon being probed by Brown 
to specify the nature of such plans, Cameron made only two references to spending 
(and only these throughout the entire Debate): 
• “Let me take on very directly this question of money and public 
spending because I think it’s going to be a common feature right 
through these Debates. How do we fund the public services that we 
need? And I think it’s really important that we start focusing on what 
we get out of the money we put in because if we think that the 
future is just spending more and more money we’re profoundly 
wrong” and “what matters is what comes out”.  
• In response to a question on dealing with the budget deficit without 
damaging economic growth: “This is an absolutely vital question, 
and I’m glad it’s been asked, because we've got to get this 
economy moving. We've got to get this economy growing. What we 
say is save £6 billion in the coming current year in order to stop the 
jobs tax which we think will derail the recovery. Because if you put a 
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tax on jobs, that I think is a jobs killer, it is a recovery killer, it's an 
economy killer” (Cameron, 2010a). 
 
The two examples referred to were the only occasions throughout the Debate in 
which Cameron made reference to economic policy. Our reading of Cameron’s lack 
of policy detail is twofold. First, he seemed unable to grasp economic matters; 
second, he did not seem to perceive the economy as important enough to warrant 
attention.  
 
We should also point out that when economic policy questions were being discussed 
by Brown and Clegg and upon being probed by Brown, Cameron’s physical 
disposition indicated nervousness and lack of self confidence. He started writing 
notes, looked flushed and somewhat flustered when speaking, and moved back and 
forth to the lectern. The inconsistent physical comportment reinforced nervousness 
and weaknesses in his political persona. Cameron’s physical and discursive policy 
performance throughout the Debate contrasted with his self assured manner prior to 
the Debate as well as his reputation as a self assured and confident political 
performer. Cameron’s physical disposition contrasted sharply with that of Nick Clegg 
who appeared to be relaxed, confident and self assured when referring to his party’s 
policies. Such a contrast reinforced Cameron’s uneasiness in relation to policy. We 
refer to the dynamics between all three performers in the conclusion (9.1.4).  
 
Cameron’s avoidance of elaborating Conservative party policies through the use of 
anecdotes or by using policy to negate his two opponents illustrates two things: 
 
• Cameron did not consider policy to be very important, particularly economic 
policy. 
• Cameron used his time allocated to discuss Conservative party policies to 
criticise the policy trajectories and current policies of his two opponents. In so 
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doing, he deflected the attention away from himself momentarily. However, 
the avoidance of policy talk confirmed the existing weakness in his political 
persona.  
 
In summary to our analysis of Cameron’s relationship to policy, throughout the 
Debate, Cameron lacked policy detail and failed to counteract the existing weakness 
in his persona. His relationship to policy and performance of it throughout the Debate 
was negative e.g. lack of policy detail, appearance of nervousness, and lack of self 
confidence. The format of the Debate was not used to revise his persona or to 
elevate his status or authority; instead, the existing weakness in his persona was 
iterated and raised questions regarding his national leadership suitability. Cameron’s 
lack of policy depth created space for his rivals, Brown and Clegg, to outperform him, 
a point we refer to in the conclusion of this sub-chapter.  
 
We now turn to the third aspect of our analysis of Cameron’s performance in the 
Debate and appraise his relationship to the audience. 
 
9.1.3c Relationship to the audience 
Cameron’s relationship to the studio audience, viewing public and his two opponents 
is analysed in this section.   
 
Cameron’s relationship to the studio audience was both positive and negative. 
Cameron followed Clegg’s lead in terms of referring to the questioner by first name 
as well as positioning himself so that he was facing the questioners. However, he did 
not appear to be as confident and relaxed as Clegg; Cameron’s dependency upon 
note-taking and their use when answering questions illustrated a sense of 
nervousness and lack of confidence. Cameron’s use of naming was not as effective 
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as Clegg’s style of addressing the studio audience. Cameron had been outperformed 
by a political outsider; this weakened the perception of him as an astute and self 
assured performer.  
 
Cameron’s relationship with the viewing public was not positive. During the opening 
statement, he did not manage to imply an unmediated relationship with the viewing 
public as Clegg had managed to do. At times, Cameron appeared to be looking into 
the distance, at other times he looked into the camera but also at his notes; the 
inability to establish unmediated contact with the audience was striking as, since 
2005, Cameron had always garnered support and credibility through performance. 
His physical disposition demonstrated nervousness, a lack of self confidence and the 
inability to perform under pressure. The demonstration of nervousness contrasted 
with Cameron’s previously accomplished performances and called into question his 
reputation which had been founded on political performance.  
 
Cameron’s relationship with his two rivals, Brown and Clegg, was critical and 
negative and has been referred to in section 9.1.3b. He deflected policy questions by 
personally and politically criticising his two rivals. His relationship to Brown and Clegg 
was therefore based upon negative exchanges in the form of personal and political 
criticisms. Cameron’s negative disposition towards both opponents deflected 
attention away from him, specifically in terms of policy questions, whilst emphasising 
his lack of policy depth.  
 
In sum, Cameron’s relationship to all three audiences contrasted with his previous 
performances in which he had garnered much audience support through 
performance, was able to confidently outperform his political rivals, and always 
appeared to be relaxed and self confident. Cameron’s inability to consistently perform 
as above enabled his rivals to outperform him. His performance during the Debate 
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confirmed the existing policy weakness in his persona and image instead of revising 
it. By iterating his negative persona he created space for his rivals, Clegg and Brown, 
to outperform him. 
 
9.1.4 Conclusion 
In our main conclusion to all three Debates we will establish and appraise the 
personae of all three political actors and identify the impact of the performances upon 
culture and institutions. To sum up our analysis of the first Debate we make two brief 
points which we then expand in our main conclusion.  
 
Our first point is on the impact of the political outsider. Prior to the Debate, Clegg was 
a political outsider, for many, an unknown, for others, a lightweight. One advantage 
of this status is that the persona is less developed and has not enjoyed the same 
level of attention as Brown or Cameron; the format of the Debate offered Clegg a 
stage that was of equal if not indeed greater significance to his rivals and space to 
develop his persona.  
Our second point is that prior to the Debate, both David Cameron and Nick Clegg 
had a negative relationship to policy. However, Clegg outperformed Cameron by 
inventing a positive relationship to policy i.e. insisting upon making reference to 
Liberal Democrat policies, and showing self confidence when discussing policy. 
Clegg’s self projection as possessing policy depth and breadth highlighted 
Cameron’s lack of policy discussion. Brown also outperformed Cameron on policy. 
The fact that Clegg outperformed Cameron on policy demonstrates three things: first, 
the role of the political outsider can be so significant that it can transform and 
reconfigure the traditional imagined two-party dichotomy in British politics. Second, 
contemporary political discourse has placed emphasis upon the personality of 
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political actors. However, our analysis demonstrates that policy is important and that 
a lack of policy depth can have negative political consequences. Third, the 
synchronisation of the physical and the discursive can have positive ramifications for 
perceived character and persona as we have demonstrated with Nick Clegg. Clegg’s 
performance throughout the Debate established him as a site of political authority. 
Conversely, the disjunction between the physical and the discursive with Cameron 
illustrated nervousness and tension. Cameron’s reputation as a confident political 
performer was revised.  
Our analysis of the first Leaders’ Debate has demonstrated that the unexpected can 
have a dramatic effect upon the process of British politics. Up to this point, Nick 
Clegg had politically and institutionally remained a political outsider. His performance 
in the Debate revised his outsider status to the point that he was viewed as a 
potential Kingmaker in the event of a hung parliament, and of near equal leadership 
status to his rivals.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 279 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9.2 Second Leaders’ Debate  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 280 
9.2a Overview 
In this chapter, we analyse the performances of Gordon Brown, David Cameron and 
Nick Clegg in the second Leaders’ Debate, and demonstrate the relationship 
between performance and persona. The second Debate focused on foreign affairs 
and was hosted by broadcaster, Sky. Our analysis of each leader focuses upon one 
moment in the Debate which had a significant impact upon the political persona. 
Before we set out the structure of our analysis for each political actor, we should note 
that although the second Debate was thematically organised around foreign policy, 
just two out of eight questions posed were exclusively about foreign policy i.e. 
Europe, and Afghanistan and future military action. The remaining six questions were 
on climate change, the Pope visiting Britain, restoring faith in politics, state pensions, 
a future collaborative government of all talents, and immigration; more domestic, 
therefore, than related to foreign affairs. The lack of thematic focus limited scope to 
fashion the persona through the discourse of foreign policy. We set out the structure 
of our analysis of each leader which takes into account the thematic divergence and 
makes reference to the preceding persona that emerged in the first Debate and its 
significance for performance in the second Debate.  
 
Gordon Brown’s performance in the first Debate was based upon his relationship to 
the economy. His insistence and dependency upon the language of the economy 
was used to reinstate a previous persona that existed at the time of the global 
financial crisis. Brown highlighted his relationship to the economy through a range of 
domestic policy positions and used episodic information to emphasise his lead role in 
the financial crisis. Our analysis of Brown’s performance in the second Debate 
followed a similar pattern to his performance in the first Debate, namely, dependency 
upon the economy and use of syllogistic reasoning in his opening statement, as a 
way of garnering support and creating dependency upon him (section 9.2.1). The 
 281 
lack of foreign policy questions limited Brown’s ability to refer to his role in the global 
financial crisis and to reinstate the previous persona; in order to counter the thematic 
divergence, Brown made reference to his role in the financial crisis and to his 
international political capital. We analyse the overuse of self endorsement, and the 
negative impact Brown’s appearing narcissistic had upon the persona. 
 
David Cameron’s performance in the first Debate confirmed the existing weakness in 
his persona, what we have called lack of policy depth and gravitas. Cameron’s 
negative relationship to policy created space for his rivals to outperform him, as was 
the case with both Brown and Clegg. Taking into account the thematic divergence of 
the second Debate from foreign affairs to domestic policy, our analysis of Cameron’s 
performance focuses on his relationship to policy (9.2.2). We appraise one significant 
moment in the Debate in which Cameron illustrates his flippant relationship to policy, 
and focus on a series of exchanges with Brown on the subject of care for the elderly. 
In the exchanges, Cameron committed himself and the party to five policy positions 
which were absent from the Conservative party manifesto. We appraise Cameron’s 
relationship towards policy-making and the negative impact upon the subsequent 
persona.  
 
Nick Clegg had unexpectedly outperformed David Cameron throughout the first 
Debate. An opinion poll conducted immediately after the Debate asked respondents 
who had performed best, Clegg polled at 51% (YouGov, 2010). Clegg’s performance 
had immediately elevated his political status and authority. He became an instant 
‘media darling’ nationally, and to some degree internationally, and enjoyed media 
treatment similar to that of a celebrity. ‘Clegg-mania’ was the term used by the media 
to describe his appeal, which embodied aspects of celebrity. In the first Debate, 
Clegg had invented a positive relationship to policy, he outlined policy detail, costs, 
implications and projected policy depth and gravitas. His policy on the replacement of 
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the nuclear missile, Trident, had been endorsed by four ex-Army Generals in the 
week leading up to the second Debate. The policy endorsement by senior military 
figures had positive effects for Clegg’s persona and emphasised his perceived 
positive relationship to policy. The fact that Clegg was considered to be a threat to 
Cameron resulted in the Conservative party launching an attack upon a range of 
policy positions that Clegg had discussed in the first Debate. The Tory press 
dominated Clegg’s honeymoon after the first Debate and up to the second; and it 
negated Clegg’s policies as well as his character. This is very important as it was 
instantaneous and clearly a reaction to Clegg’s success in the first Debate. The 
negative attacks upon Clegg’s persona continued even on the day of the second 
Debate, as the Conservative party publicly criticised Clegg’s relationship to financial 
donors through the right-wing print media. Clegg’s response was immediate. He 
claimed his innocence by publishing his bank statements just two hours before the 
Debate was due to begin. Such an action eliminated him of any wrongdoing and, 
more importantly, his positive political persona was not revised. The analysis of Nick 
Clegg in the second Debate focuses upon his relationship to policy and the ways in 
which he maintained his positive persona (9.2.3).  
 
As with all three case studies, we appraise the significance of both physical and 
discursive performance. We begin with the order of opening statements and start 
with Gordon Brown, thereafter David Cameron, and Nick Clegg.  
 
9.2.1 Gordon Brown 
The lack of foreign policy questions limited Brown’s ability to refer to his role in the 
global financial crisis and to reinstate a previous persona. To counter this, he made 
reference to himself and his relationship to the economy. We identify Brown’s self 
endorsement throughout the Debate and begin with his use of syllogism in the 
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opening statement (9.2.1a). Thereafter, we identify Brown’s overuse of self 
endorsement throughout the Debate and the negative impact of this upon his 
persona. 
 
9.2.1a Use of syllogism 
Throughout the second Debate, Brown made continuous reference to the self. 
Similar to the first Debate, Brown used syllogism in the opening statement of the 
second Debate; the syllogism depended upon the language of the economy:  
“This may have the feel of a TV popularity contest, but in truth, this 
is an election about Britain's future, a fight for your future, and for 
your jobs. If it’s all about style and PR, count me out. If it's about the 
big decisions, if it’s about judgment, it’s delivering a better future for 
this country, I’m your man. Ahead are huge challenges, delivering 
the economic recovery in jobs, bringing our brave troops safely 
home from Afghanistan, keeping our streets free of terrorism, 
building alliances in Europe against nuclear weapons, against 
climate change, against poverty and to deal with our banks. Now, 
not everyone has the answers, but I say get the big decisions wrong 
and Britain's security and jobs are at risk. Get the big decisions 
right, and we can have a prosperous, fairer, greener and better 
Britain. Like me or not, I can deliver that plan. The way to do it is 
with a majority Labour government” (Brown, 2010b). 
 
Brown’s appeal to the audience based on syllogism in the opening address was as 
follows:  
 
Proposition 1: The economy is important: 
“Ahead are huge challenges, delivering the economic recovery in jobs, bringing our 
brave troops safely home from Afghanistan, keeping our streets free of terrorism, 
building alliances in Europe against nuclear weapons, against climate change, 
against poverty and to deal with our banks”. 
Proposition 2: I am connected to the economy:  
“I say get the big decisions wrong and Britain's security and jobs are at risk”. 
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Conclusion: I am important:  
“Like me or not, I can deliver that plan” (Brown, 2010b). 
 
The syllogism brought to the fore the memory of Brown as chancellor and 
emphasised his role in the financial crisis; it also sought to reinstate a previous 
persona, garner support and credibility and create dependency upon him. 
Throughout the opening statement Brown looked into the camera and addressed the 
wider viewing public. Both Brown and Cameron copied Clegg’s performance from the 
first Debate; in doing so, they followed the political outsider who had outperformed 
them both. Such changes on the part of both Brown and Cameron only served to 
enhance Clegg’s image still further.  
 
Brown’s overuse of references to the self and the negative impact upon the 
subsequent persona is as follows.  
 
9.2.1b Self endorsement 
Throughout the Debate, Brown repeatedly endorsed himself. For the purposes of 
space in this chapter the following six examples illustrate our point:  
• “I worked with the European leaders through the global financial 
crisis. I had to persuade them that we had to restructure our banks 
and they had to restructure their banks. I had to persuade them they 
had to work with America in the G20, but when Europe and America 
works together, we are so much stronger”. 
• “I persuaded the Americans to be part of the G20 that dealt with the 
banking crisis and I’m still pushing the Americans to take action on 
climate change as well”. 
• “We are trying to get an economic recovery. That depends on 
economic recovery, depending on Germany, France and other 
countries growing as well”. 
• “I think what people want is us to solve the employment problem, 
the economic problem and get on with the job. I need to work with 
these other countries in Europe – President Sarkozy, Chancellor 
Merkel. David’s walked away from the European People's Party, 
which is an alliance of the centre, progressive parties in Europe, and 
gone in with a group of right-wing extremists. I want to work with the 
 285 
sensible people in Europe to get jobs for our British economy. If we 
don’t trade with Europe, we lose jobs, we lose businesses, we lose 
growth. Let's make sure our priority trading with Europe, sorting out 
the problems of the European Union, yes, but let’s make sure we 
get a recovery that’s stronger than ever”. 
• “In discussions on the United Nations: We are stronger, we’ve just 
been chairman of the G20 as a result of the efforts we made in the 
economy”. 
• On energy: “There is no British-only solution and David has to face 
up to that. You’ve also got to face up to the fact that the co-
operation we've achieved, 100 countries have now signed carbon 
emission reduction plans. We’re trying to persuade China and 
America to do so. We need America on our side”. 
• “I persuaded the Americans to be part of a G20 that dealt with the 
banking crisis and I’m still pushing the Americans to take action on 
climate change as well. But, David, I mean, your anti-Europeanism 
becomes more and more obvious as this debate goes on. It is the 
big society at home, but it’s the little Britain abroad. I think you’ve 
got to rethink your policies” (Brown, 2010b). 
 
Brown’s references to the self brought to the fore his previous persona; highlighted 
his experience and also implied that his rivals did not have policy depth to deal with 
fiscal management. However, the overuse of references to the self e.g. “I worked 
with European partners”, “I persuaded the Americans”, “I had to persuade them…”, 
and “I need to work with these other countries in Europe” all had a negative impact 
upon his persona. The expression of past achievements implied narcissism. 
Theoretically, the use of the self can offer both positive and negative political 
outcomes; in the case of Brown, the use of the self confirmed the negative media 
refraction of his personality as expressed in the public realm, and this through its 
unexpectedness, as if the non-personal Brown was reminding his audience of his 
persona. We argued in the previous sub-chapter that Brown’s use of syllogistic 
reasoning was like a logical compensation for the lack of projection of self. In the 
second debate, its use alongside strong although quite clumsy projection of the self, 
seemed only to reinforce a sense of the speaker’s own self regard without creating 
audience empathy with the persona. 
 
We now analyse David Cameron’s performance in the second Debate.  
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9.2.2 David Cameron 
The thematic divergence placed greater attention upon domestic policy than upon the 
agreed theme of foreign policy; this gave Brown greater political opportunity to probe 
Cameron on a range of policy positions, even though it had impeded Brown from 
deploying very much his own international status. Let us look at Cameron’s flippancy 
towards policy as expressed in a series of exchanges with Gordon Brown on the 
issue of care for the elderly as one significant moment in the Debate which had an 
impact upon Cameron’s persona.  
 
9.2.2a Relationship to policy  
The policy exchanges between Cameron and Brown highlighted Cameron’s policy 
disposition as confirming the existing weakness in his persona: 
GORDON BROWN: “But I’ve got one or two problems with the other 
two manifestos of the other parties. David doesn’t seem to have 
mentioned free prescriptions for the elderly or free eye tests. And to 
be honest, Nick has a problem in his manifesto, because he seems 
to be cutting the budget of the winter fuel allowance this year. I 
would like them to explain to the pensioners of this country what in 
fact they propose to do” (Brown, 2010b). 
 
ADAM BOULTON [Moderator]: David Cameron, your chance. 
DAVID CAMERON: “I just think it is disgraceful to try and frighten 
people in an election campaign, as Gordon Brown has just done, 
and as the Labour Party are doing up and down the country. I would 
like to take this opportunity to say very clearly to any pensioner in 
the audience, anyone listening at home, that we will keep the free 
television license, we will keep the pension credit, we’ll keep the 
winter fuel allowance, we'll keep the free bus pass. Those leaflets 
you have been getting from Labour, the letters you have been 
getting from Labour are pure and simple lies. A politician shouldn’t 
say lies very often, I say it because I have seen the leaflets and they 
make me really very, very angry. You should not be frightening 
people in an election campaign, it is just not right” (Cameron, 
2010b). 
  
GORDON BROWN: I do seem to be right. David did not mention 
free eye tests. 
 
DAVID CAMERON: “Well let me do it right now. We’ll keep them. 
Let me challenge you. Will you now withdraw the leaflets... Will you 
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withdraw the leaflets that are going out round the country saying 
that the Conservatives would take away things like the free bus 
pass? You know, you really should be ashamed of doing things like 
that” (Cameron, 2010b). 
 
During the exchanges with Brown, Cameron committed himself to five policy 
positions on care for the elderly: the free television license, the pension credit, winter 
fuel allowance, free bus pass and free eye tests; all of which were omitted from the 
party’s manifesto. The fact that Cameron had ‘made’ policy during the live Debate 
suggested that he did not have a grip on the policy making process or that he did not 
consider policy to be important to warrant detailed discussion and planning. Cameron 
displayed anger towards Brown in the policy exchange referred to. Cameron’s 
disposition was such that he raised his voice louder than Brown. The intonational 
shift indicated anger; moreover, Cameron appeared to be tense e.g. his shoulders 
were hunched together and not relaxed; he gripped the lectern whilst speaking, 
looked red in the face and starting to perspire. All of this demonstrated his uneasy 
relationship to policy-making; more significantly, it demonstrated his flippancy 
towards policy, and arguably a tendency to display anger.  
 
In summary, our analysis of David Cameron’s performance in the second Debate 
focused upon his relationship to policy. We have demonstrated Cameron’s uneasy 
relationship to policy which confirmed the existing weakness in his persona.  
 
We now appraise Nick Clegg’s performance, specifically his discursive interpolation 
of policy. 
 
9.2.3 Nick Clegg 
Our analysis of Nick Clegg’s performance in the second Debate focuses upon his 
relationship to policy. As the second Debate diverged from the theme of foreign 
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policy, this limited Clegg’s ability to fashion his persona through the discourse of 
foreign policy. He did, however, use the two questions on foreign policy, Europe and 
military action/defence, to highlight his political trajectory and experience. We 
appraise Clegg’s discursive interpolation of foreign policy and defence. 
 
9.2.3a Relationship to policy 
Clegg’s performance in the first Debate demonstrated a positive relationship to policy 
despite being known for a lack of policy depth. In order to maintain the positive 
persona that emerged through performance in the first Debate, in response to a 
question on Europe, Clegg brought to the fore his political trajectory:  
• “I actually worked for the man who was sent by Margaret Thatcher, 
would you believe it, to bat for Britain in Brussels. What I learned 
when I was there was this: the European Union is not perfect – of 
course not. This is a club that took 15 years to define "chocolate" in 
a chocolate directive. Anything that takes 15 years to define 
chocolate is not a model of democratic efficiency. What I also 
learned was this, that there are a whole load of things, whether we 
like it or not, whatever your views on Europe and the European 
Union, which we simply can't do on our own. We can't deal with 
international crime that touches and affects every single community 
in this country on our own. We can’t deal with climate change on our 
own. The weather doesn't stop at the cliffs of Dover. We can't 
regulate these wretched banks that got us into so much in the first 
place which now sprawl across countries. I don’t think the European 
Union is perfect. I want it reformed, that’s why I want to lead in the 
European Union. But we’re stronger together and we're weaker 
apart”. 
• “I worked in my previous life before going into politics for a while as 
a negotiator on behalf of all of us, on behalf of Britain and the 
European Union, negotiating trade deals with the Chinese 
government, the Russian government and others. What I noticed 
there was that the Chinese and the Russians, they only listened to 
what we were saying because I was representing the largest single 
market in the world of 475 million consumers” (Clegg, 2010b). 
 
By highlighting his political experience, Clegg projected depth and gravitas. Cleverly, 
Clegg’s self endorsement did not appear narcissistic, as he made many references 
other than to the self, and he emphasised a positive relationship to policy, as if 
setting himself within a knowing range of policies, events and developments. 
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Moreover, Clegg’s recent political exposure and its positive reception gave the 
persona space to fill out and develop; references to the self were therefore not 
viewed as narcissistic.  
 
We now refer to Clegg’s discourse on defence policy and its use to enhance his 
status and authority. During the one week period from the end of the first Debate up 
to the second Debate, Clegg’s policy positions were criticised mainly by the right 
wing print media, newspapers such as the Daily Telegraph and Daily Mail. His policy 
position on the abolition of the costly nuclear missile deterrent, Trident, was, 
however, endorsed by (some) senior military officials. Clegg made reference to this 
endorsement and thus attempted to maintain his positive relationship to policy. He 
did so on two separate occasions in response to a question on Afghanistan and 
future military action and defence:  
• “I don’t think it’s right to do what both David Cameron and Gordon 
Brown want, which is now to commit, before we need to make a 
decision, to spend up to £100 billion renewing, exactly in the same 
old way, the Cold War Trident nuclear missile system. If you take 
decisions like that, then maybe you can equip our troops so they 
don't get so terribly overstretched, as they were in fighting two wars 
on two fronts in Iraq and in Afghanistan”. 
• “If you don’t believe me, then believe the several generals who 
wrote just this week in a newspaper saying precisely what I have 
been saying all along, why take a decision now to commit that 
amount of money on replacing Cold War nuclear missile system, 
when that system has still got several years to run, when those 
military people themselves say there are cheaper and better 
alternatives, and of course most importantly, when the world is 
changing. President Obama said last week, I think quite rightly, that 
now the greatest threat to us is not the Cold War threats of old, it’s 
terrorists getting hold of dirty bombs, Trident isn’t going to help you 
with that. Let’s move with the times, take decisions when we need to 
take them, and at least have this review, which I talked about, after 
the election and consider everything that is possible” (Clegg, 
2010b). 
 
Clegg’s discourse on defence projected him as a pragmatic, modern politician who 
sought new solutions to new problems e.g. replacing Trident with a cheaper 
alternative that was responsive to new terrorist security threats. Clegg’s reference to 
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President Obama and the (apparent) similarity in policy was an implicit endorsement 
of the Liberal Democrat policy on Trident, and an implicit association of Clegg with 
Obama. Clegg used external endorsements to enhance his status and authority as a 
pragmatic, modern and responsive politician.  
 
9.2.4 Conclusion 
In conclusion to this chapter on the second Debate, we can make two points on self 
endorsement and narcissism. For Brown, of course, the irony was that his 
established persona was a kind of anti-personal persona, this triggering notions of 
narcissism when references to the self start suddenly to multiply. 
 
In the second Debate, both Brown and Clegg made reference to the self. In each 
case, self endorsement had startling political consequences. Brown’s references to 
the self had a negative impact, and implied narcissism. In contradistinction to Brown, 
Clegg’s use of the self was not received as narcissistic; Clegg’s persona was less 
developed and therefore provided him with space to suffuse it with positive 
references. Our wider point on self endorsement and narcissism is that a less 
developed persona can be an advantage and references to the self do not imply 
narcissism. However, if a persona is developed, overuse of the self can imply 
narcissism.  
 
Our second concluding point is that the performance of all three leaders was about 
the same (although weaknesses in Clegg’s persona were beginning to emerge). 
Brown and Cameron performed slightly better than in the first Debate. By the end of 
the second Debate, performatively, all three leaders had rapidly converged, and no 
leader significantly outperformed the other two.  
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9.3 Third Leaders’ Debate  
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9.3a Overview  
The third Debate focused on the economy; in this sub-chapter therefore, we analyse 
the relationship of each political leader to the economy. We set out the structure for 
our analysis of each leader which takes into account the significance of the preceding 
persona that emerged in the first two Debates. We begin in order of opening 
statements, David Cameron, Nick Clegg and Gordon Brown.  
 
In the first two Debates, Cameron’s negative relationship to policy seemed to confirm 
an existing weakness in his persona. In the context of the proposed £6Billion deficit 
reduction plan proposed by the Conservative party, Cameron failed to elaborate a 
suite of economic policies. He deflected policy questions by using anecdotes as 
policy substitutes, and by personally and politically criticising his opponents. 
Cameron’s lack of policy detail created space for both Brown and Clegg to 
outperform him. Our analysis of Cameron’s performance in the third Debate is 
twofold. First, in section 9.3.1a, we focus upon the relationship of his persona to the 
economy; Cameron’s elaboration of policy detail throughout the third Debate was an 
illustration to the audience that the persona now possessed policy depth; he 
therefore appeared to possess some policy depth and gravitas. Second, in section 
9.3.1b, we analyse Cameron’s critique of Brown by formally addressing Brown as 
‘the prime minister’ which, falsely deferential, highlighted Brown’s political trajectory 
and (negatively) associated him with the financial crisis.  
 
Clegg’s performances in the previous Debates – relationship to the audience, 
invention of policy discourses, and characterisation of Brown and Cameron as more 
similar than distinct, were very effective, and revised his status as a political outsider. 
Clegg became an instant media darling; positive endorsement by the media also 
revised Clegg’s political status. His persona as a credible, straight-talking politician 
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was starting to emerge in public consciousness. Our analysis of Clegg’s performance 
in the third Debate identifies his relationship to economic policy (9.3.2a), and his (this 
time less successful) use of the discourse of old and new politics to characterise his 
two opponents (9.3.2b).  
 
Brown’s relationship to the economy in the previous Debates was apparent. He had 
used the language of the economy to highlight his positive role in the financial crisis 
and to reinstate a previous persona. However, Brown’s insistence and dependency 
upon the economy in the first two Debates had negative ramifications for his persona. 
As we have seen, the overuse of self endorsements meant that the persona 
appeared narcissistic. In addition to the negative persona, two days before the third 
Debate, Brown was embroiled in the ‘Duffygate’ scandal. He had met pensioner 
Gillian Duffy whilst canvassing; she raised an issue on immigration to which Brown 
responded pragmatically. However, Brown later referred to Mrs Duffy as a ‘bigoted 
woman’ in a private capacity unknowing that his microphone was still on. The 
disjuncture of Brown’s amicable and engaging conversation with the pensioner, and 
his private remarks emphasised previous negative accusations that Brown had a split 
personality, was a bully, and so on. The Duffygate scandal took place before the third 
Debate and confirmed catastrophically the negative persona that already existed in 
the media and public realm. Taking into account the negative persona that existed 
immediately before the third Debate, we analyse Brown’s publicly perceived 
relationship to the economy. In so doing, we identify references to the self and to his 
leading role in the global financial crisis of 2008 (9.3.3a). In addition to self 
endorsement, we identify Brown’s use of fear and anxiety to create dependency upon 
him. We analyse the impact of narcissism and evoking of fear upon Brown’s already 
negative political persona.  
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We now follow the structure of analysis set out for each leader and begin with David 
Cameron.  
 
9.3.1 David Cameron 
In this section we do two things. First, we analyse Cameron’s relationship to the 
economy. Throughout the Debate, Cameron discursively created a positive 
relationship to economic policy and made continuous reference to Conservative party 
policies and outlined forthcoming policy actions and cost saving measures, but not in 
great detail. By elaborating economic policies, he projected the appearance of policy 
depth, which, arguably, was fragile. Second, we identify Cameron’s use of formality 
to critique Brown. Cameron’s formal address to Brown as ‘the prime minister’ evoked 
the image of Brown as prime minister (and as chancellor) as if responsible for and 
associated with the current financial crisis. There is also a certain mockery in the use 
of Brown’s formal title.  
 
9.3.1a Relationship to the economy 
As we have said, Cameron’s uneasy relationship to policy was highlighted in the first 
two Debates. He countered the weakness in his persona through his discourses on 
the economy, outlining economic policy positions, implications and cost saving 
measures and projected the appearance of policy depth. To illustrate our point, we 
refer to five examples in which Cameron uses the discourse of the economy to 
political effect: 
• In his opening statement Cameron begins with the discourse of the 
economy: “Let me tell you what I would do. First, we’ve got to 
reward work and tackle welfare dependency. Second, we’ve got to 
fix our banks: tax them to get our money back, regulate them 
properly and get the lending again. Third, we’ve got to start making 
things again in this country. It's no policy to just borrow from the 
Chinese and buy goods made in China. Fourth, we’ve actually got to 
get value for money in our public services. I want good public 
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services for everyone, and we can only do that if we save and stop 
the waste. Let me tell you one thing I wouldn’t do: with Greece so 
much in the news, I can guarantee you that I would never join the 
euro, and I’d keep the pound as our currency”. 
• “Let me respond to this point about the £6 billion as directly as I 
possibly can. £6 billion saving this year, so we stop the jobs tax next 
year. That means saving one out of every £100 that the government 
spends”. 
• “The first thing we need to do is actually regulate these banks 
properly. We would put back to the Bank of England the power to 
regulate the banks, including having a big say over the appalling 
bonuses that have been paid. The next thing we need is a bank 
levy. We say don’t wait for the rest of the world, put that levy on now 
to start getting back the money from the banks that so many people 
have had to put in. We also want to see the banks lending again, 
particularly to small businesses, and so we need to make that 
happen. Something else we need to do is this, retail banks, banks 
that you and I put our deposits into, they should not be behaving like 
casinos, taking wild bets. So we agree with President Obama's plan, 
which is actually to say those banks shouldn’t be able to take part in 
the most risky activities. That, I think, would start to get this under 
control, and make sure the banks serve the economy and serve the 
people, rather than the people and the economy serving the banks”. 
• “We want a bank levy to get the money off the banks that all of us 
have had to put into the banks. Do I want to cut taxes on all 
businesses, particularly small businesses to get the economy 
moving? You're damned right I do. We’ve got to get this economy 
moving otherwise we're not going to get the jobs, we’re not going to 
get the investment and the wealth that we need”. 
• “I say after 13 years of a Labour government, there’s a lot of waste 
we can cut out. There are quangos in education that spend £300 
million a year. There's the fact that headteachers get 4,000 pages of 
information a year. The Department of Children, Schools and 
Families spent £3 million on itself, including, and I’m not making this 
up, a massage suite and contemplation room. I know that working in 
this government can be tough, but we don’t need those sorts of 
things. Cut the waste, get the money into the classroom, and please 
stop trying to frighten people” (Cameron, 2010c). 
 
By outlining some detail relating to the proposed £6Billion deficit reduction plan, 
Cameron (at last) projected what we have called policy depth. By prefixing responses 
with “let me tell you… ”, “let me respond to this point… ”, “the first thing we need to 
is… ” or “we want a… ” implied a positive relationship to the question and to 
economic policy.  
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Cameron had used the discourse of the economy to change the appearance of his 
persona; however, the lack of policy detail still implied his previous negative 
relationship to policy e.g. “do I want to cut taxes on all businesses, particularly small 
businesses to get the economy moving? You’re damned right I do” and “so we agree 
with President Obama’s plan, which is actually to say those banks shouldn’t be able 
to take part in the most risky activities. That, I think, would start to get this under 
control”. Cameron’s lack of policy detail did not therefore revise the existing 
weakness in his persona. Physically, Cameron’s disposition when outlining 
Conservative party policies was self assured, confident and relaxed. His body 
language suggested he was relaxed and not tense; his left arm rested upon the 
lectern and his head was tilted slightly to the left; he spoke clearly and did not stutter. 
In contrast, upon being probed by Brown to specify detailed policy proposals, 
Cameron appeared nervous and tense. He started to make notes and looked 
flushed. The contrasting policy disposition indicated that the policy weaknesses in 
Cameron’s persona were still evident. By appearing to possess policy depth, 
Cameron had copied Nick Clegg’s style, his performance therefore appeared 
somewhat rehearsed and not quite genuine, and, more importantly, still vulnerable. 
 
Throughout the Debate, Cameron tried to emphasise a positive relationship to the 
economy, outlining minimal policy detail and cost saving measures. The lack of policy 
detail did not change the appearance of the persona.  
 
We now turn to the second part of our analysis of Cameron and identify his critique of 
Brown, both personally and politically.  
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9.3.1b Critique of Brown 
In the first Debate, Brown introduced informality in addressing political opponents. 
His use of first names was adopted by both Cameron and Clegg and was used by all 
opponents in the first and second Debates. In the third Debate, Cameron addressed 
Brown informally, but also formally. On seven separate occasions, he referred to 
Brown as the prime minister. The use of formality, conversely, evoked a certain scorn 
for the image of Brown as prime minister, reminding the audience of his unpopularity 
and the negative image of his premiership. Brown’s political trajectory as chancellor 
was also highlighted in Cameron’s references to 13 years of a Labour government. 
Moreover, Cameron’s personal and political criticisms of Brown were juxtaposed with 
references to forthcoming Conservative plans. Cameron used the discourse of past 
and present to characterise himself and Brown. The following three examples 
illustrate our point:  
• “What I would say to what the Prime Minister’s just said is that if you 
look at the Labour record over the last 13 years, they did very much 
hitch the whole fortunes of the economy to the City of London. And 
we got into a situation where we ended up with the whole economy 
having to serve the banks rather than the other way around”. 
• “Now, the Prime Minister has just said, I wrote it down, “No life on 
the dole”. But we’ve had 13 years of Labour government and there 
are five million people on out-of-work benefits. There are still three 
million people almost still on incapacity benefit. They have had so 
long to do something about this. Let me give you some positive 
things that we would that would make a difference”. 
• “I’m a little bit unsure about which country Gordon Brown thinks he’s 
Prime Minister of. Because in Britain today, there are actually 
900,000 young people not in employment, not in education, not in 
training. He’s caused record youth unemployment. We’ve seen 
unemployment today 40% higher than when he came to power in 
1997 after the longest and deepest recession in our history. So, to 
talk about as if somehow he’s got a magnificent economic record is 
nonsense” (Cameron, 2010c). 
 
We make one point on David Cameron’s performance in the third Debate. 
Continuous references to economic policies sought to revise the weakness in 
Cameron’s persona. The persona appeared to possess policy depth. However, 
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Cameron’s previous flippant policy disposition still lingered. The appearance of policy 
depth that he had achieved was fragile. 
 
We now analyse Clegg’s performance in the Debate.  
 
9.3.2 Nick Clegg 
In the first two Debates, Clegg had projected a very positive relationship to policy, 
characterised Brown and Cameron as more similar to than distinct from one another 
and had a positive relationship to the studio audience and viewing public. Through 
performance and positive media endorsements, Clegg had revised his status as a 
political outsider. His persona, as a credible, straight-talking politician was starting to 
emerge. Our analysis of Clegg’s performance in the third Debate identifies his 
relationship to the economy and his use of the discourse of old and new politics to 
characterise the actors in the Debate.  
 
9.3.2a Relationship to economic policy 
Throughout the Debate, Clegg had the same policy disposition as in the previous 
Debates e.g. elaborating Liberal Democrat policies, outlining costs and policy 
implications. Subsequently, his invention of policy depth revised his persona further. 
In the third Debate, Clegg’s repetition of previous policy dispositions confirmed the 
persona as possessing policy depth and gravitas. The following three examples 
illustrate our point:  
• “We have set out in our manifesto, you can look at it in the back 
pages, we’ve set out numbers right there, specifying the savings 
that we do think should be made. Set out in much greater detail than 
any other party. £15 billion worth of savings which are a kind of 
upfront down payment to deal with this huge black hole we have in 
our public finances. What are we talking about? Things like 
scrapping the new generation of biometric passports, public sector 
pay restraint, saying the top 20% of recipients of tax credits 
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shouldn’t receive those tax credits so they can be targeted 
elsewhere. I’m saying no to things like the multi-billion pound 
Eurofighter Typhoon project – a defence project. Those are the kind 
of big decisions you need to take”. 
• “Specifically on bonuses, I would say we need to do the following. 
Firstly, it sounds draconian, but I think it's now necessary, we should 
say no bonuses whatsoever for the directors of banks at board 
level… Then I would say absolutely no cash bonuses at all above 
£2,500. And finally, I don't think banks which are making losses 
should be handing out multibillion pound bonuses at all, full stop. No 
bonuses in banks who make a loss. No bonuses for people at 
director level, and no cash bonuses above £2,500. That's specific, 
it’s tough, but it'll finally root out this outrageous abuse of bankers’ 
bonuses”. 
• [On housing] “What do you do about it? I would do three things: 
firstly, there are hundreds of thousands of empty properties in our 
communities boarded up, no doubt there are many in Birmingham, 
too, which I think for a relatively modest amount of money you could 
convert into homes which people could live in. It is just not right, and 
people either can’t afford like you, Anna, or simply can’t find places 
to live in, that we have all these empty properties. We have a plan, 
set out, costed in our manifesto to convert 250,000 empty homes 
into homes that people can live in. Secondly, I would give local 
councils more freedom to borrow against their own assets so they 
can invest in building new homes. And the third thing I would do, all 
these empty flats we see in our city centres, built for one people... 
person, I think they should be converted into the homes that people 
need for young families, like yours” (Clegg, 2010c). 
 
Clegg’s responses to policy questions were detailed and direct. He gave policy 
discursive reality by setting out policy actions e.g. “no bonuses in banks who make a 
loss. No bonuses for people at director level, and no cash bonuses above £2,500”; 
“scrapping the new generation of biometric passports, public sector pay restraint” and 
“we have a plan, set out, costed in our manifesto to convert 250,000 empty homes 
into homes that people can live in”. By prefixing his responses with “I would say we 
need to do the following” or “I would do three things…” Clegg projected transparency, 
and gave the audience the impression that he was honest, transparent and 
forthcoming and present.  
 
Clegg’s reference to his policy on bank bonuses as “draconian” was a projection of 
the publicly perceived self as serious, decisive and pragmatic. Clegg had 
demonstrated a positive relationship to policy throughout the third Debate. His 
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invented relationship to the economy confirmed the preceding persona as 
possessing policy depth and gravitas.  
 
We now appraise Clegg’s characterisation of Brown and Cameron. 
 
9.3.2b Characterisation of opponents  
In the first Debate, Clegg had emphasised discourses of old and new politics that 
existed within the culture and gave them discursive reality. Brown and Cameron were 
characterised as more similar to than distinct from one another. This characterisation 
was successful, in part owing to Clegg’s status as a political outsider. Clegg repeated 
this characterisation in the second Debate. However, his overuse of depicting Brown 
and Cameron as representing old politics had become redundant by the third Debate, 
in part through the now slightly hollow repetition, in part because he himself was no 
longer considered as a political outsider. The characterisation of Brown and Cameron 
as more similar than distinct had been effective, particularly in the first Debate as 
Clegg was an outsider; the revision of his status therefore made such references 
repetitive, irrelevant and redundant. The following eight examples illustrate our point: 
• “Can I try and move beyond the political point-scoring?”. 
• “Surely one of the problems here… Gordon Brown talks about a 
plan in the future, but has no details on it. David Cameron talks 
doing something now, but also has no details”. 
• “After 13 years of Labour, who would have believed it that you 
would have now a tax system where a multimillionaire from the City 
of London, pays a lower rate of tax on their capital gains, that's 
income to you or me, than their cleaner does on their wages. After 
13 years of Labour, we have the bottom 20% of people in this 
country who pay more in tax as a proportion of their income than the 
top 20%. I think we need to change that. David Cameron says you 
can't afford tax giveaways. No, you can’t”. 
• “Here they go again”. 
• “David Cameron has been talking about parties being too close to 
the city. The blunt truth is that both Conservative and Labour 
Governments now for ages have been far too close to the City, 
basically preferring the interests of the one Square Mile of the City 
of London, rather than the 100,000 square miles of the whole of the 
United Kingdom”. 
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• “Maybe I should explain, rather than having David Cameron and 
Gordon Brown, very much in the style of old politics, making 
misleading claims. I think there is a problem. It’s a problem I didn’t 
create, you didn’t create, they created. It was Conservative and 
Labour Governments that created chaos in your immigration system 
so that lots of people came here illegally”. 
• “One of the things we need to do immediately after this general 
election is restore the earnings link in pensions. There’s been a 
huge amount of talk about it from both the old parties about doing 
that, lets get on with it and do it. It was broken some years ago by 
the Conservative government, hasn’t been restored under 13 years 
of the Labour government. Lets get on and do that, David Cameron 
keeps repeating we've got nothing to say. We’re the only party, 
actually, in this general election campaign who've got a plan fully 
costed to get people off benefits and into work”. 
• “Where we disagree is that I have a plan to make sure that taxes 
reward work when you start work. Particularly to get you off benefits. 
David Cameron’s priority is to give tax breaks to double millionaires, 
and Gordon Brown has no plans to lower taxes for people on 
ordinary incomes an ordinary incomes. That's a big difference. 
That’s a big choice” (Clegg, 2010c). 
 
In summary to our analysis of Clegg’s performance in the third Debate, he 
demonstrated a positive relationship to policy and confirmed the preceding persona. 
However, his overuse of the discourse of old and new politics to characterise his 
opponents and himself was not as effective as the first Debate. The revision of his 
political status made such references redundant and irrelevant.  
 
9.3.3 Gordon Brown 
Throughout the Debate, Brown depended upon the language of the economy, as had 
also been the case in the previous two Debates. His use of the self was an attempt to 
reinstate a previous persona that had existed at the time of the financial crisis (2008). 
However, Brown combined self endorsements with negative references about the 
future of the economy, thus possibly creating anxiety in the attempt to create 
dependency upon him. We assess the impact of each upon his persona, which up to 
this point had been very negative. For the purposes of analysis, we refer to three 
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examples in which Brown made reference to the self; thereafter we refer to four 
examples in which he evoked fear and anxiety to create dependency upon the self. 
 
9.3.3a References to the self 
We refer to three examples in which Brown made positive reference to the self:  
• [opening statement] “There’s a lot to this job, and as you saw 
yesterday, I don’t get all of it right, but I do know how to run the 
economy in good times and in bad. When the banks collapsed, I 
took immediate action to stop crisis becoming calamity and to stop a 
recession becoming a depression. As a result of that, Britain is now 
on the road to recovery. But as we meet tonight, economies in 
Europe are in peril, and there is a risk of dragging us into recession. 
So I’m determined that nothing will happen in Britain that will put us 
back in that position, and I want to set out my plan, and why this 
year is so important. Support the economy now, and you will ensure 
that there are jobs and a recovery, and ensure that we can have the 
resources for deficit reduction. Shrink the economy now, as the 
Conservatives would do, and they risk your jobs, living standards 
and tax credits”. 
• “David, I had to nationalise Northern Rock, and we had also to take 
over the Royal Bank of Scotland, and Halifax, Lloyd’s TSB, and the 
reason we did so was to save the savings and deposits of families 
throughout the country, if we hadn’t done that then the banks would 
have collapsed”. 
• “We’ve got to support the recovery until it’s fully established. Then 
my deficit reduction plan, which is a four-year plan, comes into 
place. But take money out of the economy now” (Brown, 2010c). 
 
Brown’s references to his role in the global financial crisis e.g. “I do know how to run 
the economy” or “I took immediate action” and “my Deficit reduction plan” became 
redundant as the persona that was emerging was narcissistic (attention is drawn to 
the ‘I’ drawing attention to the ‘I’. The overuse of the self did not have positive 
ramifications in terms of reinstating his previous persona of late 2008; instead, the 
repetition of self endorsement confirmed the narcissistic persona, and this in the 
context of the crushing blow to his image caused by the Gillian Duffy Affair.  
 
We now refer to four examples in which Brown evoked fear and anxiety amongst the 
studio audience and viewing public in order to create dependency upon him:  
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• “But I do say one thing that is absolutely crucial: don’t believe that 
we can fail to support the economy this year. If we fail to support the 
economy this year, then we risk a double-dip recession, and that’s 
really the problem with the Conservative policy”. 
• “David, for ideological reasons, and you put the recovery at risk. I do 
fear an emergency Tory budget in a few weeks’ time, putting the 
very work we’ve done to secure the recovery in jeopardy, and no 
other country in the world is prepared to do that now”. 
• “But I have to say one thing that is absolutely crucial to the time 
we're in at the moment in this uncertain and dangerous world: David 
is proposing that there be cuts in public spending now - £6 billion - 
and that will shrink the economy at a time when we need to support 
the economy. We cannot afford to lose jobs and businesses and 
lose growth now. We must maintain the recovery and support it, and 
please let us not make the mistake of the 1930s and the 1980s and 
the 1990s, and let us support the economy until the recovery is 
assured”. 
• [Closing statement] “I know that if things stay where they are, 
perhaps in eight days' time, David Cameron, perhaps supported by 
Nick Clegg, would be in office. But I’ve had the duty of telling you 
this evening that while we have policies for the future, the 
Conservatives would put the recovery immediately at risk with an 
emergency budget. I’ve asked David and Nick questions all evening. 
David has not been able to confirm, but it is the case that 
inheritance tax cuts will go to the richest people in the country. I 
believe he’s planning to cut the Schools Budget, and he hasn't 
denied it. I believe also that child tax credits would be cut by both 
parties if they came into a coalition. I believe too that policing would 
be at risk from a Conservative government, because they have not 
said they would match us on policing either. And the health service 
guarantees that we have that gives every cancer patient the right to 
see a specialist within two weeks would be scrapped by the 
Conservative Government if they came into power. I don't like 
having to do this, but I have to tell you that things are too important 
to be left to risky policies under these two people. They are not 
ready for government, because they have not thought through their 
policies” (Brown, 2010c).  
 
Brown evoked anxiety by discrediting the Conservative party policies and their plans 
for the economy. Brown highlighted Cameron’s policy weakness; in so doing, he 
attempted to create dependency upon himself. However, instead of establishing the 
self as a site of political authority, he seemed calculated, almost self obsessed.  
 
In summary to our analysis of Brown’s performance in the third Debate, we make the 
following point. His overuse of the self combined with the evoking of fear confirmed a 
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range of negative character traits that now co-existed in public consciousness with 
other negative traits.  
 
9.3.4 Conclusion 
We conclude the third Debate in the following sub-chapter which concludes all three 
Debates.  
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9.4a Overview 
In sub-chapters 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3 we used our analysis of political leadership and the 
elaboration of a framework of political performance to analyse the performances of 
Gordon Brown, David Cameron and Nick Clegg in each of the three Leaders’ 
Debates. This chapter concludes the performances of all three leaders in the 
Debates and uses our analysis of British politics and the practice of leadership to 
understand the qualitative shift in the comportment of the 2010 election compared to 
that of 2005, including analysis of cultural and institutional contexts which have 
facilitated this shift. We make four concluding points, one point on each political 
leader and one concluding point on the impact of the Debates.  
 
9.4.1 Gordon Brown  
Prior to the televised Debates, Gordon Brown’s persona had become that of a weak 
and indecisive prime minister. His premiership was, in large part, informed by a 
series of relentless attacks upon his character, by cabinet members as well as the 
opposition and media commentariat. Brown did acknowledge that he suffered from 
communication shortcomings, arguably, performative shortcomings that existed 
within a culture that had come to place increasing emphasis upon the performance of 
political leaders. Despite the negative character attacks upon the person and the 
‘persona’ prior to the Debates, Brown emphasised policy and substance as his main 
strengths. His performance in the Debates emphasised policy in order to recapture 
the few positive aspects of the persona. Brown’s overuse of references to the self 
had the opposite effect; instead of reinstating a previous positive persona, he 
emphasised a kind of self referential narcissism which clashed with the received view 
of a character almost lacking in such ‘human’ concerns, and therefore confirmed and 
even worsened the existing negative persona. Re-instating a previous persona can 
be very difficult and can have a series of negative ramifications.  
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9.4.2 David Cameron  
David Cameron’s rise to political fame within and beyond the Conservative party was 
based in great part upon using performance to political effect. As leader of the 
opposition, Cameron iterated the use of political performance and enjoyed an upward 
trajectory in personal poll ratings, mainly, in comparison to Gordon Brown, post-2007. 
Cameron had established a reputation as a confident and self assured political 
performer; however, his persona displayed a certain weakness of ‘weight’ as regards 
policy detail. His performance in the first Debate emphasised his lack of policy depth 
as he deflected policy questions through the use of anecdotes and by critiquing 
Brown and Clegg. In so doing, Cameron provided space for Clegg to outperform him 
and exploit his outsider status.  
 
In the second Debate, Cameron further highlighted his negative and flippant 
relationship to policy; in an exchange with Brown, he confirmed five policy positions 
that were not previously alluded to in the Conservative party manifesto. The lack of 
seriousness towards the policy making process highlighted Cameron’s inexperience 
and questioned his suitability as prime minister. However, in the third Debate, 
Cameron’s insistence upon policy projected some policy depth and gravitas. He did 
not, however, counter or overcome the accumulated weakness in his persona 
through performance in the Debates.  
 
9.4.3 Nick Clegg  
Prior to the Debates, Nick Clegg had failed to assert himself as a site of political 
authority within the Liberal Democrat party and beyond, in part, due to the lack of 
media attention and the two-party dichotomy that characterised British political 
discourse. Possibly the greatest reason, however, was the stunning media status of 
his second-in-command, Vince Cable. Clegg’s inclusion in the Debates was 
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significant as this meant he had a voice that was of equal significance to the two 
main political party leaders. Through performance in the first Debate, Clegg revised 
his outsider status and subsequently outperformed both Brown and Cameron. His 
persona as a modern political leader started to emerge, indirectly adding, in part, to 
Cameron’s status as evidence of a new generation of younger leaders. Clegg’s 
political popularity and media endorsements signified the transformation in his status 
from political outsider to potential Kingmaker role in the event of a hung parliament, 
irrespective of his or his party’s electoral potential. Clegg’s performances in the 
following two Debates were credible in that they maintained the preceding political 
persona; however, his repetition of a political outsider status became ineffective after 
the first Debate, and in fact drew him closer to the caricatures he was sketching of 
his two rivals. The characterisation of Brown and Cameron as more similar to than 
distinct from one another also became redundant as Clegg was now one of them 
through his own performance.  
 
Clegg’s performance in the Debates did, however, have a positive impact upon his 
persona and the perception of him in the public realm. He enjoyed mass exposure 
nationally (and internationally) as a result of the Debates.  
 
9.4.4 The significance of the Leaders’ Debates 
We can make four points on the significance of the televised Debates in terms of 
culture and institutions and impact upon the comportment of the 2010 General 
Election.  
 
First, the initiation and endorsement of the Debates by the media was an example of 
the enormous influence of the media upon the discourse of contemporary British 
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politics. The media as an institution therefore altered the traditional institutions within 
which leaders perform during leadership campaigns.  
 
Second, the acceptance of the Leaders’ Debates illustrated the wider cultural shift 
within the polity towards the strong personalisation of political actors. 
 
Third, Mandelson notes that “the Debates had altered the rhythm of the campaign… 
the media’s view of the parties’ lack of candour on the deficit had closed off any 
meaningful policy debate on the economy” (2011, p. 539). The lack of focus upon the 
economy did not enable Brown to deploy the self to political purpose. Thus iterating 
the media’s ability to frame political action and structure political outcomes. 
 
Fourth, the comportment of the 2010 General Election compared to that of 2005 saw 
political performance and the ‘persona’ used to new effect and purpose. The 
televised Debates altered the discourse of contemporary political leadership in 
Britain, in particular, the 2010 election campaign. The actual effect of these upon 
political outcomes has yet to be fully researched. 
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10a Overview 
This chapter outlines the theoretical and substantive contributions that this research 
has made to the discipline of political science. The research question addressed was: 
 
• Are cultural and institutional configurations significant and consequential for 
contemporary British party leadership performance? 
 
Three related sub-research questions were also addressed. How do political actors 
use the self to political purpose? What is the significance of political actors deploying 
their person and ‘persona’ to affect and structure political outcomes? What is the 
relationship between performance and mediation? 
 
Section 10.1 refers to the framework of political performance as a theoretical 
contribution to the discipline of political science. The application of the framework to 
the case studies has delivered four substantive conclusions on each of the case 
studies (10.2). The findings are presented in section 10.3.  
 
10.1 Theoretical contributions 
Previous research on British political leadership has referred to the relationship of 
culture or institutions to political leadership (Hennessy (2000); Foley (2000); Allen 
(2003); Marquand (2007); King (2009); Bale (2010)) but was less concerned with 
analysing British political leadership performance per se. Leadership biographies e.g. 
Rentoul (2001), Seldon (2007) or Bower (2007) are descriptively rich but have not 
analysed political performance within the context in which it occurs. Some attempts 
have been made to explain the premiership of Tony Blair in terms of an emphasis 
upon personal authority e.g. Hennessy (2000, 2005), Foley (2000), or the interaction 
of personal authority within an institutional context e.g. Shaw (2007) but have not 
 312 
stressed performance per se. A framework of political performance was developed in 
order to answer the research question. The framework is a contribution to theoretical 
knowledge as each constituent part (culture, institutions and performance) has not 
previously been put together in this way to analyse political leadership performance. 
The framework is not limited, however, to polities which place emphasis upon 
leaders; nor is it framed only for polities which emphasise institutional contexts. It can 
be applied to political leaders and aspirant leaders within a range of polities, with a 
range of cultural, institutional and performative characteristics. The framework is 
used to understand politics as performance, and character and persona as political 
phenomena, which are situated within broader and yet specific cultural and 
institutional configurations. The robustness of the framework is expressed in the 
following two diagrams which indicate its general proposition (figure 10.1) and 
application to British political leadership (figure 10.2). 
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Figure 10.1 A framework of political performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Culture 
 
The cultural features of a given 
community such as history and 
traditions, norms and values and the 
way these interact with and 
influence or are influenced by formal 
political institutions and practices. 
 2. Institutions 
 
The institutional configurations within 
the polity as informed by culture and 
history e.g. formal political institutions 
and the media.  
  
 
  
 
3. Performance 
 
The actions, utterances, comportment of 
political figures, informed by personal 
and/or political trajectory, situated within a 
given culture and set of institutions. E.g. 
discursive performances; responses to 
events/performance in crisis moments; 
ideological and/or policy performances; 
and performance to the media.  
 
Key: 
   Evolution of  
   constituent elements 
   
  Application of 
framework 
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Figure 10.2 A framework of British political performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
The application of the framework of political performance to the leadership case 
studies has delivered four substantive contributions to understanding the leadership 
performance of Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and Nick Clegg in the Leaders’ Debates. 
1. Culture 
 
• Personalisation of 
politics including 
celebrity. 
• Shifts in Left/Right 
political ideology. 
 
 
2. Institutions 
 
• Formal political institutional 
configurations: prime minister and 
cabinet; political party. 
• The media as a semi-political 
institution. 
 
  
 
 
3. Performance 
 
The actions, utterances, comportment of political figures, 
informed by personal and/or political trajectory, situated 
within a given culture and set of institutions:  
• Discursive performances: leadership acceptance 
speech, party conference keynote speech, 
announcements, utterances, manifesto launches, 
Prime Minister’s Questions, leaders’ debates. 
• Responses to events/performance in crisis 
moments. 
• Ideological and/or policy performances/Queen’s 
speech.  
• Performance to the media.  
Key: 
    Evolution of  
    constituent elements 
   
   Application of 
framework 
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10.2 Substantive contributions 
10.2.1 Tony Blair 
Tony Blair’s inordinate emphasis upon the publicly perceived ‘self’ both in opposition 
and in government demonstrated that deployment of character and persona is 
context-specific and can have positive but unsustainable political consequences. 
Political ideology, culture and institutions were three contexts that were significant 
and consequential as regards Blair’s leadership performance in the public realm.  
 
Blair’s relationship to political ideology as leader of the Labour party in which he 
embraced Third Way politics emphasised Blair as a moderniser and the catalyst of 
change thus developing his image as a modern leader who gave a traditionally Left 
party fresh appeal. Blair’s use of ideology was context-specific but also a 
performance which emphasised an “actor-centred” trend (see Shaw, 2007) which 
heightened the role of symbolic political leadership in contemporary British politics. 
Blair’s performance as regards political ideology did, for a time, have positive effects 
upon his political persona and image, however, this intensified under different 
circumstances which saw the revision of his publicly perceived character. As 
opposition leader, Blair’s adoption of Third Way politics could be seen as analogous 
to Bill Clinton’s ability to provide the Democrat party with renewed electable appeal. 
Despite obvious cultural and institutional differences in both polities, Blair’s use of a 
Clintonian ideological strategy was acceptable given the Left history of both parties. 
However, Blair’s foreign policy as regards the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and his 
closeness to Republican leader George W. Bush demonstrated a contradiction in 
Blair’s character as regards political ideology and policy orientations. Post-2003, 
Blair’s foreign policy discourses and actions were formative in ending his overlong 
honeymoon period which saw the dramatic fall in his popularity.   
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Blair’s use of culture and institutions simultaneously enabled the symbolism of 
leadership to gain wider expression within the polity. Symbolic politics thus became 
increasingly part of contemporary British politics and was more consequential than 
was hitherto the case. Throughout the Blair premiership, several examples illustrate 
the interdependency (and use) of culture, institutions and performance e.g. the 
triangulation of political cultural ideology as enacted through the institution of the 
party, the integration of celebrity culture within political comportment or garnering 
media endorsements within and outside the polity, all of which enabled Blair’s highly 
personalised style of leadership public expression. The ability to draw upon aspects 
of political culture and use institutional configurations to political purpose did, at least 
for a time, generate positive political support for Blair. The reverse is also true, that 
post-2003, Blair’s overlong honeymoon period ended. Thus we see how culture and 
institutions are inherently linked to leadership and relate to the research question and 
sub-questions. 
 
10.2.2 Gordon Brown 
Cultural and institutional developments within the British polity from the 1990s 
onwards e.g. personalisation and celebrity, the qualitative and quantitative changes 
in the nature and scope of the media and changes in the structure of the Labour 
party in particular highlighted the role that personalisation had assumed in 
contemporary British politics. A personalised polity in which a leadership-centred 
culture had emerged (see also chapter 5), an active 24-hour media and a highly 
personalised style of leadership developed by Tony Blair in which the self was 
deployed to political purpose were contexts of Gordon Brown’s premiership. Brown’s 
relationship to such contexts dominated his premiership positively and negatively.  
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During Brown’s tenure in office, the question of character became predominant and 
relentless; and raised questions as to whether Brown was actually able to cope with 
the question of character and its role as part of the political process. Initially, Brown’s 
deployment of an anti-celebrity narrative did, for a time, have positive political effects 
in terms of his popularity. However, the unresolved question of Brown’s lack of 
political mandate and his attempt to legitimate his premiership began a period of 
intense media scrutiny as regards his character traits and suitability as prime 
minister. As character, personality, celebrity and their mediation had become 
culturally and institutionally embedded, Brown’s inability or reluctance to ‘perform’ the 
dominant cultural and institutional narratives impacted negatively upon his political 
persona, popularity ratings and, very rapidly, premiership. Brown’s negative 
relationship with the media created the conditions in which his status and authority as 
prime minister was questioned on several occasions, including being undermined by 
his own core executive.  
 
Significant and formative parts of Brown’s premiership were characterised by 
negative media reporting to the point that political action and its mediation was 
dominated by the “pack mentality” of the media (Political correspondent, A, see 
chapter 5) and its ability to act in a concerted fashion as regards the projection of 
political character and persona. The mediation of political leadership affects and 
structures political outcomes irrespective of positive political actions. Media reception 
to political persona thus affects political coverage. In the case of Brown, the interplay 
of a personalised polity, changes in the mediation of politics and the legacy of his 
predecessor, had dramatic and negative effects upon his premiership and tenure in 
office. Political leadership is thus culturally and institutionally determined.  
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10.2.3 David Cameron 
Talented personalisation and political performance were the basis of David 
Cameron’s rise within the Conservative party. He used the context of the 
Conservative party and predecessors, in particular, the negative image of the party 
and predecessors in the public realm and ideological traditions of Conservatism to 
political purpose. Both contexts were formative in Cameron’s election as party leader 
and thereafter. Substantively, the emphasis upon performance by a political actor to 
establish the public ‘self’ becomes a precondition of subsequent leadership style. 
From 2005-2010, Cameron’s leadership style was highly personalised and stressed 
performance; the media reception to Cameron was largely positive given his ability to 
personalise the self; positive media endorsements followed with no real emphasis 
upon Cameron’s policy weaknesses. Media reception to political performance and 
persona can structure political outcomes.  
 
Cameron’s leadership style was similar to that of Tony Blair’s in that both deployed 
the self to political purpose and incorporated aspects of culture i.e. integrating 
personalisation and celebrity in political comportment. Both political actors used the 
institution of the political party to performative advantage and created emphasis upon 
the self as the embodiment of change. By deploying modern narratives as regards 
the Labour and Conservative parties, Blair and Cameron symbolised modern politics 
and gave their respective parties renewed appeal. Political performance is a cultural 
phenomenon which takes place within a range of institutional configurations. Political 
performance, particularly as expressed by Tony Blair and David Cameron, reflected 
the ways in which leadership affects cultural and institutional configurations. For 
Cameron, culture and institutions offered performative opportunities to deploy the self 
to political purpose. Cameron altered the image of the Conservative party from 
unelectable to electable, and by changing the image, he helped change the reality. 
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Thus, performance and discourse and, in this case, the institution of the party, were 
performatively linked. 
 
10.2.4 Nick Clegg 
The performance of Nick Clegg in the Leaders’ Debates ahead of the 2010 General 
Election was culturally, institutionally and performatively significant as regards 
contemporary British political leadership. The cultural and institutional phenomena of 
the Debates reflected a personalised political culture and the qualitative and 
quantitative shifts in the media, thus providing Clegg with performative ‘space’ vis-à-
vis Gordon Brown and David Cameron.  Clegg’s highly effective performance was 
based upon his relationship to opponents; it was through discursive interpolation of 
policy and the characterisation of old and new politics that Clegg was able to revise 
his outsider status (and outsiderness) and present the self as a credible political 
alternative. Performance is thus framed by rivals and adversaries and their use to 
political purpose. Clegg’s instantaneous media reception to political persona 
facilitated political popularity. Media reception to performance thus frames political 
outcomes.  
 
At a symbolic level, Clegg’s inclusion in the Debates reconfigured the 
Labour/Conservative dichotomy with a whole series of demonstratable political 
effects. The most significant being Clegg’s centrality regarding the 2010 Election 
result and pivotal role as regards Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition politics 
despite no electoral gain for the Liberal Democrat party under the leadership of 
Clegg.  
 
In the case of Clegg, culture and institutions i.e. the significance of political 
personality within the polity and the format of the Leaders’ Debates afforded Clegg 
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performative space to enable his political persona expression in the public realm. 
Thus culture, institutions and performance are inherently linked and dramatically 
transformed the status of Nick Clegg. The culturally and institutionally determined 
electoral system was also consequential for the prominence of Nick Clegg within the 
British polity post-Leaders’ Debates. 
 
10.3 Findings  
The findings of this research are as follows:  
• Political leadership performance has assumed an integral role in British 
politics.  
• Culture and institutions are contexts which frame political action, providing 
performative opportunities and/or constraints.  
• There are various ways in which political actors deploy their person and 
‘persona’ to affect and structure political outcomes e.g. comportment, 
speeches, interpolation of policy. The media reception of political persona 
affords political actors positive and negative opportunities and constraints. 
The relationship between the media and politics is significant and 
consequential for political outcomes. 
• The relationship between performance and persona is significant; however, 
the mediation of performance and persona in the public realm is not 
controlled by political actors.  
• The most important conclusion from the literature review, interview data and 
case studies is that culture, institutions and performance and inherently 
linked. Political performance cannot be seen in isolation from culture and 
institutions.  
 
 321 
10.4 Summary  
This research was an in-depth examination of contemporary British political 
leadership performance from 1997-2010. The research responded to British political 
leadership literature which lacked emphasis upon performance per se and also 
contributed to the discipline of political science in that the framework of political 
performance can be used in different contexts. The research conducted was a 
detailed account of leadership performance as relating to culture and institutions in 
the contemporary British political context. The findings are particular to the case 
studies but have wider cultural, institutional and performative significance for British 
political leadership. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 322 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 REFERENCES  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 323 
Allen, G. (2003). The Last Prime Minister. Being honest about the UK Presidency. 
Thorverton: Imprint Academic.  
 
Archer, M. (1995). ‘Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach’ In 
McAnualla, S. (2005). ‘Making Hay with Actualism? The Need for a Realist Concept 
of Structure. Politics. Vol, 25, No, 1. pp. 31-38. 
 
Aristotle. (2004). The Art of Rhetoric. Translated by H.C.Lawson-Tancred. St. Ives: 
Penguin Books. 
 
Atkinson, M. (1984). Our Masters’ Voices. London: Metheun & Co.  
 
Atkinson, P & Hammersley, M. (1994). ‘Ethnography and participant observation’. In 
Denzin, Y & Lincoln, Y. (eds). (2000). Handbook of Qualitative Research. 2nd edn. 
Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
 
Bagehot, W. (1867). In Sampson, A. (2004). Who Runs This Place? The Anatomy of 
Britain in the 21st Century. London: John Murray publishers.  
 
Bailey, F.G. (1988). Humbuggery and Manipulation. The Art of Leadership. New 
York: Cornell University Press.   
 
Bale, T. (2010). The Conservative Party. From Thatcher to Cameron. Cambridge: 
Polity Press.  
 
Barber, J.D. (1972). The Presidential Character. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall 
 
BBC (1997). [Online]. Available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/19/newsid_2450000/2450845.st
m (Accessed: 26/10/2008). 
 
BBC. (2006a). [Online]. Available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/4072261.stm (Accessed: 26/10/2008). 
 
(BBC, 2006b) [Online]. Available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/5269750.stm (Accessed: 01/12/2010). 
 
BBC. (2007). [Online]. Available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4717504.stm (Accessed: 26/10/2008). 
 
BBC Poll Tracker. [Online]. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8280050.stm 
 (Accessed: 25/10/2007).  
 
Beckett, A. (2009). When the Lights went out. Britain in the Seventies. London: Faber 
& Faber.  
 
Beech, M. (2009). ‘Cameron and Conservative Ideology’. In Lee, S. & Beech, M. 
(eds). (2009). The Conservatives under Cameron. Built to last? Hampshire: Palgrave 
Macmillan. pp. 18-30. 
Bell, D. S. (2007). ‘Political Leadership: A Framework for Analysis’. (No publication 
details). 
 
Bell, D. S., Hargrove, E. C. & Theakston, K. (1999). ‘Skill in Context: A Comparison 
of Politicians’. Presidential Studies Quarterly. Vol, 23. No, 3. pp. 528-548.   
 
 324 
Berger, P. L. & Luckman, T. (1967). ‘The Social Construction of Reality’. New York. 
Doubleday. In Peters, B.G. (1999). Institutional Theory in Political Science. The ‘New 
Institutionalism’. London: Continuum. 
 
Blaickie, N. (2000). Designing Social Research: The Logic of Anticipation. 
Cambridge: Polity Press.  
 
Blair, T. (1994a). In Campbell, A. The Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume One. 
Prelude to Power. London: Hutchinson.  
 
Blair, T. (1994b). In Campbell, A. The Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume Two. Power 
and the People. London: Hutchinson.  
 
Blair, T. (1995). ‘Blair: In His Own Words’. BBC. 11 May. [Online].  
Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3750847.stm (Accessed: 
02/08/2007). 
 
Blair, T. (1997a). princessWhizz. (2008). ‘Princess Diana’s Death, News Throughout 
the Mourning’.  
Available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MW-TZaw2AAc (Accessed: 
05/12/2008). 
 
Blair, T. (1997b). ‘Tony Blair’s Key Quotes’. The Guardian. 26 April. [Online].  
Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2007/apr/26/tonyblair.labour 
(Accessed: 07/02/2008). 
Blair, T. (1997c). ‘A Chronology of the Conflict - 1998’.  CAIN Web Service. [Online]. 
Available at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch98.htm (Accessed: 07/02/2008).  
Blair, T. (1997d). ‘Address by the Prime Minister Mr. Tony Blair at the Royal 
Agricultural Society Belfast’.  CAIN Web Service. [Online].   16 May.           Available 
at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/tb16597.htm (Accessed: 07/02/2008).  
Blair, T. (1998a) ‘New politics for a new century’. The Independent. [Online]. 21 
September. Available at:  
http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/new-politics-for-the-new-century-
1199625.html (Accessed: 29/10/2008). 
 
Blair, T. (1998b). In Boulton, A. (2008). Tony’s Ten Years. Memories of the Blair 
Administration. London: Simon & Schuster. 
 
Blair, T. (1998c). ‘A Day We Must Treasure’. The Independent. [Online]. 11 May. 
Available at: http://www.independent.ie/national-news/a-day-we-should-treasure-
448312.html (Accessed: 07/02/2008). 
 
Blair, T. (1999a). ‘We must act - to save thousands of innocent men, women and 
children’. The Guardian. [Online]. 23 March. 
Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/1999/mar/23/balkans.tonyblair 
(Accessed: 07/02/2008).  
 
Blair, T. (1999b). In Rentoul, J. (2003). Tony Blair Prime Minister. London: Time 
Warner Books.  
 
 325 
Blair, T. (2000). In Hennessy, P. (2000). The Prime Minister. London: Penguin 
Books. 
 
Blair, T. (2001a). ‘Blair calls for World Fight Against Terror’. The Guardian. [Online]. 
12 September. 
Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2001/sep/12/uk.september11 
(Accessed: 03/10/2007). 
 
Blair, T. (2001b). ‘Full Text: Tony Blair’s Speech (part one). The Guardian. [Online]. 2 
October. 
Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2001/oct/02/labourconference.labour6  
(Accessed: 03/10/2008). 
 
Blair, T. (2002). ‘Statement to the House of Commons. Iraq and Weapons of Mass 
Destruction’. Hansard. 24 Sept. Columns 1-23.  
 
Blair, T. (2003). ‘Full Text: Tony Blair’s Speech’. The Guardian. [Online]. 18 March. 
Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2003/mar/18/foreignpolicy.iraq1 
(Accessed 04/10/2006).  
 
Blair, T. (2010). A Journey. London: Hutchinson. 
 
Blau, P.M. (1964). Exchange & Power in Social Life. New York: John Wiley.  
 
Bolinger, D. 1980. Language, The Loaded Weapon. The Use and Abuse of 
Language Today. Longman Group Limited: Edinburgh Gate, England. 
 
Booth, R. (2006). ‘Cameron plans wind turbine for his roof’. [Online]. Available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/mar/04/politics.greenpolitics 
(Accessed: 15/04/2007).  
 
Borger, S. (2008). ‘Gordon Brown Saves the Banks and Himself’. Spiegel Online 
International. Available at 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,584124,00.html 
(Accessed: 10/11/2008). 
 
Boulton, A. (2008). Tony’s Ten Years. Memories of the Blair Administration. London: 
Simon & Schuster.  
Bower, T. 2007. Gordon Brown Prime Minister. London: Harper Perennial.  
Brown, G. (2007a). ‘Statement at Downing St’. [Online]. 27 June 
Available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page12155 
(Accessed: 01/08/2007). 
Video footage from Downing St. (2007). ‘Prime Minister Gordon Brown arrives at 
Downing Street’.  
Available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?gl=US&hl=uk&v=TezCBzlB3d8  (Accessed: 
01/08/2007). 
 
Brown, G. (2007b). Andrew Marr show. BBC1 Television. 23 September.  
 
Brown, G. (2007c). Andrew Marr show. BBC1 Television. 7 October. 
 
Brown, G. (2008a). ‘Bank shares fall despite bail-out’. BBC. [Online]. 13 October. 
Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7666695.stm (Accessed: 
13//10/2008). 
 326 
 
Brown, G. (2008b). ‘Speech on Global Economy’ Number10.Gov.UK. [Online]. 13 
October. 
Available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/number10.gov.uk/news/speeches-and-
transcripts/2008/10/speech-on-global-economy-17161 (Accessed: 15/10/2008). 
 
Brown, G. (2009a). ‘Ministers Defend Expenses Scandal’  BBC. [Online]. 8 May. 
Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/8039977.stm  
(Accessed 25/10/2009). 
 
Brown, G. (2009b). Speech made to the Royal College of Nursing Conference in 
Harrogate 
Brown, G. (2009c). ‘Campaign for Democracy: I’ll consider anything that makes the 
political elite accountable to citizens’. The Independent. 27 May.  
Brown, G. (2009d) ‘It’s a strange life really’. Guardian Weekend. 20 June.  
 
Brown, G. (2010a). ‘First Prime Ministerial Debate Transcript’ [Online]. 
Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/16_04_10_firstdebate.pdf 
(Acessed 27/04/2010). 
 
Brown, G. (2010b). ‘Second Prime Ministerial Debate Transcript’ [Online]. 
Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/23_04_10_seconddebate.pdf  
(Acessed 01/05/2010). 
 
Brown, G. (2010c). ‘Third Prime Ministerial Debate Transcript’ [Online]. 
Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/30_04_10_finaldebate.pdf  
(Acessed 01/05/2010). 
 
Bryman, A. (2004). Social Research Methods. 2nd edn. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
 
Cable, V. (2007a) (Hansard, 6 Nov 2007. Column 34 and 35). 
 
Cable, V. (2007b) (Hansard 28 Nov 2007 (pt 0003). 
 
Cameron, D. (2005a) ‘Change to Win’, Speech at the Conservative Party 
Conference, 4 October.  
 
Cameron, D. (2005b) ‘A voice for hope, optimism and change’, Leadership 
Acceptance Speech, 6 December.  
 
Cameron, D. (2005c) ‘Until we’re represented by men and women in the country, we 
won’t be half the party we could be’, Speech on candidate selection at Leeds. 12 
December.  
 
Cameron, D. (2006a) ‘We need a greater sense of urgency on climate change’. The 
Independent. 20 April.  
 
Cameron, D. (2006b) Speech to Party Conference. 4 October. 
 
 327 
Cameron, D. (2007a). ‘Where’s the Conservative Reaction?’. Iain Dale’s Diary. 
[Online]. 6 October.  
Available at: http://iaindale.blogspot.com/2007/10/wheres-conservative-reaction.html  
(Accessed: 18/09/2007). 
 
Cameron, D. (2007b). (Hansard, 6 Nov 2007. Column 34 and 35). 
 
Cameron, C. (2010a). ‘First Prime Ministerial Debate Transcript’ [Online]. 
Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/16_04_10_firstdebate.pdf 
(Acessed 27/04/2010). 
 
Cameron, D. (2010b). ‘Second Prime Ministerial Debate Transcript’ [Online]. 
Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/23_04_10_seconddebate.pdf  
(Acessed 01/05/2010). 
 
Cameron, D. (2010c). ‘Third Prime Ministerial Debate Transcript’ [Online]. 
Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/30_04_10_finaldebate.pdf  
(Acessed 01/05/2010). 
 
Campbell, A. & Stott, R. (eds). (2008). The Blair Years. Extracts from The Alastair 
Campbell Diaries. Reading: The Randon House Group Limited.  
 
Campbell, A. (2011). The Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume Two. Power and the 
People. London: Hutchinson.  
 
Chilton, P. (2004). Analysing Political Discourse: Theory and practice. London: 
Routledge.  
 
Clegg, N. (2008). ‘When Piers met Nick Clegg’. [Online]. May 2008. 
Available at http://www.gq-magazine.co.uk/comment/articles/2010-07/23/when-piers-
met-nick-clegg/sex  
(Accessed 03/04/2010).     
 
Clegg, N. (2010a). ‘First Prime Ministerial Debate Transcript’ [Online]. 
Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/16_04_10_firstdebate.pdf 
(Acessed 27/04/2010). 
 
Clegg, N. (2010b). ‘Second Prime Ministerial Debate Transcript’ [Online]. 
Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/23_04_10_seconddebate.pdf  
(Acessed 01/05/2010). 
 
Clegg, N. (2010c). ‘Third Prime Ministerial Debate Transcript’ [Online]. 
Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/30_04_10_finaldebate.pdf  
(Acessed 01/05/2010). 
 
Coates, D. ‘The character of New Labour’. In Coates, D. and Lawler, P. (eds). New 
Labour in Power. Manchester: Manchester University Press. pp. 1-16.  
 
Coleman, J. (1973). The Mathematics of Collective Action. London: Heinemann.  
 
Coleman, J. (1990). Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge: Belknap. 
 
Collier, R. B. & Collier, D. (1991). ‘Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the 
Labour Movement and Regime Dynamics in Latin America’. In Peters, B. G. (1999). 
 328 
Institutional Theory in Political Science. The ‘New Institutionalism’. London: 
Continuum.  
 
Corner, J. & Pels, D. (2003). Media & the Restyling of Politics. London: Sage.  
 
Coulthard, M. (1985). An Introduction to Discourse Analysis. 2nd edn. London: 
Longman.  
 
Cowley, P. ‘Parliament’ In Seldon, A. (ed). (2007). Blair’s Britain 1997-2007. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 16-34. 
 
Cracknell, D. & Schofield, A. (2007). ‘All mouth and no trousers’ The Sunday Times. 
7 October. 
 
Curtice, J. (2007). ‘Elections and public opinion’. In Seldon, A. (ed). (2007). Blair’s 
Britain 1997-2007. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 35-53. 
 
Denscombe, M. (1998). The good research guide for small scale research projects. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Denzin, Y. & Lincoln, Y. (eds). (2000). Handbook of Qualitative Research. 2nd edn. 
Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
 
Dobbin, F. (1994). Forging Industrial Policy: The United States, Britain & France in 
the Railway Age. New York: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Easton, D. (1953). The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science, 
New York: Knopf. 
 
Edelman, M. (1985). The Symbolic Uses of Politics. Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press. 
 
Edinger, L.J. (1976) Political Leadership in Industrialized Societies. Huntington, New 
York: R. E. Krieger Publishers. 
 
Elliot, L & Saeger, ‘A. Spread of banking panic forces ministers to guarantee 
savings’. The Guardian. 18 September 2007. 
 
Evans, E.J. (2004). Thatcher and Thatcherism. 2nd edn. New York: Routledge.  
 
Evans, P, B., Rueschmeyer, D & Skocpol, T. (eds). (1985). Bringing the State Back 
In. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Eyre, R. (1997). Strut and fret up on the hustings. Financial Times. Cited in 
Hennessy, P. (2000). The Prime Minister. London: Penguin Books. 
 
Fairclough, N. (1995). Critical Discourse Analysis: the Critical Study of Language. 
Harlow: Longman.  
 
Fairclough, N. (2001). Language and Power. 2nd edn. Harlow: Longman.  
 
Finlayson, A. (2002). ‘Elements of the Blairite image of Leadership’. Parliamentary 
Affairs. Vol. 55. No. 3. pp. 586-599 
 
Foley, M. (2000). The British Presidency. Manchester: Manchester University Press.  
 329 
Forman, F. N. & Baldwin, N. D. J. (1999). Mastering British Politics. 4th edn. London: 
Macmillan.  
 
Fox, L. (2007) cited in Porter, A. & Harding, T. ‘Gordon Brown’s Basra pullout is a 
stunt’. The Telegraph. [Online]. 3 October.  
Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1564934/Gordon-Browns-
Basra-pullout-is-a-stunt.html (Accessed: 1211/2007).  
 
Franklin, B. ‘The Hand of History: New Labour, News Management and Governance’. 
In Ludham, S. &Smith, M.J. (eds). (2001). New Labour in Government. Basingstoke: 
Macmillan. pp. 130-144. 
 
Freedland, J. (2007). ‘A Contrarian and a Magician’. The Guardian. [Online]. 11 May.  
Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2007/may/11/tonyblair.labour5 
(Accessed: 04/07/2007).  
 
Gaffney, J. (1991). The Language of Political Leadership in Contemporary Britain. 
New York: St. Martins Press. 
 
Gaffney, J. (2001). ‘Imagined Relationships; Political Leadership in Contemporary 
Democracies’. Parliamentary Affairs. Vol, 54. No. 1. pp. 120-133. 
 
Gaffney, J. (2007). ‘The Only Act in Town: Charles de Gaulle’. In Gaffney, J & 
Holmes, D. (eds). (2007). Stardom in Postwar France. New York. Oxford: Berghahn 
Books. pp. 199-216. 
 
Geertz, C. (1999). ‘Thick Description: towards an interpretative theory of culture’. In 
Bryman, A & Burgess, R. (eds). (1999). Qualitative Research, Vol, 3. London: Sage.   
 
Giddens, A. (1984). The Constitution of Society. Cambridge: Polity Press 
 
Giddens, A. (1998). The Third Way. The renewal of social democracy. Cambridge: 
Polity Press.  
 
Gladwell. M. (2005). Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking. New York: Back 
Bay Books 
 
Grainger, J.H. (2005). Tony Blair and the Ideal Type. Exeter: Imprint Academic. 
 
Greene, J. (1994) ‘Qualitative Program Evaluation: practice & promise’. In Denzin, Y. 
& Lincoln, Y. (eds). (2000). Handbook of Qualitative Research. 2nd edn. Thousand 
Oaks: Sage. 
 
Greenstein, F. I. (2000). The Presidential Difference. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Grice, A. (2007). ‘Vision off the menu as PM puts bread-and-butter policies first’. The 
Independent. 7 November. 
 
Grice, A. (2007). ‘Brown’s advisors back push for an early autumn election’. The 
Independent. 27 July. 
Grice, A. (2009). ‘Cameron pays the price of expenses scandal’. The Independent. 
[Online]. 2 June.Available at: 
 330 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/cameron-pays-the-price-of-expenses-
scandal-1694507.html (Accessed: 02/06/2009). 
Grint, K. (2000). The Arts of Leadership. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Hall, P. A. (1986). Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in 
Britain and France. New York: Oxford University Press.  
Hall, P. A. (1993). ‘Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State: the Case of 
Economic Policy Making in Britain. Comparative Politics. Vol. 25, No. 3. pp. 185-196.  
Hall, P. A. & Taylor, R. C. R. (1996). ‘Political Science and the Three 
Institutionalisms’. Political Studies. Vol. 44. No. 5. pp. 936-957.   
Hansard Society. (2009). Audit of Political Engagement 6. London: Hansard Society.  
 
Hargrove, E. C. (1998). Presidential Leadership: Appealing to the Better Angels of 
our Nature. In Bell, D. S., Hargrove, E. C. & Theakston, K. (1999). ‘Skill in Context: a 
comparison of politicians’. Presidential Studies Quarterly. Vol, 23. No, 3. pp. 528-548.   
 
Hay, C. (1999). ‘Continuity and Discontinuity in British Political Development’. In 
Marsh. D. et al (1999). Postwar British Politics in Perspective. Cambridge: Polity 
Press. pp. 23-42. 
 
Hay, C. (2000). ‘What Place for Ideas in the Structure-Agency Debate? Globalisation 
as a ‘Process Without a Subject’. Conference on Ideational Institutionalism: 
Perspectives on European Politics. University of Birmingham, 2-4 June 2000. 
 
Hay, C. (2002). Political Analysis. Basingstoke: Palgrave.  
 
Hay, C. (2008). ‘Constructivist Institutionalism’. In Rhodes, R.A.W., Binder, S. & 
Rockman B.A. (eds). The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. pp. 56-74. 
 
Hennessy, P. (2000). The Prime Minister. London: Penguin Books. 
 
Hennessy, P. (2005). ‘Rulers and Servants of the State: The Blair Style of 
Government 1997-2004’. Parliamentary Affairs. Vol. 58 No. 1. pp. 6-16.  
 
Herbert, N. (2007). ‘Brown announces extra cut of 500 British troops on trip to 
Baghdad’. Times Online. [Online]. 2 October.  
Available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article2572657.ece 
(Accessed: 02/10/2007). 
 
Heywood, A. (2000). Key Concepts in Politics. Hampshire: Palgrave.  
 
Homans, G. C. (1961). Social Behaviour: Its Elementary Forms. Harcourt: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul. 
 
Horspool, D. 2009. The English Rebel. London: Penguin Viking.  
 
Howard, M. (2004). ‘Howard Attacks BNP in Burnley’. Politics.co.uk. [Online]. 20 
February. Available at: http://www.politics.co.uk/news/howard-attacks-bnp-in-burnley-
$27439.htm (Accessed:  12/10/2008).  
 331 
Ingle, S. (2008). The British Party System. 4th edn. London: Routledge.  
 
Jenkins, R. (2001). Churchill. Macmillan: Chatham, Kent. 
 
Jessop, B. (2002). ‘Liberalism, Neoliberalisn & State Governance: A State-
Theoretical Perspective’. Antipode. Vol. 34. No. 3. pp. 452-472.  
 
Judge, D. (2005). Political Institutions in the United Kingdom. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
 
Kane, J. (2001). The Politics of Moral Capital. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.  
 
Katwala, S. (2007). ‘Brown must not stick to his winning formula’. The Independent. 6 
November. p. 27.  
 
King, A. (2009). The British Constitution. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Krasner, S. (1984). ‘Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical 
Dynamics’. Comparative Politics Vol 16, No. 2. pp. 223-46. 
 
Krugman, P. 2008. ‘Gordon Does Good’. The New York Times. [Online]. 12 October. 
Available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/13/opinion/13krugman.htm?_r=2&oref=slogin 
(Accessed: 15/10/2008). 
 
Kuhn, R. (2007). ‘Media Management’. In Seldon, A. (2007). Blair’s Britain 1997-
2007. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 123-142. 
 
Lecours, A. (2005). New Institutionalism: Theory and Analysis. Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press.  
 
Lee, S. (2009). ‘Introduction: David Cameron’s Political Challenges’. In Lee, S. & 
Beech, M. (eds). (2009). The Conservatives under Cameron. Built to last? 
Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 1-17. 
 
Leeuwen, T. (2008). Discourse and Practice: New Tools for Critical Discourse 
Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Letts, Q. (2007). ‘A tale of two leaders: Blair and Brown compared’. [Online]. 
Available at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-462947/A-tale-leaders-Blair-
Cameron-compared.html 
(Accessed: 11/09/2007). 
 
Lewis, P. (2009). ‘Rumours about Gordon Brown’s health fuelled by unproven claim 
on blog’. [Online]. Available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/sep/28/rumours-gordon-brown-health-blog 
(Accessed: 20/11/2009). 
 
Lijphart, (1999). Patterns of democracy: government forms and performance in thirty-
six countries. New Haven: Yale University Press.  
 
Lyall, S. (1997). ‘Blair Meets With Adams, I.R.A. Figure, In Belfast’. The New York 
Times. [Online]. 14 October. 
 332 
Available at http://www.nytimes.com/1997/10/14/world/blair-meets-with-adams-ira-
figure-in-belfast.html (Accessed: 10/12/2008). 
 
MacGregor Burns, J. (1978) Leadership. New York; London: Harper and Row. 
 
Machiavelli, N. (2003). The Prince. Translated by George Bull. London: Penguin 
Books. 
 
Mackintosh, J. P. (1977). The British Cabinet. London: Stevens & Sons Limited.  
 
Major, J. (2007). ‘Brown announces extra cut of 500 British troops on trip to 
Baghdad’. Times Online. [Online]. 2 October.  
Available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article2572657.ece  
(Accessed: 02/10/2007). 
 
March, J. G & Olsen, J. P. (1984). ‘The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors 
in Political Life’. Americal Political Science Review. Vol.78. No. 3. pp. 734 – 749 
 
March. J. G & Olsen, J.P. (1989). Rediscovering Institutions. New York: New York 
Free Press  
 
Marr, A. (2007). A History of Modern Britain. London: Macmillan. 
 
Marwick, A. (2003). British Society since 1945. London: Penguin Books.  
 
Marquand, D. (2008). Britain Since 1918. The Strange Career of British Democracy. 
London: Weidenfelf & Nicolson.  
 
Marquand, D. (2009). ‘Europe’s 1788 moment’. The Guardian. 1 December.  
 
McAnualla, S. (2005). ‘Making Hay with Actualism? The Need for a Realist Concept 
of Structure. Politics. Vol, 25, No, 1. pp. 31-38. 
 
McAnulla, S. (2006). British Politics. A critical introduction. London: Continuum.  
 
McDonnell, J. (2007). ‘Opposition Attacks Labour’s Election Decision’. The 
Telegraph. [Online]. 7 October. 
Available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/labour/1565344/Opposition-
attacks-Labours-election-decision.html (Accessed: 11/10/2007). 
 
Meyer, J & Rowan, B. (1977). ‘Institutionalizing Organizations: Formal Structure as 
Myth & Ceremony’. American Journal of Sociology. 83. pp. 340-363. In Peters, B. G. 
(1999). Institutional Theory in Political Science. The ‘New Institutionalism’. London: 
Continuum. 
 
Meyer, J. W et al. (1987). ‘Ontology & Rationalization in the Western Cultural 
Account’. In Thomas, G et al (1999) Institutional Structure. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.  
 
Miliband, D. (2008) ‘Against all odds we can still win, on a platform for change’. The 
Guardian. 29 July. 
 
Morgan, K. O. (2001). Britain since 1945: the people's peace. 3rd end. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
 333 
Nelson, P. (2002). Discourse Analysis: Investigating Processes of Social 
Construction. Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
 
Neustadt, R. E. (1990). Presidential power and the modern presidents: the politics of 
leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan. New York: The Free Press. 
 
Norton, P. & Aughey, A. (1981). Conservatives and Conservatism. London: Temple 
Smith.  
 
Oakeshott, M. (1978). ‘On Being Conservative’. In Crespigny, A. & Cronin, J. (eds). 
Ideologies of Politics. London: Oxford University Press. pp. 23-54.  
 
O’Grady, S & Morris, N. (2008). ‘At last, the world fights back as one’. The 
Independent. 14 October.   
 
Paige, G.D. (ed). (1972) Political Leadership. London: Free Press: Collier Macmillan. 
 
Paige, G.D. (1977). The Scientific Study of Political Leadership. New York: The Free 
Press of Glencoe. 
 
Parsons, S. (2005). Rational Choice & Politics. London: Continuum. 
 
Peters, B. G. (1999). Institutional Theory in Political Science. The ‘New 
Institutionalism’. London: Continuum. 
 
Perkin, H. (2002). The Rise of Professional  Society. London: Routledge.  
 
Pierson, P. (2004). Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
 
Poguntke, T. & Webb, P.D. (eds). (2005). The Presidentialization of Politics: A 
Comparative Study of Modern Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Powell, W.W & DiMaggio, P.J. (1991). The New Institutionalism in Organizational 
Analysis. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
 
Price, L. (2010). Where power lies. Prime Ministers v the Media. London: Simon & 
Schuster.  
 
Purnell, J. (2009). ‘James Purnell’s Resignation Letter’. The Times. 5 June. 
 
Putnam, R. (with Leonardi, R & Nanetti, R.Y.). (1993). Making Democracy Work: 
Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. In Kane, J. (2001). The Politics of Moral Capital. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Radice, G. (1993) ‘Southern Discomfort’. In Riddell, P. The End of Clause IV, 1994-
95 . Contemporary British History. Volume 11 Issue 2, Summer 1997, pp. 24 – 49.  
Rawnsley, A. (2010). The End of the Party. London: Penguin Books.  
 
Rentoul, J. (2003). Tony Blair Prime Minister. London: Time Warner Books.  
 
Rhodes, R. A. W. & Dunleavy, P. (eds) (1995). The prime minister, cabinet and core 
executive. London: Macmillan.  
 
 334 
Rhodes, R. A. W. (1997). ‘Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, 
Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability’. In Judge, D. (2005). Political Institutions 
in the United Kingdom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Rhodes, R. A. W. (2008) In Rhodes, R.A.W., Binder, S. & Rockman B.A. (2008) 
(eds). The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Preface.  
 
Richards, D. & Smith, M. J. (2002). Governance and Public Policy in the UK. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
 
Riddell, P. (1991). The Thatcher Era and its legacy. 2nd edn. Oxford: Blackwell.  
 
Riddell, P. (1997). ‘The End of Clause IV, 1994-95’. Contemporary British History. 
Vol. 11, Issue 2, pp. 24 - 49 
 
Riker, W. H. (1986). ‘The Art of Political Manipulation’. In Bell, D. S., Hargrove, E. C. 
& Theakston, K. (1999). ‘Skill in Context: A Comparison of Politicians’. Presidential 
Studies Quarterly. Vol, 23. No, 3. pp. 528-548.   
 
Ryley, J. (2009). ‘This Is A Unique Opportunity…’. Sky News. [Online]. 1 September. 
Available at: http://blogs.news.sky.com/editorsblog/Post:69139385-4abb-4ba3-936d-
6aaadfcef4fd (Accessed: 28/09/2009).  
 
Sampson, A. (2004). Who Runs This Place? The Anatomy of Britain in the 21st 
Century. London: John Murray publishers.  
 
Schiffrin, D. (1994). Approaches to Discourse. Oxford: Blackwell.  
 
Schmidt, V. (2006). ‘Institutionalism’. In Hay, C, Lister, M. & Marsh, D. (eds). (2006). 
The State: Theories and Issues. Basingstoke: Palgrave. pp. 98-117. 
 
Schwandt, T. (2001). Dictionary of Qualitative Enquiry. 2nd edn. London: Sage. 
 
Skocpol, T. (1992). Protecting Soldiers and Mother: The Political Origins of Social 
Policy in the United States. Harvard: Harvard University Press.  
 
Scott, J. (2000). ‘Rational Choice Theory’ In Browning, G., Halcli, A. & Webster, F. 
(eds). Understanding Contemporary Society. London: Sage Publications. pp. 126-
138. 
 
Seldon, A. (2004). Blair. London: The Free Press.  
 
Seldon, A. (ed). (2007). Blair’s Britain 1997-2007. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.  
 
Sewell, W.H. (1996). ‘Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology’. In 
Pierson, P. (2000). Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics. 
American Political Science Review. Vol, 94, No, 2, pp 251-266. 
 
Silverman, D. (2000). Doing Qualitative Research: A Practical Handbook. London: 
Sage.  
 
Skowronek, S. (1993). The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams 
to George Bush. Cambridge: Belknap Press. 
 335 
Soanes, C. (2001). (ed). Oxford Paperback Dictionary, Thesaurus and Wordpower 
Guide. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Sparrow, N. (2007). [Online]. ‘Clear Thinking in a Complex World’ Available at  
http://www.icmresearch.com/pdfs/2007_oct_sunday_telegraph_poll.pdf  
(Accessed: 03/11/2007). 
 
Stake, R. E. (1995). The Art of Case Study Research. London: Sage. 
 
Steinmo, S. (1992). Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative 
Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Stubbs, M. (1983). Discourse Analysis: the Sociolinguistic Analysis of Natural 
Language. Oxford: Blackwell.  
 
Theakston, K. (2006). ‘What Makes for an Effective Prime Minister? Annual Meeting 
of the American Political Studies Association.  
 
Thelen, K. (1999). ‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics’. Annual Review 
of Political Science. Vol. 2. pp. 369-404.  
 
Tolbert, P.S. & Zucker, L.G. (1996) ‘The Institutionalization of Institutional Theory’. In 
Peters, B.G. (1999). Institutional Theory in Political Science. The ‘New 
Institutionalism’. London: Continuum.  
 
The Guardian [online]. (2003). ’10 ways to sex up a dossier’. Available at  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2003/sep/27/uk.davidkelly1 
(Accessed: 15/04/2007). 
The Guardian [Online]. (2008). ‘Banking crisis timeline’. Available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/oct/08/creditcrunch.marketturmoil 
(Accessed: 12/10/2008). 
 
The Telegraph. [Online]. (2008). ‘David Cameron: A Prime Minister in Waiting’. 
Available at  
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/telegraph-view/3562521/David-Cameron-a-
prime-minister-in-waiting.html 
(Accessed: 12/10/2008).  
 
van Dijk, T.A. & Kintsch, W. (1983). Strategies of Discourse Comprehension. 
London: Academic Press.  
 
van Dijk, T.A. (2008). Discourse and Context: A Sociocognitive Approach. 
Cambridge: University Press. 
 
Vinen, R. (2009). Thatcher’s Britain: the Politics and Social Upheaval of the 1980s. 
London: Simon and Schuster.  
 
Viner, K. (2009) ‘It’s a strange life really’. Guardian Weekend. 20 June.  
 
Weber, M. (1947) The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. Translated by 
A.M.Henderson & Talcott Parsons. London: The Free Press of Glencoe. 
 
Wells, A. (2005). ‘Good and Bad News for David Davis’. Available at 
http://ukpollingreport.co.uk/blog/archives/90  
(Accessed : 10/11/2006). 
 336 
 
Wilson, G.K. (2007). ‘A Blair Era? The Political Order of Modern Britain’. The Forum. 
Vol. 5, Issue 3, Article 2. pp.1-13.  
 
Wodak, R. & Meyer, M. (2001). (eds). Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis. 
London: Sage.  
 
Woodward, W. (2007). ‘Brown faces first cabinet criticism as Johnson attacks 
election dithering’. The Guardian. 11 October. p. 6.  
 
Yin, R. (2003). Case Study Research. Design and Methods. 3rd edn. Thousand Oaks: 
Sage.  
 
YouGov. [Online]. (2010). First post-Debate poll from YouGov. Available at  
http://www.politicshome.com/uk/article/7926/first_post_debate_poll_from_yougov_big
_win_for_clegg.html  
(Accessed: 15/04/2010).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 337 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 338 
Appendix A  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 339 
Interview consent form 
 
Thesis title: Political Leadership: Character & Performance. A Comparative Analysis 
of British Political Leadership, 1997-2010.  
 
Supervised by: Professor John Gaffney. School of Languages & Social Sciences. 
Aston University, Aston Triangle, B4 7ET. Email: j.gaffney@aston.ac.uk 
 
Purpose of the research:  
The focus of Amarjit’s research is the elaboration not of a framework of political 
leadership per se but of political persona. Having established the elements of a 
political persona, for example, that of Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, David Miliband, 
Vince Cable or David Cameron Amarjit will then apply the framework to 1) establish 
the character traits and other aspects of a politician’s political persona; and, 2) to 
appraise the role of and effects of the political persona in the political process. An 
essential element of a politician’s political persona is his/her discursive persona. 
Amarjit is particularly interested therefore on how the discursive persona is created 
on the basis of speeches supplied by speechwriters. The focus of Amarjit’s research 
is also concerned with image more generally and the relationship of audience/s to the 
imagined personae of politicians, and the role of symbolic politics. 
 
Interviewee participation:  
I understand that I have the right to agree or disagree with the digital recording of this 
interview. Where interviewees do not agree to be recorded they will be asked to sign 
the interviewer’s notes in order to verify their accuracy. Where interviewees agree to 
the recording of the interview, the final written work may include quotations from the 
interview; the research follows Chatham House rules and all quotations will be non 
attributable and your personal identity as a research participant will remain 
anonymous at all times  
A copy of the thesis will be made available upon completion. 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any 
given time.  
 
Consent: 
 
I agree to participate in this study and GIVE PERMISSION for 
this interview to be recorded. 
 
 
I agree to participate in this study and DO NOT GIVE 
PERMISSION for this interview to be recorded. 
 
 
 
 
Signature:………………………………….. 
 
Date:………………………………………... 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 340 
Appendix B  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 341 
Front page of The Sun newspaper (18 March 1997) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Available at 
http://www.channel4.com/news/articles/politics/domestic_politics/the%2Bsun%2Bdro
ps%2Bsupport%2Bfor%2Blabour/3365897.html (Accessed: 15 June 2007).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 342 
Appendix C  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 343 
Tony Blair’s arrival in office 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tim Rooke/Nils Jorgensen/Rex Features (1997). [Online]. 
Available at: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/mar/29/cool-britannia-g20-blair-brown 
(Accessed: 15 June 2007).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 344 
Appendix D  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 345 
‘Cool Britannia’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Naden, R. (1997) Tony Blair and Noel Gallagher at the famous Downing Street 
reception [Online]. 
Available at: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/music/musicblog/2007/may/10/whathappenedtorockunder
bl (Accessed: 15 June 2007).  
 
 
 
 
 346 
Appendix E  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 347 
Tony Blair’s statement in response to the death of Princess Diana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Available at: http://www.labour-network.co.uk/blair/images/tbgdiana1.png (Accessed: 
15 June 2007).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 348 
Appendix F  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 349 
Gordon Brown’s first utterance as prime minister   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Berehulak, D. (2007) Getty Images [Online] 
Available at:  
http://www.life.com/image/74939611 (Accessed: 30 June 2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 350 
Appendix G  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 351 
Gordon Brown and Sarah Brown 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Macdiarmid, P. (2007). New Prime Minister Arrives at Downing Street. Getty Images 
News. [Online]. 
Available at:  
http://www.zimbio.com/pictures/Zg6SBzARXGe/New+Prime+Minister+Arrives+10+D
owning+Street/2wqis3GdEVy/Sarah+Brown (Accessed: 30 June 2007).  
 
 
 
 
 
 352 
Appendix H  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 353 
David Cameron delivering his speech for party leadership 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vincent, B. (2005). Conservative Party Conference in Blackpool. Getty Images. 
[Online]. 
Available at: 
http://www.life.com/image/55849345 (Accessed: 17 October 2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 354 
Appendix I  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 355 
David Cameron visits Norwegian Glacier 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Parsons, A. (2006). David Cameron in Norway. [Online]. 
Available at: 
http://politics.guardian.co.uk/gall/0,,1758617,00.html (Accessed: 17 October 2007).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 356 
      Appendix J  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 357 
David Cameron engages with the ethnic community 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Online]. Available at  
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-454158/Cameron-No42-Dave-takes-break-
Asian-family-Birmingham.html (Accessed: 17 October 2007).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 358 
Appendix K  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 359 
First Leaders’ Debate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Getty Images. (2010). [Online]. 
Available at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/election-2010/7596224/Election-debate-audience-
verdict.html (Accessed: 25 April 2010).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 360 
 
Appendix L  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 361 
Nick Clegg as the political outsider  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
McKay, K. (2010). [Online]. 
Available at: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/apr/21/nick-clegg-shocked-leaders-debate 
(Accessed 25 April 2010).  
 
 
 
 
 
